A few weeks ago, I was invited to speak with a group of retired diplomats and local businesspeople in the US State of Colorado about Iran and the future of the Middle East.
The conversation, as usually happens when the region is the subject, did not stay on Iran for long. Gaza entered the discussion, then Sudan, Libya, the Red Sea, and the Nile. What stayed with me most was not a point I made, but something several people in the room repeated in different ways: Egypt, despite all the pressure around it, has so far managed to preserve a difficult balance in its foreign policy.
This balance strategy is evident throughout Egyptian foreign policy, and it is worth noting that the “balance” in this context is not about standing in the middle for the sake of looking moderate. It is more about trying to protect the state in a region where one crisis quickly opens the door to another.
Gaza is not only about the humanitarian relief the Gazans need, but it also touches Sinai, Jordan, domestic politics, Egyptian and Arab public opinion, and the future of the Palestinian question. Sudan is not only a tragic Civil War next door, but it also affects Egypt’s southern border, migration, the Nile Valley, food security, and the Red Sea.
Libya remains tied to Egypt’s western security environment. The Red Sea crisis is hurting the Suez Canal, even though Egypt did not start the war that produced it. And the Nile, above all, remains an existential issue for the country.
For this reason, Egypt’s foreign policy should not be judged by a single issue alone. Cairo is not dealing with one problem, one border, or one negotiation. It is dealing with several pressures at the same time, and each one carries the possibility of escalation. In such circumstances, emotional policies may sound attractive for a moment, but they can be very costly.
Egypt’s approach has been to move carefully, keep channels open, avoid unnecessary confrontation, and draw lines where it believes its core interests are directly threatened.
Gaza is the clearest example. Since the beginning of the war, Egypt has rejected any forced displacement of Palestinians into Sinai. This position is sometimes described abroad as a narrow security concern. Security is certainly part of it, but the issue is bigger than that. Moving Palestinians into Sinai would not solve the Palestinian question. It would shift the conflict into Egypt’s territory, undermine the prospect of a real political settlement, and create a dangerous new reality for the whole region.
Egypt’s refusal is therefore both national and political. It protects the Egyptian border, but it also rejects the idea that the Palestinian cause can be liquidated by pushing its people elsewhere.
Sudan requires a different kind of attention. Egypt does not have the luxury of treating Sudan as a distant crisis. The two countries are connected by geography, history, water, population movement, and security. The longer the war continues, the greater the danger that Sudan’s institutions will weaken further and that armed groups and outside actors will become harder to contain.
Egypt’s basic interest is not to dictate Sudan’s future, but to prevent the collapse of the Sudanese state. This explains Cairo’s repeated emphasis on Sudan’s unity and the preservation of its national institutions. It is a cautious position but caution here should not be confused with indifference.
Libya presents another version of the same problem. On 21 May this year, Cairo hosted the foreign ministers of Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia under the tripartite mechanism of Libya’s neighbouring countries. The meeting reiterated familiar principles: support for a Libyan-led political process, rejection of foreign interference, unification of state institutions, and a move towards elections.
These points may sound routine, but for Egypt, they are not abstract diplomatic language. Libya’s division affects border security, arms trafficking, militias, irregular migration, and the presence of foreign forces close to Egypt’s western frontier. Egypt does not need another permanently open wound on its borders. It needs a Libyan state capable of controlling its own territory.
The Red Sea and the Suez Canal add an economic dimension to this regional pressure. Egypt is paying the price for instability that it did not create. Attacks on shipping, the war in Gaza, the conflict in Yemen, Iranian Israeli tensions, and the calculations of major powers all affect maritime security.
When ships avoid the Red Sea, the impact extends to the Suez Canal and, through it, to the Egyptian economy. Egypt has a clear interest in freedom of navigation, but it also has a clear interest in not being pulled into a wider confrontation whose rules are set by others. This is one of the most difficult parts of Egypt’s current position: it cannot ignore the damage to its interests, but it also cannot rush into an escalation that may cost more than it solves.
Then comes the Nile, which is in a category of its own. Other issues involve security, borders, trade, diplomacy, or regional influence. The Nile is the basic foundation of Egyptian life. Egypt has repeatedly said that cooperation with Nile Basin countries is necessary and desirable. But cooperation cannot mean accepting unilateral actions that threaten water security.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that the Ethiopian government has built on the Blue Nile is not merely a technical dispute about development. For Egypt, the absence of a fair and legally binding agreement on the dam leaves the country exposed to a long-term vulnerability. No Egyptian government can treat water as an ordinary foreign-policy issue, simply because it is not ordinary.
When these issues are seen together, Egypt’s careful language becomes easier to understand. Cairo often avoids making dramatic statements because they can reduce room for manoeuvre. It sometimes waits because waiting may prevent a worse outcome. It negotiates because negotiation, even when frustrating, can keep doors open.
But patience should not be misunderstood. It is not endless, and it is not the same as acceptance. Patience can help manage a crisis, but it cannot resolve one others keep feeding. It can reduce immediate pressure, but it cannot absorb permanent damage.
This is what regional and international actors need to understand. Egypt’s balanced diplomacy is not a blank cheque for the status quo. It is a calculated policy by a state surrounded by overlapping crises and aimed at preventing the region from becoming even more unstable. Those who assume that Cairo will simply continue to absorb the consequences of other actors’ decisions may be misreading the situation.
Egypt cannot solve the Gaza, Sudan, Libya, and Red Sea crises and the Nile dispute by itself. No state could. But Egypt remains one of the few regional actors that matters in all these issues at once. Its geography gives it weight. Its institutions give it continuity. Its diplomatic experience gives it channels that many others lack.
The current policy is not perfect because no foreign policy is ever perfect. But its basic logic is clear enough: protect the state, prevent spillovers, keep diplomacy alive, and avoid paying the price for wars that others begin.
The writer is an associate professor of international politics at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs and the associate director of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 11 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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