Egypt: Revitalising non-alignment

Amr Hamzawy
Wednesday 10 Jun 2026

Revitalising the principles of non-alignment would give the nations of the Global South a historic opportunity to reshape the international order, with Egypt being well-positioned to play an influential role.

 

The world today is witnessing a pivotal moment and one whose implications extend far beyond merely traditional rivalry among the major powers or a simple redistribution of influence within the international system.

What we are truly observing is a widening rift in the norms that have governed international relations for decades, a decline in the capacity of multilateral institutions to manage crises and conflicts, and an erosion of the political and economic consensuses that have served as the bedrock of relative stability since the end of World War II and subsequently since the conclusion of the Cold War.

At the very heart of these transformations stand the United States, Russia, and China, with each acting as a key agent in the reshaping of the international order while also simultaneously serving as sources of turbulence and uncertainty.

In the United States, foreign policy no longer exhibits the degree of continuity that historically defined it. Traditional allies across Europe, Asia, and elsewhere can no longer engage with Washington with the assurance that its choices and commitments remain predictable.

The nationalist and populist currents that surged powerfully over the past decade, culminating in the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House, have undermined many of the foundational pillars upon which American global influence rested. Neither traditional alliances nor multilateral institutions retain the same prominence within American strategic thinking. Indeed, the prevailing discourse has shifted to focus on reducing external burdens and redefining international commitments through the lens of immediate cost-benefit calculations in a shift that has alarmed allies while emboldening rivals to test the limits of American power.

Conversely, Russia continues to pursue policies predicated on the deployment of military and “hard” power to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The war in Ukraine is not merely a limited regional dispute; rather, it poses a direct challenge to the very concept of European security and to the norms upon which relations among European states were established following the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, it exposes the limited capacity of international institutions to prevent or contain wars, while reintroducing into the global arena the lexicon of spheres of influence, zones of control, and military power balances. The result is a less stable Europe, a more fragile international order, and escalating risks of conflicts spilling over into new theatres.

As for China, it continues its global ascent through a diverse and increasingly sophisticated array of instruments. Beijing does not rely solely on military force, even as it rapidly develops its defence capabilities, but rather grounds its strategy primarily in economics, trade, investment, and technology.

By channelling financial resources across various continents and constructing extensive networks of economic partnerships and infrastructure projects, China is working to reshape the global balance of influence in a process that is gradual yet profound in its impact. Furthermore, it seeks to forge new frameworks for cooperation, alliances, and institutional networks that will grant it greater leverage to influence both the global economy and international politics.

Concurrently, the system of alliances led by the United States for decades is coming under unprecedented pressure. Trump’s policies, characterised by scepticism regarding the value of traditional alliances, demand that allies shoulder a greater share of the burden, and a transactional approach to international relations has eroded confidence in the enduring nature of US commitments.

Thus, even as China works to expand its economic and political networks, and Russia continues to challenge European security arrangements, the United States appears less inclined to shoulder the traditional leadership roles it has exercised for many decades.

However, interpreting these transformations solely through the lens of great-power rivalries remains an incomplete analysis. Alongside these major powers there is a broad spectrum of states that lack the military or economic capabilities of the superpowers but are also no longer merely peripheral entities or passive arenas for international competition.

These are the “middle powers” of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East – nations that have come to wield increasing political and economic weight, as well as a greater capacity for diplomatic manoeuvering and the formulation of independent policies.

POSITIVE NEUTRALITY: Hence, the importance of reviving the concepts of non-alignment and “positive neutrality” comes to the fore.

This is not intended to signify a return to Cold War-era paradigms or a romanticised invocation of the past. The world that gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists, and the very nature of international relations has undergone a radical transformation.

Nevertheless, the core principles upon which that movement was founded retain their enduring value and relevance. At the heart of non-alignment lay the autonomy of national decision-making, a refusal to submit to the polarising gravitational pull of the major powers, and a defence of the right of developing nations to chart their own policy courses based on their own national interests rather than on external dictates.

Today, these principles have acquired a heightened significance. The world’s middle powers are under no obligation to align themselves with the United States in its confrontation with China, nor to subscribe to the Chinese worldview, nor to automatically embrace, or oppose, Russian policies.

Rather, their true interest lies in safeguarding their strategic autonomy, cultivating balanced and multifaceted relationships with a diverse array of international actors, and leveraging the rivalry between the major powers to advance their own developmental, economic, and political objectives.

In the 21st century, positive neutrality does not imply standing on the sidelines or refraining from taking a stance; rather, it signifies active engagement in international affairs in defence of stability, multilateral cooperation, and the rule of international law. It also entails working to reform international institutions so that they become more representative of current global power dynamics and better equipped to address the challenges of development, poverty, climate change, food security, and energy crises.

Furthermore, the revitalisation of the principles of non-alignment presents the nations of the Global South with a historic opportunity to reassert their collective role. These nations account for the majority of the world’s population and encompass emerging economies, vast markets, and immense natural resources. Should they succeed in coordinating their positions and strengthening their cooperation, the Global South can transform itself from an object of rivalry among the major powers into an influential actor in shaping the future of the international order.

In this context, Egypt appears well-positioned to play a distinct and influential role. Beyond its considerable weight within the Arab, African, and Mediterranean spheres, Egypt possesses a historical and political legacy directly linked to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser was, after all, one of the most prominent leaders who sought to carve out a space for national sovereignty and independent action for the newly independent nations in a forum free from the polarisations of the Cold War. This undertaking was not merely an attempt to distance these nations from the two rival camps; rather, it was a political and moral project aimed at empowering the nations of the Global South to defend their shared interests and contribute to the construction of a more just international order.

Today, Egypt can draw inspiration from this historical legacy and reinterpret it in a manner befitting the realities of the modern era. It maintains strategic ties with the United States and Europe, while simultaneously cultivating significant partnerships with China and Russia, all the while preserving an influential presence within its Arab, African, and Mediterranean circles.

This diverse network of relationships endows Egypt with the capacity to serve as a bridge between various parties and to contribute to articulating a new vision for the role of the middle powers and the Global South.

Today, the world has no need of new polarisations or a resurgence of bloc-based conflicts; rather, it requires voices that champion cooperation, peaceful resolutions, respect for international law, and multilateralism. It also requires middle powers capable of curbing the major powers’ drift towards confrontation and conflict and of fostering spaces for consensus and dialogue within an international system that is increasingly trending towards multipolarity.

As a result, the revival of non-alignment and positive neutrality is not merely a restoration of a successful historical experience, but rather is a necessary response to profound global transformations. It is a call to empower the Global South to become a partner in shaping the future, rather than a mere recipient of the outcomes of others’ conflicts.

It also presents an opportunity for Egypt to reclaim an inspiring intellectual and political role – one grounded in its history, its geopolitical standing, and its capacity to harmonise independence with openness, as well as the defence of national interests with a contribution towards building a more balanced, just, and stable international order.

The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 11 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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