Under the overarching theme “The World and the Region in 2026,” the issue brings together a group of senior researchers whose contributions collectively explain why the international system has entered a prolonged phase of managed crises, calibrated escalation, and unresolved conflict.
The issue opens with a comprehensive analytical framework developed by Ahmed Kandil, who introduces the concept of “Maps of Fire” as a tool for understanding global crises in 2026.
Kandil argues that the world is no longer shaped by discrete conflicts that can be contained geographically or politically, but by interconnected zones of tension operating within a condition he describes as “strategic liquidity” accompanied by “structural uncertainty.”
In this environment, the rules governing power, deterrence, and crisis management have eroded without being replaced by a new stable order.
Wars are not decisively won, peace is not conclusively achieved, and escalation is carefully calibrated to remain below the threshold of global confrontation.
Building on this conceptual foundation, Mohamed Ezz El-Arab examines the Middle East as a central arena in which this new logic of crisis management is most visible.
His analysis shows that the region in 2026 is defined less by dramatic turning points than by the persistence of unresolved aftermaths.
The consequences of the fifth Gaza war continue to shape regional dynamics, with unresolved questions surrounding governance, reconstruction, and the future of armed actors ensuring that calm remains temporary.
Across Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan, conflicts have shifted from high-intensity warfare to prolonged attrition, reinforcing a regional pattern in which wars are managed rather than settled.
Within this regional landscape, Hassan Abu Taleb focuses on Egypt’s foreign policy posture as it moves into 2026.
His contribution highlights continuity rather than rupture, emphasizing that Egyptian diplomacy remains anchored in core principles: preserving the independence of national decision-making, rejecting sharp international polarization, supporting the cohesion of the nation-state, and prioritizing political solutions over military escalation.
Abu Taleb situates Egypt’s engagement in Gaza ceasefire efforts, Sudanese unity, Libyan stabilization, Red Sea security, and the Horn of Africa within a broader strategy aimed at containing spillovers and preventing regional fragmentation from undermining national security.
Beyond the Middle East, the issue expands its analytical horizon to the global level. Returning to the “Maps of Fire” framework, Kandil traces how similar patterns of managed tension appear in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and other strategic theatres.
The Russia-Ukraine war, now entering a phase of prolonged exhaustion, is presented as a paradigmatic case of a conflict that neither side can decisively conclude nor politically abandon.
The war has exposed the limits of Western deterrence, the resilience of Russia’s strategic posture, and the fragility of Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture, transforming Ukraine into a long-term stress test for the international order rather than a conflict moving toward resolution.
In East Asia, the issue highlights how strategic competition between the United States and China increasingly relies on ambiguity rather than confrontation.
Taiwan and the South China Sea are analyzed not as imminent flashpoints, but as arenas of daily friction where military signalling, economic pressure, and technological rivalry accumulate risk over time.
The danger, as the analysis suggests, lies less in deliberate war than in miscalculation within an environment of constant low-level escalation.
The same logic applies to the Korean Peninsula, which is presented as a model of unstable nuclear deterrence.
North Korea’s continued development of missile and nuclear capabilities reinforces a cycle of provocation and counter-deterrence that prevents collapse without producing stability.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is examined as a multilayered crisis space where security threats, humanitarian disasters, and regional rivalries intersect.
In 2026, Afghanistan remains a case of crisis containment rather than political normalization.
Africa south of the Sahara occupies a significant place in the global map of tension.
The analysis shows how terrorism, coups, economic decline, and weak state structures interact to produce chronic instability across the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and Central Africa. Particular attention is given to the Horn of Africa, where geography magnifies fragility.
Conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are no longer local in impact, as control over ports, maritime routes, and Red Sea access has transformed local struggles into international competitions.
The Israeli recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 is examined as a development with implications that extend beyond symbolism, touching on maritime security and regional alignments in one of the world’s most sensitive corridors.
Outside the traditional centres of global tension, the issue turns to Latin America, with a focused analysis of Venezuela as an example of what it terms “low-intensity escalation at the strategic margins.”
Venezuela in 2026 is portrayed as a crisis that is actively managed rather than resolved, shaped by energy markets, migration pressures, and great-power competition in the Western Hemisphere.
Sanctions, electoral bargaining, and diplomatic signalling function as tools of control rather than instruments of transformation.
Complementing the geopolitical analyses, Hussein Suleiman examines the global economic outlook for 2026, arguing that relative stability should not be mistaken for security.
While growth prospects appear steadier than in previous years—supported by artificial intelligence investments in the United States and demand recovery in China—the underlying environment remains fragile.
Geopolitical shocks, trade tensions, and the risk of an AI-driven investment bubble continue to threaten sudden reversals, particularly for developing and emerging economies that remain vulnerable to external shocks.
From a developmental perspective, Hanaa Obeid addresses what she describes as the region’s “three development curses”: conflict, aid dependence, and resource mismanagement.
Her analysis shows how these factors reinforce one another, limiting the effectiveness of conventional development strategies.
While some Gulf economies have made progress through diversification and technological investment, much of the region remains trapped between opportunity and structural constraint, with conflict continuing to distort development trajectories.
Taken together, the January 2026 issue of Al-Malaf Al-Masri presents a coherent diagnosis of a world defined by managed turbulence.
Escalation and de-escalation are no longer opposites, but complementary tools within a single logic of crisis management.
Wars are not fought to be won, nor negotiations pursued to conclude conflict, but to adjust balances, test limits, and postpone rupture.
The issue’s central conclusion is clear and unsentimental: 2026 is unlikely to witness a global war, but it is equally unlikely to deliver meaningful stability.
The international system has learned how to prevent collapse, yet it has lost the capacity to generate resolution.
In this context, the ability to read the world’s “maps of fire,” as Kandil and his colleagues suggest, is no longer a matter of academic interest, but a necessary condition for understanding international politics in an age where crises persist without end and stability exists without peace.
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