Just under two years ago in this space, I published an article entitled “We have only ourselves to rely on”, reiterating an appeal I had voiced in numerous Arab forums. The publication date was 13 March 2024. The geopolitical horizons at the time were bleak: The war in Ukraine had just entered its third year and was still sending tremors through the international order. The fifth war in Gaza was well into its second year, sending shockwaves through the regional order.
The cycle of quakes afflicting this region and the world reached new heights with the outbreak of the ongoing fourth Gulf War, whose opening round was the 12-day war between Iran on one side and Israel and the US on the other in June. The compound effects of those three wars have placed the Arab world under extreme pressure of an intensity unprecedented in earlier regional wars and tensions.
The Arab world is caught in a global tug-of-war involving China, Russia, and the US under Trump. A strategic corridor — the Strait of Hormuz — is in peril, a possibility many had thought inconceivable. Yet such are the circumstances of the world today that the situation in Hormuz has surpassed the crises that occurred in its fellow chokepoints, the Bab Al-Mandab and the Suez Canal. Also, whereas the eastern flank of the Arab world had previously been exposed to Houthi missiles fired against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it is now vulnerable to direct strikes from Iran, as well as attacks by the Popular Mobilisation Forces and similar groups in Iraq.
Due to the pace, severity, and complexity of the interweaving crises, collective Arab action has entered one of the most precarious phases in its history. A heavy burden has fallen on Arab elites — far weightier than they have borne in previous turning points. Nothing illustrates this more than the current status of the Gaza war, as epitomised by a peace initiative that has stalled even before the completion of its first stage. Not a sound is heard from its “Board of Peace”, whose chairman shows no interest in it, now that he is embroiled in the fourth Gulf War and preparing for his next war, this time against Cuba.
The latest development to emerge from the twists and turns of the current war in the Gulf is a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, also known as the Islamabad Document. After this, the MoU was announced, and President Trump spoke with Arab leaders to tell them that, in his view, a settlement with Iran was at hand and that the Arab powers should use that occasion to commit to the Abraham Accords and normalise relations with Israel. The latter, meanwhile, was continuing to swallow up more Palestinian territory in Gaza and the West Bank and more Lebanese territory — including north of the Litani River. In its response to Trump, Riyadh pointed out that there was still no irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood.
What is new in the general backdrop is that the Arab world is no longer what it once was. Following the eruptions of the so-called Arab Spring, a reformist current gained ground in 12 Arab states, which had neither militias nor civil wars of any form. The reform experiences that unfolded in these states reflected the maturity of their national development. They have shown themselves to be prepared to continue building their countries while pushing back against provocations and attempts to drag them into reckless adventures.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, in particular, demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of Iran’s aggressive tactics, while preserving the political acumen needed to contain the conflict. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, they persisted with near-miraculous efforts to overcome bureaucracy, conservatism, and reactionary forces as they shifted gears from “strategic expansion” and “poverty distribution” to methods of “strategic latency” and “wealth management”.
To these ends, they maximised benefit from the diversity of global development experiences, especially those in Asia. Moreover, perhaps for the first time since the early post-independence era after World War II, building national strengths and activating domestic capacities have acquired greater importance for these states than the broader global scene, apart from the international developments that bear directly on growth and progress.
This leads us to conclude that, in the face of a precarious and volatile reality, an alliance of influential states — ones characterised by solid internal structures and by the demographic, geographic, and political capacities enabling them to engage diplomatically and politically with all sides of the crisis — is indispensable. These states are determined to avoid the surrounding flames and to prevent their prolongation, escalation, and spread. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are participating in mediation efforts in different ways, while other important Arab actors, such as Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, remain in close consultation.
Still, required is nothing less than an integrated strategy devised by partners who trust each other and have common interests. At this juncture, it wouldn’t hurt for those states to set aside the usual mutual suspicions that arise in such crises. Indeed, this may present a historic opportunity to move beyond them and, at the same time, to free themselves from the social media culture that has come to dominate our landscape.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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