The confrontation between the US and Iran has evolved into far more than a traditional military crisis. For US President Donald Trump, the war has become deeply connected to domestic political calculations, economic pressures, energy security, and the upcoming congressional elections in November.
While Trump continues to present himself as a leader determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, his recent behaviour reflects a president attempting to balance military escalation with political survival.
The contradiction between threatening Tehran and postponing military action against it demonstrates that the White House is increasingly aware that a prolonged regional war could reshape the American political landscape before the upcoming midterm elections.
The central question therefore becomes: why is Trump wavering over restarting large-scale military operations against Iran?
During this week alone, Trump moved repeatedly between escalation and restraint. He declared that the US “may have to attack Iran again”, revealing that he was “one hour away” from authorising a strike before delaying the decision, while also warning that military action could occur within two or three days possibly on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, or even the following week.
Yet he abruptly cancelled a planned strike after Gulf leaders urged Washington to leave space for negotiations. This hesitation reveals that Trump is no longer acting solely according to military calculations, but according to a broader geopolitical and economic equation in which Gulf states play a central role.
This explains why, despite maintaining military readiness and continuing the naval blockade around Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz, Trump has simultaneously left the door open for negotiations.
At the same time, the military situation itself does not provide Trump with easy options. Analysts increasingly argue that Washington lacks a decisive military scenario capable of “ending the mission” in Iran.
The naval blockade imposed on 13 April has not produced rapid results. Intelligence assessments reportedly indicate that severe economic pressure on Tehran may require three or four months before becoming strategically effective. Even then, many analysts doubt the Iranian regime would surrender, especially considering how states such as Cuba and North Korea have survived decades of sanctions and isolation.
Meanwhile, Iran has adapted through alternative economic mechanisms. Tehran has increasingly relied on old oil-tankers as floating storage facilities after the American blockade reduced exports, particularly towards Asian buyers.
According to estimates by Kpler, a data and analytics company, Iranian oil stored on ships in the Gulf has reached approximately 42 million barrels, marking a 65 per cent increase since the beginning of the crisis. Iran’s land-based storage capacity has reportedly increased by 10 million barrels, reaching 64 per cent utilisation, while empty tankers under blockade could hold an additional 24 million barrels.
Before the blockade, Iran exported between 40 and 60 million barrels a month, representing nearly two per cent of global oil supplies. These figures demonstrate that Tehran is attempting to buy time rather than surrender under pressure.
At the same time, Trump faces growing divisions within the Republican Party itself. The old establishment wing represented by figures such as Mitt Romney and Liz Cheney has largely disappeared or been marginalised, leaving a party increasingly centered around personal loyalty to Trump.
While this gives him greater short-term control, it also reduces internal correction mechanisms. In previous administrations, party elites often pressured presidents to deescalate unpopular wars before electoral damage became irreversible. Today, many Republicans remain hesitant to openly challenge Trump even as polling indicators become more dangerous.
However, the real political danger for Trump lies inside the US. According to estimates from Brown University, Americans have paid more than $40 billion in additional fuel costs since the beginning of the conflict. The total burden has reportedly reached $41.5 billion, exceeding the federal $40 billion bridge repair programme and surpassing the estimated $31.5 billion cost of modernising America’s air-traffic control system.
Petrol prices have surged by 51 per cent to $4.51 per gallon, while diesel prices have increased by 54 per cent to $5.65 per gallon, approaching record levels. On average, each American household has paid an additional $316 because of rising fuel costs.
These numbers matter politically because inflation remains one of the most sensitive issues for American voters. Current estimates suggest inflation could approach five per cent, directly undermining Trump’s promises of economic recovery and a “new golden age” for America.
On a broader strategic level, the upcoming congressional elections may represent the most dangerous political moment for Trump since his return to the White House. Historically, midterm elections tend to punish the ruling party.
Since World War II, the president’s party has lost an average of nearly 28 seats in the House of Representatives and around four seats in the Senate during midterms. Even presidents such as Barack Obama and Bill Clinton suffered major losses despite strong political momentum.
The electoral calculations are deeply concerning for Republicans. Control of the House often depends on fewer than 15 districts nationwide. In such a polarised environment, even a small economic shock can dramatically reshape outcomes.
Petrol prices rising by 51 per cent and diesel prices climbing by 54 per cent directly affect the suburban and working-class voters central to Trump’s coalition. The additional $41.5 billion burden on consumers translates into daily frustration that Democrats can weaponise politically.
The Senate map adds another layer of complexity. Republicans may retain advantages in conservative states, but even a narrow Democratic gain of two or three Senate seats could dramatically limit Trump’s manoeuvrability.
In the House, Democrats need only modest gains to reclaim control. If Democrats take the House while Republicans lose momentum in the Senate, Trump’s final two years could become politically paralysed, transforming him into a classic “lame duck” president unable to effectively push legislation through or maintain political momentum.
Another important factor is Trump’s enormous political machine. His fundraising network reportedly controls approximately $1.776 billion, giving Republicans unprecedented financial capacity ahead of the elections.
However, money alone may not neutralise inflation, war fatigue, or voter frustration. Therefore, the broader expectation that is being increasingly discussed in Washington is not necessarily that Trump will lose power entirely, but that he may lose Congress and spend his remaining two years governing under institutional siege.
For this reason, Trump’s hesitation over escalating the war with Iran reflects more than military caution. It reflects the awareness that every additional week of instability in the Gulf may increase the probability that the congressional elections will transform him from an assertive wartime president into a politically constrained lame duck for the remainder of his presidency.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 28 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
Short link: