These borders share a critical characteristic: they adjoin states and borderlands marked by a high degree of fluidity and limited governmental capacity to control their frontiers with Sudan. The ongoing war in Sudan has demonstrated that the security challenges emanating from these border regions are extraordinarily complex and cannot be effectively addressed by security agencies or military forces alone. Their roots stretch far deeper than the current conflict, extending back years—if not decades—into a troubled historical legacy.
As Sudan’s civil war has dragged on far longer than originally anticipated, Darfur has begun generating its own distinct set of challenges. This is largely because the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) regard this vast territory as their principal strategic hinterland, the heartland of their leadership, influence, and alliance networks. One of the most significant recent developments is that the fractures now affecting what was once known as the “forced alignment” of Darfur’s local communities with the RSF against the Sudanese state have prompted a profound reassessment among many actors.
As the broader ambitions of the militia have become increasingly visible, revealing a project that many now see as threatening the very foundations of Sudanese national existence, this alignment has come under mounting pressure and scrutiny.
An equally dangerous development has been the outbreak of armed conflicts within Darfur itself—not between opposing camps, but among factions that once belonged to the same camp, whether by coercion or consent. This has become evident in the recent fighting between the Salamat and Beni Halba tribes in South Darfur. Since May, fierce clashes have erupted near Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State.
While tensions between the two tribes have surfaced before in limited disputes, the current confrontation has expanded dramatically, taking on the characteristics of a separate and self-contained conflict. Local accusations have pointed to the RSF as a key driver behind the renewed violence, alleging that the militia has helped intensify the conflict by supplying one side with combat vehicles and drones.
Local eyewitnesses have gone even further, claiming that RSF fighters have participated on behalf of both sides simultaneously. Significantly, both tribes had, from the earliest days of the war, declared support for the RSF—whether voluntarily or under pressure—and had contributed thousands of fighters to its military campaigns.
Within a single week, the fighting claimed the lives of approximately fifty people and was accompanied by widespread abuses, including killings, arrests, and extensive acts of destruction. Large numbers of civilians were forced to flee villages and residential communities near Kubum and Markondi in South Darfur. While there is no definitive explanation as to why RSF leaders may have chosen this particular moment to reignite conflict between two major tribal groups such as the Salamat and the Beni Halba, certain facts remain difficult to ignore. Drones reportedly launched from Nyala carried out strikes against dozens of locations in and around Kubum, while heavy weapons appeared on the battlefield shortly thereafter. In addition, heavily armed combat vehicles were reportedly used in large-scale raids targeting property and communities associated with both tribes.
By late May and early June, mobilization efforts had expanded beyond South Darfur. Recruitment and military preparations spread along both banks of Wadi Ruwaina and into Central Darfur State. Campaigns encouraging young men to join the fighting intensified in areas near Um Dukhn, adjacent to the border with the Central African Republic.
At the same time, humanitarian conditions deteriorated rapidly. Temporary displacement centers, already lacking the capacity to receive large numbers of displaced civilians, became increasingly overcrowded and faced severe shortages of water, food, and medical supplies. The crisis consequently entered a more violent and complex phase, raising serious questions about the internal predicament facing the RSF itself and the factors driving its apparent involvement in fueling a tribal conflict with the potential to spread into additional regions. Indeed, such expansion has already begun to occur within a remarkably short period of time.
The international conflict-monitoring organization ACLED, which closely tracks armed conflicts worldwide, has published several important reports on developments in Sudan over the past three years. One of its most recent assessments highlights the growing fragmentation within the RSF’s sphere of influence. From an analytical standpoint, this trend carries profound implications.
As opportunities for revenge and competition proliferate among communities and armed actors, particularly in areas where state authority remains weak or absent, localized conflicts are likely to expand and intensify. In many cases, these conflicts may ultimately become more dangerous than the larger war itself.
According to the report, this fragmentation is a direct consequence of the RSF’s reliance on a decentralized alliance model based primarily on mutual interests and transactional relationships. That model is now being severely tested by the growing scarcity of resources, a challenge exacerbated by geographic shifts toward regions that offer fewer financial opportunities.
As the economic incentives that once united ethnic militias and former rebel groups continue to diminish, local loyalties are increasingly overshadowing allegiance to the RSF’s central leadership. The result has been the eruption of violent struggles among factions operating under the broader alliance umbrella, each competing for access to what remains of the war economy and its diminishing spoils.
Monitoring and field assessments of the conflict reveal that the incentive structure based on reciprocal transactions—which previously enabled the RSF to absorb local militia leaders into its broader military coalition—has begun to collapse under the weight of mounting economic pressures. Since the second half of last year, the extraction of resources in both Darfur and Kordofan has become increasingly difficult. Expanding violence against civilians and the widespread proliferation of looting have undermined the stability of local communities and disrupted access to resource-rich areas.
While this predatory pattern is not new, eyewitness accounts indicate that mercenary fighters and militia elements have become increasingly dependent on kidnapping and ransom operations as alternative sources of revenue. This evolution reflects not only the deterioration of the conflict economy but also the accelerating disintegration of the social and political order across western Sudan.
* The writer is a Security and Strategic Affairs Expert.
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