At a moment defined by acute geopolitical volatility - war in the Gulf, intensifying great-power rivalry, and a palpable resurgence of nuclear anxieties - the question confronting the international community is no longer rhetorical: is the global nuclear non-proliferation regime in crisis, or merely passing through another cyclical phase of strain? The cumulative evidence emerging from recent deliberations surrounding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons leaves little room for ambiguity. What we are witnessing is not episodic turbulence, but a structural crisis - one that cuts into the very logic, balance, and credibility of the post-1968 nuclear order.
The NPT was constructed as a carefully calibrated bargain: non-nuclear states would renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology and a credible commitment by nuclear-weapon states to pursue disarmament. Today, that balance is no longer holding. The treaty’s three pillars - disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use - are not simply under pressure; they are drifting apart, each weakened by a combination of political inertia, strategic competition, and selective implementation.
The most visible dimension of this crisis lies in the absence of meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, the trajectory is moving in the opposite direction. Nuclear arsenals are expanding and modernizing, while the architecture of bilateral arms control - once the backbone of strategic stability - has steadily eroded. The collapse or suspension of key agreements has removed guardrails that had constrained escalation for decades. At the same time, new technologies, including artificial intelligence and advanced delivery systems, are being incorporated into nuclear doctrines, adding layers of complexity and risk to already fragile deterrence equations.
No less troubling is the stagnation of the non-proliferation pillar. The spread of sensitive nuclear capabilities - particularly enrichment technologies - continues, often under opaque or undeclared frameworks. States are increasingly investing in latent nuclear capacity, positioning themselves at the threshold without formally breaching treaty obligations. This pattern reflects not only technological diffusion but also a declining confidence in the regime’s ability to guarantee security through compliance. As a result, the line between civilian and military nuclear programs is becoming increasingly difficult to define or enforce.
At the institutional level, the erosion is equally pronounced. The role of verification bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency has come under growing strain, with diminishing implementation of comprehensive safeguards and increasing political contestation over access and oversight. The broader multilateral system, including agencies like the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is experiencing a similar decline in authority. This weakening reflects a deeper reality: the gradual erosion of the United Nations system itself, and its reduced capacity to exercise leverage over major powers.
This institutional paralysis is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the failure of successive NPT review conferences to produce forward-looking, consensus-based outcome documents over the past fifteen years. The last meaningful agreement dates back to 2010. Since then, the process has largely devolved into extended rhetoric, procedural deadlock, and an overreliance on statements and side events - far removed from the original purpose of the regime as a mechanism for implementation and accountability.
Beneath these trends lies a structural imbalance that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. The United Nations Security Council Permanent Members have grown more powerful and more nuclear, while developing countries have become relatively weaker in their capacity to influence outcomes. What was once described as “double standards” has evolved into something more entrenched: a system of multiple standards, where rules are applied selectively and inconsistently. The result is a widening credibility gap that is now beginning to undermine the very cornerstone of the regime.
The Middle East illustrates this crisis in its most acute form. The region is no longer a peripheral case; it has become central to the future of the non-proliferation regime. Iran’s advancing nuclear program, Israel’s undeclared capabilities, and the growing involvement of external nuclear powers have created a complex and unstable environment. The absence of universality - particularly the non-participation of Israel, India, and Pakistan - has effectively hollowed out the NPT’s authority in the region. More strikingly, non-NPT nuclear states are now key players in diplomatic processes, including mediation efforts related to the Iranian nuclear file, underscoring the extent to which the treaty has been marginalized.
Recent political developments in Washington have added a new and consequential layer to this already fragile landscape. A letter from Democratic lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives urging President Donald Trump to break his silence on Israel’s nuclear arsenal is not merely a domestic political gesture - it is a signal of shifting discourse at the highest levels of American policymaking. By explicitly raising the issue, the letter risks further complicating the regional equation while simultaneously highlighting a long-standing asymmetry that has remained largely unaddressed.
The significance of this development is reinforced by the language used in the same communication addressed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio. As the lawmakers warned, “the risks of miscalculation, escalation and nuclear use in this environment are not theoretical.” This is a stark and deliberate formulation. It reflects a recognition that the current trajectory in the Middle East is not simply unstable, but potentially dangerous in immediate and tangible ways. The risks are no longer hypothetical—they are embedded in the structure of the regional security environment itself.
For Arab states, the implications are profound. The strategic focus on Iran, particularly in light of its actions in the Gulf, remains understandable but increasingly insufficient. The broader reality is that the region is witnessing an unchecked and largely unmonitored expansion of nuclear-related capabilities beyond Iran alone. At the same time, new patterns of cooperation - such as arms and technology partnerships between Gulf states and nuclear-armed countries like India and Pakistan - are unfolding outside the NPT framework, further weakening its relevance.
This raises a fundamental question about universality. A regime that aspires to regulate global nuclear behavior cannot remain credible while key actors operate outside its framework. The coexistence of recognized and unrecognized nuclear powers, governed by different sets of expectations, has created a structural contradiction that continues to erode the treaty from within. In effect, the NPT is being sidelined even as the risks it was designed to manage continue to grow.
Within this context, the Arab position - led consistently by Egypt - retains both its relevance and its urgency. For decades, Egypt has acted as the institutional memory of the NPT, advocating for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This objective, rooted in the 1995 Review Conference resolution, remains the most coherent and viable framework for addressing the region’s nuclear challenges.
Yet the current moment demands more than reaffirmation. It calls for a renewed effort to bring this objective to the forefront of international diplomacy. The establishment of such a zone is no longer a long-term aspiration; it has become a strategic necessity. This requires not only political commitment but also a practical framework for implementation, including the rollback of weapon-grade nuclear capabilities and the full application of international safeguards.
The example of South Africa, which voluntarily dismantled its nuclear program and placed its facilities under international supervision, demonstrates that reversal is possible. Similarly, the Pelindaba Treaty provides a successful regional model that could inform efforts in the Middle East. What is needed is a carefully negotiated, technically sound, and politically supported treaty that reflects the realities of the region while restoring the principles of the global non-proliferation regime.
The stakes are no longer limited to the credibility of a treaty. They extend to the future of international peace and security. As nuclear risks accumulate, institutional safeguards weaken, and geopolitical competition intensifies, the margin for error continues to shrink.
The conclusion is therefore unavoidable. The crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not a matter of perception—it is a matter of fact. Without a serious and coordinated effort to restore balance, enforce commitments, and reassert the authority of the multilateral system, the cornerstone of the global nuclear order will continue to fracture, with consequences that may prove irreversible.
*The writer is a Professor of international Relations at Geneva School of Diplomacy and senior fellow at Geneva center for security policy.
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