It came to play a central role in discussions surrounding the conditions, context, and understandings related to ending the conflict, beginning with the announcement of a temporary ceasefire on 8 April 2026.
It then continued during the first round of US-Iranian negotiations in Islamabad held through Pakistani mediation immediately afterwards, as well as during and after the extension of the ceasefire announced by the US president and the ongoing undeclared negotiations.
Although this issue was not originally among the disputed items when the war broke out, neither as an objective of the American and Israeli sides nor as one of their initial demands, it was also not on the negotiating table during earlier US-Iranian negotiations conducted through Omani mediation.
This applied both before the outbreak of the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 and before the start of the latest war on 28 February 2026. In both cases, mediation was carried out by the Sultanate of Oman.
Before Washington and Tel Aviv launched the latest war against Iran, the demands of both sides ranged from a maximum objective of overthrowing the political system in Tehran and replacing it with a regime allied with or subordinate to the US and Israel, to a minimum objective of ending Iran’s nuclear programme entirely, not merely limiting its military dimension.
These demands also included dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile program, as well as its regional alliance network with several organizations and groups, foremost among them Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and other Islamist-oriented groups in Palestine, Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen, and several armed Shiite political groups in Iraq supportive of Iran, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and others.
No issue related to the Strait of Hormuz was raised at all by any of the parties to the war before its outbreak or in its early stages. This absence of the strait from the list of demands and objectives of the two sides was entirely logical, given that there had previously been no issue concerning freedom of passage through the strait before the outbreak of the latest war.
Thus, we may conclude that the rapid rise in the importance of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in the weeks following the outbreak of the war, and its transformation into a central issue on the international agenda, not only in US-Iranian negotiations, represents a relative success for the Iranian political leadership and its broader strategy, based on results and conditions reached so far.
This is the case because the Iranian side succeeded not only in adding to the negotiating agenda with the USA an item related to the Strait and freedom of navigation through it, but also went much further than that.
Practically speaking, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz became the foremost and perhaps most important item in any negotiations, whether with Washington or later on a broader international and regional scale. It drew attention away from other issues that had seemed more important before or at the beginning of the war, at least from the American and Israeli perspectives, and perhaps also from those of their allies, such as Iran’s nuclear programme, ballistic missile programme, or regional alliance network.
There is no doubt that Iran’s introduction of the “Hormuz card” into its confrontation with the US and Israel, across military, strategic, political, and media dimensions, reflected Tehran’s continued effort to alter the balance of power in its favour. It aimed to influence the military equation vis-à-vis the American and Israeli sides.
This was based on Iran’s full awareness that if the conflict were limited solely to military balances of power, superiority might tilt toward the attacking American and Israeli sides. This required “thinking outside the box” and introducing a nontraditional element into the equation in which Iran possessed a relative advantage.
Naturally, the significance and importance of the “Hormuz card” then emerged, given that Iran already possesses the capabilities, both naval and land-based, to exercise a high degree of near-complete control over most of the strait, whether directly or indirectly, should developments on the ground necessitate such a decision and movement from the Iranian side.
Iran introduced the Strait of Hormuz into the US-Israeli war equation through control over shipping and tanker routes in the Strait, using the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly in naval and missile fields, as well as drones and unmanned aircraft to strengthen its military capacity.
These tools were used to impose what may be described as a “selective blockade” on the movement of ships and tankers through the strait. This turned the matter into an effective and influential weapon in Iran’s hands, not only against the USA and Israel but also in its relations with almost all countries of the world that depend, to varying degrees, on the Strait of Hormuz not only for substantial portions of their oil and gas imports but also for significant imports of other vital materials such as fertilizers and others.
This enabled Iran to use the “Hormuz card” to influence the positions of the two hostile sides in the war and even to modify and redirect their military and political behaviour toward the conflict.
It also enabled Tehran to exert greater influence on the political and diplomatic positions of several important international and regional players regarding the war. These actors took into account the necessity of safeguarding their interests and trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz when formulating their positions concerning the war and the developments surrounding the strait after Iran succeeded in incorporating it into the equation of its conflict with the USA and Israel.
Initially, the American political leadership sought to confiscate the “Hormuz card” from Iran and place it in its own hands to reshuffle the cards, turn the tables on Iran, and deprive Tehran of one of its most influential tools during the current conflict.
This was pursued through an escalation of the American political, diplomatic, and media campaign directed toward its allies and the international community. It accused Iran of closing the strait to international navigation, within the framework of a clear plan to mobilize broad international support for the American position.
More importantly, however, the goal was to rally Washington’s allies and regain their support after the American president had lost a good part of the sympathy of Washington’s closest allies in NATO, Europe, and Asia at the beginning of the war.
The US, therefore, called on allies, especially in NATO, Europe, and Canada, to join an operation aimed at securing safe passage for ships and tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. However, these allies, whom the US president had earlier said were not needed and that the US could win the war without them, with Israel’s support, and some of whom he had even mocked or threatened, did not respond quickly.
Instead, they acted cautiously. Their responses included calls to end the war through peaceful means, resolve the Hormuz crisis diplomatically, or set conditions such as a final ceasefire or strict adherence to international law.
These reactions forced the USA to mobilize forces and dispatch troops from several sources, including Europe, to areas near the Strait of Hormuz, while also moving major naval forces to positions beyond the reach of Iranian firepower.
This coincided with discussions about possible US landing operations to seize Iran’s Kharg Island to end Iranian control over the Strait, as well as statements by the US president, later described by his administration as postponed, announcing that Washington would provide naval and military protection for every ship passing through the Strait.
American strategy then shifted toward demanding something less from allies than before: namely, participation in removing mines allegedly planted by Iran in the strait, according to the American narrative.
However, the US administration was again surprised by international reactions, which at most insisted on a complete halt to military operations and prior understandings involving Iran before such participation.
These developments pushed the USA toward adopting an escalatory approach from another perspective, namely, attempting to impose a naval blockade on Iran and prohibit the arrival and departure of ships to and from Iranian ports via the Strait of Hormuz.
Such a measure falls within broad definitions of military action. It also amounts to a selective closure of the Strait resembling, in some aspects, the selective closure with which Iran first introduced the “Hormuz card” into the equation of its conflict with Washington and Tel Aviv.
The blockade is also a measure Washington had previously embarked on more than 60 years ago against Cuba, without notable success, and which at the time drew broad international condemnation, including from the United Nations, because it violated international law.
No party can objectively claim that the American naval blockade against Iran achieved its objectives, given the conflicting and contradictory narratives from the American and Iranian sides regarding the blockade’s effectiveness.
Washington succeeded in helping some ships pass, while Tehran succeeded in disrupting and damaging others. There are also disputes regarding Iran’s ability to diversify its trade through alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz.
However, what is clear from nearly simultaneous statements issued on Tuesday, 5 May 2026, by Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf and US Secretary of State Rubio, both of whom pointed to the impossibility of maintaining the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz despite their entirely different perspectives, is that a return to the Strait’s prewar status now appears unattainable.
This is especially true given that both Washington and Tehran have, in recent weeks, occasionally issued statements asserting each side’s right to impose fees on ships passing through the strait.
It is also reinforced by the fact that countries around the world, as well as regional states, have come to recognize the risks of leaving future navigation in the Strait of Hormuz without strong, binding international guarantees ensuring freedom of navigation.
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