Turkey set an obvious target to accomplish in the coming year: to position itself better as a key player on the global stage. The country brings along various political, military, and technological assets – not least its role as a NATO member and key component of the West’s security architecture. At the same time, it has demonstrated its ability to strike a crucial balance, forging closer ties with Russia and China while preserving its strategic partnership with the US, developing ties with the EU, and expanding relations in its regional environment.
Turkey hopes to build on its extensive network of partnerships and alliances, drawing on recent diplomatic inroads made in addressing thorny issues and resolving bones of contention with other countries. Trends during the past year in various regional areas – such as improved relations with Greece, Egypt, Iraq, and the Gulf states – appear set to gain momentum. If such developments continue to shape Turkey’s external engagements, they will contribute greatly to restoring its standing as an influential player in regional and international spheres while advancing its national interests.
According to many strategic assessments, Turkey is particularly keen to strengthen regional and bilateral ties in the Arab region, promoting closer political and security cooperation and coordination with regional powers to counter both traditional threats, such as terrorism, and emergent ones. Foremost among the latter is Israel’s aggressive expansionism, flagrantly displayed in its unrelenting incursions into Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon despite hard-won ceasefire agreements. From the Turkish perspective, the Middle East is in the process of major, fast-moving transformations with multiple domestic, regional and international implications. Turkey has been particularly alarmed by the military engagement between Israel and Iran following an unprovoked Israeli attack, the intensification of the Israeli campaign of genocide and forced expulsion in Gaza, the expansion of this campaign into the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem and, more recently, the Western powers’ drive to deepen their presence in the region in what appears to be a return to the post-World War I colonial partitioning of the Levant.
Turkey has developed what might best be described as an evolving strategy for dealing with regional shifts, one that is comprehensive, stable, and founded on certain fixed principles, yet dynamic and adaptable. One of the main constants in this strategy appears to be a determination to forge joint security arrangements to counter regional adversaries, primarily Israel. Turkey views Israeli policies as a direct threat to its national interests. Tensions have steadily escalated between the two countries since Israel launched its war on Gaza, but the antagonism reached a new pitch in relation to developments in the Syrian arena following the overthrow of the Bashar Al-Assad regime. Turkish policy towards Syria overlaps with crucial domestic concerns, from border security and the Kurdish question to the large Syrian refugee problem and economic difficulties. Recent Israeli behaviour in Syria runs counter to Turkey’s interests there.
Turkish diplomacy has been less visibly attentive to its Turkic environment, which is not to say that its relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have flagged. On the contrary, Ankara’s cooperation and coordination with these countries remain strong. Nevertheless, what is relatively new in the eastern direction is its greater focus on expanding bilateral ties in the more distant Asian sphere. Broadening its network of relations in Asia opens important economic and strategic opportunities that Ankara might also be able to draw on to address regional crises and threats closer to home. It is perhaps little surprise, therefore, that Turkey has moved towards deepening partnerships with Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Meanwhile, to the West, Turkish-US relations have improved considerably since Trump returned to the White House at the beginning of the year. Trump is generally inclined to delegate roles to regional allies and Turkey emerged as a strong option. Turkey presented itself as the “ideal actor” – to quote the Turkish foreign minister – to facilitate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine and, in fact, it served as venue for negotiations that led to a prisoner exchange in May. In the new Syrian landscape, after the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) rose to power in Damascus, the White House looked to Turkey – given its presence and influence on the ground in Syria – to create a stable environment for US influence there. Trump, who has frequently expressed his admiration for Erdogan, increasingly looks to him as a “friend” he can call into play on numerous complex issues elsewhere in the Middle East and the world.
After many years of acrimony between Turkey and Europe, the latter has begun to take a new approach to Turkey, also in the context of the war in Ukraine. As the NATO member with the largest military force after the US, Turkey can serve to protect Europe’s southeastern flank from Russia. Turkey’s developing defence industry also offers prospects, especially in drone and electronic warfare technologies. Ankara, for its part, is capitalising on Europe’s renewed openness to it to resolve contentious issues over Turkey’s bid for EU accession, as well as to boost economic cooperation with Europe, encourage renewed talks on modernising the Turkey-EU customs union, and reactivate the EU visa-liberalisation roadmap. Such steps would allow Turkey to work with the EU in ways that align with its interests while safeguarding its strategic autonomy.
The general pragmatism of Turkish foreign policy today is a far cry from the confrontational posture often associated with Erdogan’s earlier approach. This is best illustrated by Turkey’s stepped-up outreach to Africa – especially in its peace diplomacy. Turkey has presented itself as a mediator in the Sudanese Civil War, in the crisis that flared between Ethiopia and Somalia over the former’s maritime access agreement with breakaway Somaliland, and in other African disputes. At the same time, Ankara has maximised its soft-power assets to expand its presence in Africa in the form of loans and grants, development assistance, and defence technology support. In particular, it has signed a series of security agreements – especially in the drone sector – with Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, as well as wide-ranging defence-cooperation agreements with Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Somalia, Libya, and Ethiopia.
As the foregoing suggests, Turkey’s new strategy rests fundamentally on diversification. The logic appears to be that, in a world characterised by mounting polarisation and political and economic uncertainty, the more friends Turkey has, the easier it will be for it to overcome challenges, whether to its national security or economy. On the one hand, therefore, it is opening markets for Turkish manufactures and services, whether in defence or infrastructure development; and on the other hand, it is proactively offsetting risks posed by regional adversaries.
Moreover, in contrast to the period when Erdogan seemed to be creating enemies for himself at every turn, Turkey’s adversaries have largely been reduced to one: Israel, which has been working to undermine and sideline Turkey both in Syria and in the Palestinian arena. With regard to the latter, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected Turkey’s participation in the proposed international force to manage security in the Gaza Strip. However, the antipathy runs deeper, as evidenced by the Turkish closure of its airspace to Israeli military aircraft, the closure of its ports to Israeli ships, and the recent severing of all trade relations with Israel in response to the ongoing genocide in Palestine. Yet, as visceral as the Turkish reaction to Israeli atrocities may be, it is simultaneously aware of the weight Israel carries among its Western backers. So Ankara still calibrates its moves carefully while manoeuvring to increase its own weight in Western strategic thinking.
In the forthcoming year, Turkey will likely continue in the current trajectory, shifting away from belligerent posturing and military interventionism while building on recent foreign policy gains and exploring new opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in various fields. Given the persistence of regional threats and challenges as well as its domestic challenges, especially the economic ones, much of its attention will naturally remain focused on its immediate geopolitical environment and areas of influence. Nevertheless, its new dynamic foreign policy approach will certainly continue to explore new horizons also benefiting its interests.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 December, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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