The terminology employed in international relations, political science, and conflict and peace studies varies in characterizing the current situation. Yet most expert assessments tend either to define it as a mutual “war of attrition” between the two sides or as a condition best described as “neither peace nor war.”
In Egypt, the Arab world, and the broader Middle East, both situations are familiar from historical experience as well as political practice. The first — the “war of attrition” — prevailed between Egypt and Israel following the June 1967 war and continued until the summer of 1970. The second — the “state of neither peace nor war” — emerged after President Gamal Abdel Nasser accepted the American-sponsored Rogers Initiative ceasefire in the summer of 1970 and lasted until Egypt and Syria launched the October 6, 1973 War aimed at liberating Arab territories occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war.
It may therefore be argued that the current situation between the United States and Israel on one hand and Iran on the other combines elements of both conditions simultaneously: a “war of attrition” and a “state of neither peace nor war.” It is also important to underline the fragility of the present ceasefire arrangement, with both Washington and Tel Aviv repeatedly signaling that the temporary and repeatedly extended ceasefire could collapse in the near future. American and Israeli officials have, at times explicitly and at times implicitly, suggested that military operations against Iran could resume should Tehran fail to comply fully with American and Israeli demands.
Shortly after the ceasefire entered into effect, the United States imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports in response to what Washington considered an effective Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. The situation quickly escalated as American and Iranian forces exchanged attacks involving the bombardment, destruction, or damaging of vessels belonging to or protected by the opposing side. Nor did developments stop there. Targets inside Iran came under selective and intermittent bombardment, while Iran — perhaps in response both to these attacks and to the support offered by certain Gulf states to the American and Israeli positions — resumed targeting American assets, oil facilities, and other objectives in some Arab Gulf countries through similarly calibrated and intermittent strikes.
Although several senior American officials stated only days ago that the prospect of renewed war appeared unlikely for the time being — to the extent that the U.S. Secretary of State informed Congress that military operations against Iran had effectively ended — remarks made by the American president on Monday, 11 May, reignited global fears of renewed conflict. The president declared that the latest Iranian proposal submitted to Washington in response to an earlier American initiative was unacceptable and warned that the ceasefire had entered a critical phase and might be approaching collapse. These statements reinforced international concerns regarding the unsustainable nature of the current arrangement, which lacks agreed foundations between the parties and remains dangerously fragile in the absence of binding international guarantees capable of ensuring its durability.
What has taken place since the 8 April ceasefire clearly falls within the broader definition of a war of attrition.
Iran cannot afford to lower its guard. The country remains in a constant state of caution, readiness, and anticipation of a surprise military strike from Washington, Tel Aviv, or both. It continues to suffer from the consequences of the losses sustained during the first forty days of war and is unable to begin reconstruction efforts in earnest for fear that hostilities could resume at any moment. Moreover, despite official statements to the contrary, Iran continues to face the severe effects of the American naval blockade imposed on its ports.
A deeper analysis also reveals that the situation is hardly more comfortable for the United States. Washington is fully aware that Iran possesses the capacity to withstand the blockade for an extended period. At the same time, American policymakers understand that prolonged disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz exposes the global economy to enormous risks. Some of these consequences have already begun to materialize, while others may soon inflict serious damage on the American economy itself — despite attempts by some senior officials to portray the disruption as beneficial because it has boosted American oil and gas exports.
For Israel as well, the situation is far from stable. Despite repeated declarations by senior Israeli officials expressing a desire to resume the war against Iran in pursuit of strategic objectives — and despite efforts to separate the Iranian front from the Lebanese front — developments on the ground suggest that Israel is already engaged in a costly war of attrition with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The conflict continues to exact material and human losses. Since Hezbollah formally entered the war alongside Iran on 2 March 2026, Israel has been unable to restore security or normalcy in northern Israel, according to numerous international media reports and interviews conducted with residents of the area.
Likewise, developments since the 8 April ceasefire also fit squarely within the definition of a “state of neither peace nor war.”
The only post-ceasefire round of negotiations between the United States and Iran — held in Islamabad under high-level Pakistani mediation and following intensive coordination with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye — quickly collapsed despite reports of limited progress. A second round of negotiations has yet to convene. Thus far, all that has occurred is an exchange of proposals through Pakistani intermediaries, with no indication of meaningful convergence between the two sides and little evidence suggesting that either a final or even interim agreement is within reach in the foreseeable future.
The ceasefire itself, initially conceived as temporary and time-bound, was later extended under the pretext of giving diplomacy an opportunity to succeed. Yet the extension occurred without a clearly defined timeframe and without formal endorsement or guarantees from the United Nations Security Council or from any influential coalition of international or regional powers capable of ensuring its continuation and stability.
There is broad recognition that a return to full-scale war would impose enormous costs on all parties directly and indirectly involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, it remains entirely possible that the present combination of a “war of attrition” and a “state of neither peace nor war” will persist. It is equally conceivable that intermittent and selective confrontations could intensify further, eventually spiraling out of control and triggering the return of large-scale war — perhaps an even more destructive and violent conflict than the one witnessed between 28 February and 8 April 2026.
There is little doubt that certain actors — whether direct participants in the conflict or influential forces operating within some of the countries involved — have for some time favored a rapid and large-scale resumption of war under the illusion that a decisive military victory remains attainable. In reality, such calculations may serve the strategic and security interests of particular actors or factions while disregarding the interests of their own societies and the broader security and stability of the region and the international system alike.
It is also worth remembering that the assumption of complete rationality and sound judgment whenever states decide to wage war has rarely been supported by historical evidence — whether in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world.
*The writer is an expert on international relations.
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