Israel launched a new wave of attacks against Lebanon last week in breach of the 45-day extension of the US-brokered ceasefire that runs until the end of June.
In a joint statement on 1 June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that the strikes would extend to Hizbullah targets in Dahiyeh in south Beirut, which had enjoyed relative calm in recent weeks as the truce had presumably covered the Lebanese capital.
The announcement triggered a massive wave of displacement from the residential district, causing traffic congestion that paralysed Beirut for hours.
At the same time, the US announced a new de-escalation proposal, conveyed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in separate calls to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Netanyahu.
The proposal called for Hizbullah to halt its missile strikes against northern Israel in exchange for an end to Israeli strikes against Beirut.
Hizbullah had recently resumed attacks on northern Israeli settlements including Nahariya, Tiberias, and Safed in retaliation against Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon. While the Lebanese resistance movement had ceased all cross-border missile fire since the ceasefire went into effect on 16 April, Israeli strikes against southern Lebanese villages and military incursions remained unabated.
On the evening of 1 June, Trump announced on his Truth Social platform that he had intervened personally to preserve the ceasefire in Lebanon and succeeded in obtaining reciprocal commitments from Israel and Hizbullah to halt the escalation.
Reportedly through a direct call with Netanyahu, Trump stopped the Israeli plan to launch a large-scale attack on Dahiyeh. He then communicated with Hizbullah through what he described as “high-level representatives,” most likely Lebanon’s ambassador in Washington and Aoun.
A statement issued by the Lebanese Embassy in Washington affirmed Hizbullah’s commitment to the truce and its cessation of attacks against Israel. Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri had previously stated that he could get Hizbullah to halt its rocket fire into Israel if Israel ended its escalation.
He reportedly reiterated this commitment to Aoun on the evening of 1 June, which contributed to the de-escalation.
Israel was pressing ahead with its escalation even though Lebanese officials had entered into direct negotiations with their Israeli counterparts in Washington. After a third round of talks in mid-May, military delegations from the two countries met at the Pentagon on 29 May, while a fourth round of political talks was scheduled for 2 and 3 June.
Nevertheless, on 26 May, Israel chose to escalate further, focusing on the area between Nabatieh and Marjeyoun and pushing its ground forces across the Litani River near its eastern bend closest to the border.
Israel also issued evacuation orders to residents of Nabatieh, signalling its intention to reproduce the devastation it has visited on Khiam and Bint Jbeil. Israeli occupation forces also seized the approximately 900-year-old Beaufort Castle, which is strategically perched on a hill overlooking the Nabatieh governorate, one of the country’s most densely populated regions.
According to Hizbullah, Israeli forces are finding it difficult to consolidate their hold on the historic fortress.
These developments have revived memories of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Israeli forces then used Beaufort Castle as their base during their first occupation of Lebanon until they were finally driven out by Hizbullah in 2000.
To the west, Israel bombarded the city of Tyre and nearby towns as part of its attempt to extend its control along the coast from Naqoura to Tyre. Israeli forces issued evacuation orders not only to Tyre and its surroundings but also to towns extending northwards towards the outskirts of Sidon.
Evacuation orders have also been extended to villages north of the Litani River in the area between the Litani and the Zahrani River. Many believe that Israel is eyeing Lebanon’s water resources, a suspicion that has grown since the occupation forces seized the area around the Qaraoun Dam and Lake Qaraoun in the southeast, leaving the infrastructure intact.
The Israeli incursion means that its forces have advanced beyond the so-called “yellow line” demarcating the buffer zone unilaterally declared by Israel on the pretext of securing its northern settlements. Evidently, this buffer zone now requires another buffer zone, which will likely require yet another.
According to some estimates, Israel is bent on expanding its control of southern Lebanon from around 13 to 20 per cent of Lebanese territory.
Analysts differ in their explanations of the current Israeli wave of escalation despite the ceasefire. One view holds that it has been timed to precede the face-to-face meetings in Washington as a way of stepping up pressure on the Lebanese government to cave in to Israeli conditions. Lebanon continues to insist on a complete end to the war, full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the return of displaced residents, reconstruction of destroyed areas, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.
Only then will it act to disarm Hizbullah and curtail its influence in the south. The Lebanese argue that their army has plans to deploy in the south taking over Hizbullah-controlled areas but that it has been unable to implement it while the Israeli occupation continues.
Israel insists that the Lebanese army must disarm Hizbullah by force and immediately, using intelligence supplied to it by the Israeli military. The Lebanese army has rejected that proposal as well as a parallel US-proposal to create a special military unit for the purpose.
According to analysts, when the military talks in Washington on 29 May failed to produce progress towards the Israeli demands, it turned to bombs to compel Beirut to submit to conditions that infringe on Lebanese sovereignty and risk precipitating civil war.
Other views: Another view links the current Israeli escalation to the Pakistani-brokered talks between the US and Iran.
It argues that the negotiations have advanced to a point where a broad agreement to halt the hostilities is at hand. As such an agreement would necessarily include the Lebanese front, as Israel has accelerated its operations there to tighten its grip on as much territory as it can grab before Washington compels it to stop.
Then, according to this analysis, Israel would use its control over this territory as leverage to dictate terms during negotiations over an Israeli withdrawal and postwar arrangements. Among the conditions it would aim for are tighter control over southern Lebanon’s water resources and the prolonged devastation of southern villages and farmland to prevent the return of the displaced inhabitants and the resumption of normal life.
According to a third analysis, the Israeli escalation is taking advantage of the time Iran is spending to improve its negotiating position with Washington. Tehran may not fully appreciate the costs this entails for Lebanon in terms of territory lost and for Hizbullah, which is being forced to retreat from strategic strongholds in Nabatieh, Tyre, and Marjeyoun, just as it previously lost Khiam and Bint Jbeil.
Tehran remains adamant on including a halt to Israel’s aggression against Lebanon in any comprehensive agreement with Washington. This helps explain Trump’s intervention to prevent the planned Israeli bombardment of Dahiyeh, which would have most likely derailed the current Iranian-US negotiations.
Some argue that Hizbullah has intentionally withdrawn from these areas in order to lure Israeli troops deeper into southern Lebanon and inflict greater losses through attacks on advancing units. Others counter that it has genuinely lost control and was forced to retreat after its forward defences collapsed.
Israel has officially acknowledged that 23 of its soldiers have been killed and 1,024 wounded since the fighting in Lebanon resumed on 2 March. Israeli army command notoriously keeps a tight lid on its real casualty figures. During the past week alone in southern Lebanon, three Israeli soldiers were reportedly killed and 137 wounded, including 67 seriously.
By contrast, some point to the far heavier human and material toll sustained by Lebanon. Israel has completely destroyed more than 63 towns in the south and displaced over a million people. According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, Israel has killed at least 3,371 and wounded more than ten thousand Lebanese civilians since 2 March.
Two Lebanese army soldiers were killed and several others wounded in direct Israeli strikes on Lebanese military vehicles during the past week.
Some analysts argue that Hizbullah is trying to establish a new form of deterrence against advancing Israeli forces, compensating for limited capabilities through more direct engagements and high-impact drone attacks, albeit at a higher cost in casualties among its own ranks.
In a televised statement on 30 May, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that Lebanon is facing its most dangerous Israeli escalation yet but that he remains committed to negotiations.
Although the results of the process are uncertain, it remains the least costly option for Lebanon, he said, adding that Israel would not achieve security through scorched-earth tactics, collective punishment, and the destruction of Lebanese towns and villages.
The Lebanese government has decided to continue the talks with Israel, rejecting numerous calls from diverse quarters to withdraw from the sessions scheduled for 2 and 3 June.
Hizbullah continues to denounce the government for engaging in direct negotiations with Israel. In a speech broadcast on Manar TV on 24 May, its Secretary-General Naim Qassem said that “the people have a right to take to the streets to bring down the government and the American-Israeli project. There is no political sovereignty in Lebanon, only subordination to an American mandate.”
Some commentators perceive a contradiction between Hizbullah’s opposition to Lebanese negotiations with Israel and its endorsement of Iranian negotiations with the US. The latter would include a ceasefire in Lebanon, with which Hizbullah would comply. However, it does not consider itself bound by any arrangement emerging from Lebanese-Israeli negotiations.
This reflects a central dissonance in Hizbullah’s rhetoric and conduct: it blackmails the Lebanese government and undermines its negotiating position, yet it no longer possesses the military wherewithal to strengthen its own position while Israel expands deeper into Lebanon.
Other commentators add that Hizbullah’s threat to mobilise protest marches to topple the government merely adds to the burdens on its own supporters, who have already been displaced from both the south and Beirut’s southern suburbs without any clear prospect of return.
The Lebanese government has been criticised for neglecting the displaced civilians and for failing to provide adequate relief services. However, the blame for this cannot be placed fully on the current government, as Lebanon has suffered from the degradation of public services since the economic collapse of 2019.
The current war has simply contributed to exposing the state’s frailty amid declining international support, particularly from the Gulf states.
Lebanon is in a race against time to bring the war to an end before more of its land and resources fall to the Israeli occupation. Some believe the solution lies in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington, while others pin their hopes on the US-Iran talks in Islamabad.
For the moment, Lebanon, or at least part of Lebanon, has a brief respite. It is too soon to tell whether Trump’s intervention has only stopped the Israeli strikes on Beirut and Lebanese state facilities, or whether the de-escalation will also extend to Israeli’s bombardment and incursions into the south.
In like manner, it is unclear whether de-escalation for Hizbullah means only halting its rocket fire into northern Israel, or whether it will also stop attacking Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon.
Murkier still is the future of these occupation forces. Will they withdraw in accordance with agreements, clearing the way for the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south? Or will Israel procrastinate in order to consolidate de facto gains and impose its hegemony?
For Lebanon, the nightmarish scenario that could emerge is for Washington and Tehran to strike an agreement that serves their own interests and excludes Lebanon. This would leave Lebanon prey to Israel’s military predations, which the Netanyahu government hopes to use to enhance its prospects in the early elections expected to be held in the autumn.
*The writer is a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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