The recent Trump-Xi summit in Beijing was mostly presented as an opportunity for major negotiations over trade, technology, tariffs, and aircraft deals, the main elements of the world’s most important bilateral relationship.
Yet, for the Middle East, the meeting carried a different significance. The summit showed that the region has changed from being just a stage for US-China rivalry to becoming an active part of the wider bargaining process between Washington and Beijing.
While the summit produced the expected economic headlines, such as US President Donald Trump’s announcement that China had committed to buying 200 Boeing aircraft, presented as a victory for American manufacturing, the strategic details remained unclear. Analysts rightly viewed this initial reopening of the Chinese market with caution, rather than seeing it as a final breakthrough.
This familiar mix of big claims and limited clarity also appeared in political matters. On Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, Trump suggested that Chinese President Xi Jinping had agreed on keeping the strait open and preventing a nuclear-armed Tehran. However, the gap between public words and actual commitments was clear. Beijing carefully avoided making any direct promise to pressure Tehran, choosing a cautious public position that criticised the war without fully joining Washington’s pressure campaign.
This is the real story for the Middle East. The Beijing summit did not produce a major agreement between the great powers on the region, but it firmly established that Middle Eastern crises are now deeply tied to the great-power dialogue. Energy flows, Gulf security, shipping lanes, and reconstruction are no longer separate files; they are strongly connected to the broader US-China competition.
For many years, regional governments worked with a reliable formula: the United States acted as the main security provider, while China had emerged as a highly valuable economic partner. The Arab Gulf states could comfortably export energy to Beijing and attract its investments while at the same time buying American defence systems and hosting US forces. Similarly, Egypt successfully balanced its long-standing military ties to Washington with expanding, Chinese-backed infrastructure projects. This structure gave regional countries enough room to engage both powers without being forced to choose sides.
The Beijing summit shows that this balancing approach is becoming harder to manage. The US certainly retains its strong military superiority in the Middle East through its bases, naval presence, and intelligence networks. China is not trying, at least not directly, to replace that role as the regional security umbrella. Instead, Chinese influence is expanding in other areas, such as trade, major infrastructure, technology, and diplomatic access. Therefore, describing the Middle East only through the concept of American dominance is no longer completely accurate. Washington remains central, but it is not alone.
While Beijing cannot control regional outcomes by itself, its presence is now too large to be ignored. Any threat to the Strait of Hormuz directly affects China’s economy, which depends heavily on imported energy. When Gulf capitals seek advanced technology or big investments, Chinese companies are always present. And when Washington tries to isolate Iran, it simply cannot ignore the economic support Beijing provides to Tehran.
The Arab Gulf capitals understand this changing situation very well. The idea that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Qatar is simply turning away from Washington and moving towards Beijing is an overly shallow argument. Their calculation is much more practical. They want to gain the most benefit from US-China competition without being trapped by it, asking for both American security cooperation and Chinese market access.
They want strategic independence, but they also know that complete independence from the great powers is not possible in reality. Hedging has become the necessary policy of this period. The Gulf states are deepening their economic ties with China while keeping their security relations tied to the United States. The goal is not to make a final, either-or choice between the superpowers, but to delay that difficult moment for as long as possible.
Egypt fits into this wider regional picture, although with a different set of resources. While Cairo does not have the massive financial wealth of the Gulf, it uses its very important geographic location, large population, control of the Suez Canal, and historical weight in Arab and African diplomacy. Egypt’s security and diplomatic relationship with Washington remains essential, yet China has steadily become a major partner in national development and large infrastructure. For Cairo, the strategic question is not about replacing the US with China, but rather about how to expand its diplomatic space without losing strong ties with either side.
This is a very sensitive task. Egypt’s need for US military aid, Gulf financial support, Western financial institutions, and Chinese investment makes it very exposed to any major conflict between Washington and Beijing. However, if managed carefully by diversifying partnerships and avoiding unnecessary alignments, Cairo can gain significant benefits from this multipolar competition.
The main danger for Middle Eastern states is confusing multipolarity with absolute freedom. A multipolar world certainly offers more options, but it also turns regional countries into parts of a bigger bargaining process. A concession by a great power in one region could easily be exchanged for silence on a Middle Eastern issue. Pressure on Tehran might be quietly traded for trade tariffs or technological agreements regarding Taiwan. The region is now deeply placed inside the strict logic of connecting different global issues.
Trump’s business-like diplomatic style simply makes this reality more visible. His preference for big claims, numbers, and quick public victories can sometimes open closed doors by forcing direct talks. Yet, this approach has strict limits. The Middle East is not a business deal. The complex issues of Gaza, Gulf security, and shipping lanes need long-term institutional patience and a deep understanding of historical details, things that are missing in a pure deal-making approach.
At the same time, China’s position in the region should not be viewed ideally. While Beijing presents itself as a more stable, non-interfering alternative to Washington, it actively avoids heavy diplomatic responsibilities. China wants the benefits of influence such as access, stability, and respect for its interests without taking on the costly and difficult role that has historically tired out American diplomacy. This caution gives Beijing flexibility, but it also heavily limits its ability to manage or solve urgent regional crises.
In the end, the Beijing summit did not change the Middle Eastern map in one day, but it was an important clarifying moment. It proved that the region is now a permanent part of a global strategic equation. The United States remains very powerful but has less capacity to manage regional issues alone. China’s influence is widespread but naturally cautious, leaving regional states to act with more confidence than before, but at the same time making more exposed than ever.
The immediate challenge for the Middle East is not to quickly pick a side, nor is it to simply wait for things to happen. The real test of statecraft will be how to use great-power competition without becoming a mere tool inside it. Strategic diversification creates leverage, while the illusion of complete independence creates dependency. Understanding the difference between the two will shape the region’s path in the next phase.
The writer is associate professor of international politics and associate director of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs at the University of Denver.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 21 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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