The situation in the southern Syrian province of Suwayda remains extremely volatile and a constant reminder to the new Syrian government that establishing domestic legitimacy must remain a priority, despite how quickly it is gaining in international recognition.
Just days after Syrian Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa flew to Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump and several members of Congress to discuss lifting the Caesar Act sanctions on Syria, clashes erupted between the Syrian security forces and the National Guard that is loyal to the influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri.
The confrontation involved exchanges of mortar fire and various forms of drone combat. The two sides traded accusations of violating the ceasefire agreement brokered by the US and Jordan on 16 September after the previous flareup. Breaches of this agreement are certain to persist unless progress is made on the political track.
A significant gap persists between the two sides. Al-Hajri insists on demands related to autonomy and the right of self-determination for Suwayda. Damascus remains adamant that this province must remain subordinate to central government control, although it is willing to consider a special status for it allowing for a degree of jurisdiction over local affairs.
Suwayda is predominantly inhabited by Druze, while most of the other inhabitants are Sunni communities affiliated with tribal groupings that extend into neighbouring Daraa. Bordered by Jordan to the south, Damascus to the north and east, and Daraa to the west, the governorate does not have the economic resources to sustain a viable form of self-rule.
Nevertheless, a large portion of its population fears that their very existence is threatened by the nature of the new ruling authority in Damascus.
In mid-July, local Druze fighters clashed with tribal militias after Druze traders were kidnapped, robbed, and held to ransom by tribal gunmen on the Damascus-Suwayda Highway. The fighting quickly escalated in tandem with tit-for-tat kidnappings, leading government forces to intervene. However, they were far from neutral and took part in brutal attacks against Druze civilians, leading to hundreds of deaths, the burning and looting of villages, and over 100,000 displaced persons from both sides.
To compound the situation, Israel intervened by striking Syrian government forces on the outskirts of Suwayda to prevent them from reaching Suwayda City. In ostensible “solidarity” with the Druze, Israel bombed military and security sites in central Damascus, including the General Army Staff building.
The Syrian Druze have extensive kinship bonds with the Druze population of the Israeli Occupied Golan Heights, most of whom continue to adhere to their Syrian Druze identity and to reject imposed Israeli “citizenship.” However, the official Druze leader in Israel has been consulting with the Druze in Suwayda over their eventual secession from Syria. Since the overthrow of the former Al-Assad regime last December, Israel has seized control of several hundred more square km of territory in southwestern Syria.
Some Druze groups in the US have been lobbying Congress to oppose the lifting of sanctions on Syria until the problem of Suwayda is resolved. However, Al-Sharaa’s warm welcome in Washington suggests their efforts have failed, which shifts the focus back to developments on the ground in Suwayda.
In August, a Supreme Legal Committee composed of local judges and lawyers was formed in an attempt to form an autonomous government in the governorate. A military-security force called the National Guard was also established. Drawn from local residents and former officers from the Syrian army under Al-Assad, the force is around 20,000 strong and primarily tasked with defending the governorate against government forces. Soon after it was formed, it came into conflict with government forces on the governorate’s western border with Daraa.
Historically, three sheikhs have been recognised as the main spiritual authorities among the Syrian Druze: Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Jarbou’, and Sheikh Hammoud Al-Hannawi. However, recent events have pushed Al-Jarbou’ and Al-Hannawi into the background, elevating Al-Hajri as the dominant leader of Druze affairs.
On 14 November, a group of activists from Suwayda released the Jabal Al-Arab Declaration rejecting extremism and violence from all sides. The declaration called for all those guilty of crimes against civilians to be brought to justice and for the release of prisoners held by all parties. It also rejected all solutions that hinge on foreign backing, especially from Israel.
Although the declaration is a sign of growing frustration at Al-Hajri’s monopolisation of decision-making, the lack of trust in central government continues to hamper progress towards a coherent political agreement.
In an attempt to address this problem, Damascus appointed Sheikh Laith Al-Bal’ous as Suwayda’s security chief. While he enjoys prestige as a leading figure in the Men of Dignity Movement that fought the Al-Assad regime, he does not have the clout to rival the spiritual authority embodied by Al-Hajri.
The latter remains vehemently opposed to the leaders in Damascus, whom he calls “jihadist terrorists.” Al-Bal’ous, in contrast, has worked with these leaders for years, even when they were commanders in the rebranded Al-Qaeda offshoot Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).
Between the local spiritual and military poles represented by Al-Hajri and Al-Bal’ous, the authors of the Jabal Al-Arab Declaration have presented themselves as a civilian alternative that can break the cycle of mutual exclusion between Damascus and Suwayda.
As a possible model, they point to the 10 March Agreement between Damascus and the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Kurdish-controlled enclave in northeastern Syria, although this has not yet been fully implemented. Damascus and some Suwayda leaders had reached similar agreements, most recently in May 2025, but these were repeatedly violated, leading Damascus to intervene militarily.
On 16 November, a commission formed by the Syrian Presidency to investigate the crimes perpetrated against civilians in Suwayda last summer issued its first report. It concluded that members of forces affiliated with the Ministries of Defence and Interior were indeed guilty of some of the atrocities, and several perpetrators were detained after having been identified through video footage.
Stressing the need to bring all those responsible for such crimes to account, the Commission pledged to provide additional reports on the ongoing investigations.
However, it was unable to enter Suwayda to inspect the damage and speak with eyewitnesses as the National Guard has continued to bar all representatives of the government since July. This has led to shortages of food and humanitarian supplies, which the authorities in Suwayda describe as a deliberate blockade intended to deprive the governorate of essential services.
Damascus has countered that the refusal to allow in government representatives or humanitarian convoys unless mediated by the International Committee of the Red Cross or the Syrian Red Crescent is what has slowed the provision of services and aid.
Jordan is expected to follow through on its joint initiative with the US by inviting representatives from Suwayda and the government to meet in Amman to discuss formulas for stabilising the ceasefire and redistributing power.
However, unless a regional initiative backed by the US can bridge the gap between the two sides, mutual distrust will likely retain the upper hand. Damascus may believe it is building trust by prosecuting some human-rights violators, but many followers of Al-Hajri claim the Presidential Commission is little more than a PR stunt and are calling for an international investigative commission instead.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 November, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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