Amid escalating tensions between Turkey and Israel, former American-born Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard warned on 28 May of the possibility that Israel could become involved in future confrontations with both Turkey and Egypt.
“The storm is coming,” Pollard said, adding that Tel Aviv must prepare for new wars in the region after Iran. Pollard’s statement was made at a time of rising tensions between Israel and Egypt over the war in Gaza and its regional repercussions. It was also a time of increasingly sharp exchanges between Tel Aviv and Ankara over the same war, the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the Netanyahu government’s determination to leverage unwavering American support to sustain the war against Iran and reshape the Middle East’s security architecture in accordance with its own narrow vision.
The statements coincide with Turkey’s rising level of criticism of Israel. Ankara has recently been intensifying pressure on Israel, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saying on 17 May that achieving genuine peace in the region requires curbing Israeli provocations, which he described as among the principal causes of the Middle East crisis. On 13 May, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said, “Israel is increasingly being described by everyone as the elephant in the room.”
Turkey’s drive to increase pressure on Israel is linked to several factors. The first is the notable shift in European positions on Israel, as the European Union decided on 11 May to impose sanctions on Israeli settlers involved in acts of violence in the West Bank. The second relates to mounting pressure from US Democratic lawmakers to halt or delay the approval of arms deals destined for Israel, alongside support from a broad current within the Republican Party for reassessing the scale of assistance provided to Israel and gradually moving away from a policy of unconditional military support to a defence partnership.
The third factor is Ankara’s recognition that the partition of Iran or the weakening of its capabilities would remove a major regional power from the confrontation with the Israeli project in the region, which seeks to reshape the Middle East in line with the “Greater Israel” project. Moreover, the collapse of the Iranian regime or the partition of Iran is likely to result in the installation of a government allied with the US and Israel, thereby altering the regional balance of power to Turkey’s disadvantage. Although Tehran and Ankara differ ideologically and doctrinally and remain geopolitical competitors, they are united by their shared opposition of Israeli projects in the region.
From Turkey’s perspective, weakening Iran could also create new strategic challenges for Ankara, particularly in the light of existing tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations and the growing security cooperation between Israel and both Cyprus and Greece, Turkey’s principal rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s drive to intensify pressure on Israel cannot be separated from its opposition to the Netanyahu government’s efforts to gain additional time and impose its vision on the region, whether through its insistence on continuing the war in Gaza and southern Lebanon, expanding settlements in the West Bank or pursuing the overthrow of the Iranian regime.
Turkey has also sought to note that Israel would bear responsibility for any potential failure of negotiations aimed at ending the war with Iran, reflecting Ankara’s rejection of Israel’s position that regime change in Tehran is necessary. Fidan warned on 9 April, “Israel seeks to obstruct efforts to secure a ceasefire between Iran and Washington.” He also said that Israel is “now extending its genocide” in Gaza to Lebanon, adding that “continued Israeli expansionism and the imposition of its geopolitical agenda on the region will make the achievement of lasting peace, stability, and security in the Middle East impossible”. This position may, in part, reflect Turkey’s frustration with Israeli policies, particularly as Israel has adopted a more hardline approach towards Turkish interests in Syria.
It is in this context that Turkey’s proposal to establish a regional security mechanism on the fringe of the Antalya Forum in April is best understood. The initiative was meant to strengthen security cooperation and enhance prospects for coordinated action in addressing potential threats facing the region. The proposed platform would include Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt among its members and aim to reshape regional geopolitical balances through a redistribution of influence and the creation of a strategic deterrence framework capable of safeguarding the interests of participating states.
From Turkey’s perspective, the platform could also serve as a counterweight to Israel’s growing reliance on military force to impose a regional security equation aligned with Israeli interests. Turkey, along with other regional states, recognises that Israel has become increasingly aggressive, not only within its immediate neighbourhood but also across wider regional spheres, including Iran, while issuing threats to Turkey, Egypt, Iraq and Yemen. Turkey announced on 5 May the development of its first domestically produced intercontinental ballistic missile, named “Yildirim Khan”, with a reported range of approximately 6,000 km. The missile was unveiled during the SAHA 2026 International Defence and Aerospace Exhibition. Turkey’s new military posture conveys a clear message that any targeting of Turkish interests would be met with a decisive response.
Despite the evident tension between Israel and both Turkey and Egypt, however, this does not necessarily mean that relations are heading for heightened confrontation or a direct military clash. Washington, a strategic ally of both Ankara and Cairo, is unlikely to permit such a scenario given its substantial strategic interests with the two countries and President Donald Trump’s reliance on the Egyptian and Turkish roles in maintaining the regional balance, particularly with regard to the crises in the Palestinian territories. Egypt remains a strategic cornerstone in Washington’s vision as well as that of major international powers, for promoting stability in Palestine and the wider region. Consequently, the strategy pursued by the Israeli far right, which seeks to exert pressure on Ankara and Cairo through Trump, may ultimately prove ineffective.
Israel is also aware of the progress achieved in Egyptian-Turkish relations, which have witnessed extensive cooperation across multiple fields, most notably in the defence sector. Moreover, Tel Aviv understands that becoming embroiled in a military confrontation with either Turkey or Egypt could carry painful political and economic consequences. Both Ankara and Cairo have vital strategic relationships with major regional and international powers, particularly Russia, China and the European Union. Equally important, Israel lacks justifications that could be used to persuade the US to support a new war against either Turkey or Egypt.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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