This week has proved far more dramatic than previous ones in the US-Iran conflict marked by the fragile ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran. By a fortunate coincidence, US President Donald Trump chose his 80th birthday to present a “gift of peace” in the announcement of an agreement set to be signed on Friday in Geneva.
In his remarks, Trump said that “this Great Deal will bring Peace and Security to the whole Region. Many presidents have tried to make Peace with Iran, and all have failed before me. The Leaders of the Region have, for the first time, found a President who can help them achieve real Peace. With the opening of the Strait upon the signing of the Deal on Friday, for purposes of mine removal, oil will flow on both ends again for the Region, and the World!”
The Strait of Hormuz has thus emerged as the overriding priority, a narrow, constricted passage that Iran has long wielded as its trump card in the conflict. At times, it has even functioned as a temporary substitute for Tehran’s nuclear programme, the justification cited by both Israel and the United States to initiate conflict or by the Iranian regime itself as a means of survival.
This reality was underscored by the remarks of Iran’s deputy foreign minister, who stated that nuclear issues will be addressed during a 60‑day negotiation period following the signature of the deal.
Iran had prepared for this scenario, as was evident through three major naval and ground exercises it carried out before the war broke out. In each, the Strait of Hormuz was sealed off using a mix of missile systems, including ballistic weapons such as the Khalij Fars, anti‑ship missiles including the Noor and Qadir, and a range of kamikaze drones like the Shahed‑136, Arash, and Hadid‑110.
Fast attack craft capable of launching short‑range missiles with exceptional manoeuverability have added another layer of threat. Advanced naval mines such as the Maham‑3 have been deployed, with the geography of the strait itself playing a decisive role in enabling surveillance and precision targeting.
At the outset of the conflict, Iran’s naval weapons systems did not attract significant attention from the US, largely because the US Navy could operate at a comfortable distance from Iranian shores. Carrier strike groups and their fighter aircraft enjoyed the luxury of aerial refuelling, enabling them to strike Iranian territory with ease in coordination with aircraft based at Gulf airfields.
With the focus initially on land targets, attention gradually shifted towards neutralising Iran’s conventional naval capabilities in a campaign that has succeeded in destroying all frigates, corvettes, medium‑sized missile boats, and even some submarines.
Yet, its non‑traditional assets have proved far more difficult to suppress, thanks to their ability to hide, manoeuvre constantly, and remain concealed in fortified positions in rugged terrain near the narrow waterway.
In response, Trump ordered a naval blockade of Iranian ports following the collapse of the Islamabad peace talks on 11-12 April that had failed to resolve the wider conflict. The primary objective was to strangle Iran’s economy in parallel with ongoing military operations, with the ultimate aim of forcing Tehran back to the negotiating table.
One of the most critical steps was not only asserting control over the strait but also securing safe passage routes near the Omani and Emirati coasts. This required time to clear mines, a task carried out by unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
US destroyers then conducted two penetrations, deploying two to three ships that managed to escort a limited number of vessels out of the strait. During these operations, they faced multiple threats, including missiles and drones.
For years, such missions have been regarded as suicidal, given that destroyers are far from ideal platforms in the shallow waters of the Gulf where their large size makes them easy targets for successive strikes. Yet, under the protective umbrella of US Navy and Air Force aircraft, the destroyers accomplished their mission without suffering damage.
But these operations underscored the difficulty of resolving the Strait of Hormuz dilemma by force. Despite Washington’s insistence that ships can pass, repeated incidents of Iranian fire against commercial vessels have prompted companies and governments to hold back, seeking to avoid further losses.
Fears persist that Tehran could activate the Houthi front in Yemen to close the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, a catastrophic scenario that would directly threaten the international economic system. Even the skirmishes between Iran and the United States over the past two weeks, nearly derailing the negotiations after Israeli strikes on Lebanon, ultimately led both sides to the unspoken understanding that a limited level of escalation would allow the talks to continue.
The American strikes have concentrated on Iranian Air Defence systems, radar installations, and missile batteries deployed on islands overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran’s response has included targeting the US Fifth Fleet’s command centre and attempting to strike US vessels. This pattern of attacks underscores the fact that both sides’ targets are increasingly focused on the maritime theatre and on the Strait of Hormuz itself.
The strait has become the key to resolving the crisis. The immense regional and international pressure it has generated has forced both sides to confront the dilemma head on. For Iran, the strait has been cultivated as a bargaining chip in the negotiations, with its military industry dedicated to developing systems designed to complicate US naval operations.
For its part, the US Navy has never doubted its ability to operate in a highly contested environment, a fact it demonstrated, though on a limited scale, in two separate instances. Yet concerns remain about the risks of broader operations and the potential for losses. This has driven Washington to intensify the pressure by depriving Iran of its oil exports, aiming to inflict maximum economic damage.
These military dynamics brought both parties to the negotiating table in Geneva. The most pressing question now is how to address Iran’s uranium stockpile, an issue that will come to the fore during the two-month negotiation period.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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