This perspective rests on undeniable realities, including strategic competition for global influence, trade and technological conflicts, disputes over regional security issues in East Asia, and divergent political visions and values underpinning the American and Chinese systems. However, reducing the relationship between Washington and Beijing to mere conflict is an analytical error that leads to misleading conclusions regarding the nature of the current international order and its future trajectory.
In reality, relations between major powers have never—at any point in history—been defined purely by conflict or purely by cooperation. Even at the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, channels for communication, negotiation, and coordination remained active, frequently yielding significant agreements on arms control and crisis management. Viewed from this perspective, the US-China relationship today is too complex to be defined merely by competition or confrontation; it encompasses both fierce rivalry in certain areas and essential cooperation in others.
Economically, the United States and China remain key partners, despite years of trade wars, tariff restrictions, and mutual sanctions. In recent years, the volume of bilateral trade has exceeded $500 billion annually, with US companies continuing to rely on Chinese supply chains and the Chinese economy depending on US markets as a primary destination for exports and investments. Despite attempts at "decoupling" or reducing interdependence, the reality indicates that the two economies remain so deeply intertwined that a complete separation would be extremely difficult and costly for both parties—and for the global economy.
In the technological realm, the conflict appears particularly acute due to competition in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced computing, and telecommunications. Yet, this picture does not capture the full scope of the situation. There are multiple levels of scientific and research cooperation involving universities, research centers, and companies in both countries. Furthermore, many contemporary technological innovations have emerged from cross-border production and knowledge networks in which American and Chinese institutions participated—either directly or indirectly. Even as the U.S. tightened restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology to China, forms of academic, investment, and commercial cooperation did not cease entirely; rather, they were reorganized within new frameworks that accommodate national security concerns and strategic competition.
Washington and Beijing also cooperate on international issues that neither can address alone. Climate change remains a critical area for coordination between the world's two largest economies and top emitters. Similarly, global economic stability and the management of international financial crises require a degree of mutual understanding. The same applies to issues such as global health, pandemic control, maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation. Across all these areas, both U.S. and Chinese leaderships recognize that ongoing competition does not eliminate the need for cooperation.
This realization becomes even more significant when considering the stance of U.S. President Donald Trump. Despite the tough rhetoric he adopted toward China at various times, Trump was never a proponent of a complete rupture in relations. Indeed, his vision of international relations is grounded more in pragmatism and transactionalism than in ideological considerations. Consequently, he tends to view China as a power with which one can negotiate, strike deals, and achieve mutual gains through economic, trade, and investment cooperation. Thus, while Trump’s policies do not rule out escalation regarding certain issues, they simultaneously do not preclude major understandings—provided he deems them to serve American interests.
This interplay between competition and cooperation reflects a deeper shift in the nature of the international system. The world is no longer divided into closed blocs, as was the case during the second half of the twentieth century. Today, international relations have become increasingly intertwined and complex due to globalization, economic integration, and the technological revolution. It is therefore difficult to envision an all-out conflict between the United States and China that would result in a complete severance of their economic, scientific, and financial ties. The future will likely see a continued state of affairs characterized by a simultaneous mix of fierce competition and selective cooperation.
However, the prospect of cooperation or mutual understanding between Washington and Beijing should not automatically be viewed as a positive development for all other nations. "Middle powers"—states that lack the capabilities of superpowers yet possess significant economic, diplomatic, or geopolitical resources—may regard a US-China rapprochement with a degree of caution.
In recent years, many middle powers have benefited from the rivalry between the United States and China. By diversifying their economic, technological, and security partnerships, numerous countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East have managed to expand their strategic autonomy and enhance their room for maneuver. The rivalry between the two powers enabled it to secure larger investments, better terms for cooperation, and greater political influence within international institutions.
However, should Washington and Beijing move toward broad-based understandings, this room for maneuver could shrink. Consensus between the two superpowers could entail a restructuring of the rules governing trade, investment, technology, and global security—limiting the ability of middle powers to maneuver between them. It could also lead to the emergence of new international arrangements shaped primarily by the interests of the United States and China, leaving other nations with a less influential role in decision-making.
The experience of the 1960s offers a significant historical example in this context. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the dangers of direct confrontation and gradually moved toward establishing mechanisms to manage their rivalry and limit the risk of nuclear escalation. Although the Cold War persisted for decades thereafter, the period of relative détente and strategic understandings between the two superpowers helped constrain certain states and regional powers that had previously benefited from the ongoing tension between the two blocs. Indeed, considerations of global stability and the nuclear balance sometimes took precedence over the interests of smaller allies or the ambitions of regional powers.
Today, middle powers may face a similar dilemma should the United States and China succeed in establishing a stable framework for managing their rivalry and cooperation. On one hand, this would yield positive effects for the global economy and international stability, while reducing the likelihood of a clash between the two superpowers. On the other hand, it could lead to a greater concentration of global influence in the hands of Washington and Beijing, thereby shrinking the space that middle powers were able to exploit during the period of intense rivalry.
For this reason, middle powers should not base their strategies on the assumption that the US-China conflict will continue indefinitely, nor should they bank on the emergence of a full-fledged partnership between the two powers. The most likely scenario is the continuation of a hybrid relationship that blends competition with cooperation. In this landscape, the most successful nations will be those that continue to diversify their international partnerships, bolster their own capabilities, invest in multilateral diplomacy, and uphold the principles of strategic autonomy. Viewing the U.S.-China relationship as a complex dynamic—interwoven with elements of both conflict and cooperation—offers a more accurate understanding of the current international order. It also helps move beyond simplistic narratives that anticipate either a full-blown new Cold War or a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two powers. Between these two extremes, a multipolar world is taking shape where conflicting and converging interests interact, rendering cooperation and competition two sides of the same coin in great-power relations. In this landscape, the future of the international order will depend not only on the actions of Washington and Beijing but also on the ability of middle powers to safeguard their interests and carve out independent roles within an increasingly fluid and complex international environment.
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