The US and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) separately in Versailles and Geneva last week, but implementing it appears to hinge on its first clause, which calls for the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” and for “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon”.
This point is consistent with Iran’s long-held insistence that any agreement it signs with the US must provide for a ceasefire in Lebanon. When Israel attempted to sabotage the truce by refusing to halt its operations, Tehran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz again. This compelled Washington to exert considerable pressure on the Israeli government to comply.
The MoU seemed to hang in the balance, as Israel – determined to exploit the final moments before the truce – pushed its forces north of the Litani River onto the Ali Al-Taher ridge overlooking Nabatieh. Combined with Beaufort Castle, which the Israeli occupation forces seized in late May, the Ali Al-Taher ridge would give them total fire control over Nabatieh, Hizbullah’s main support base. Israel calculated that this threat would help with its efforts to compel Hizbullah to disarm.
However, Hizbullah had prepared for such an attack. As a result, between Thursday 18 June and Saturday 20 June, six Israeli soldiers, including two officers, were reportedly killed by drone strikes and pre-positioned booby traps set by Hizbullah around Kfar Tebnit. Tel Aviv avenged their death with an intensive wave of bombardment, striking 150 targets across Lebanon, according to Netanyahu, who stated that this was under his direct orders. At least 47 Lebanese were killed during these attacks, including two Lebanese army soldiers and several medical personnel.
These casualties were the price paid by the Lebanese for the “time gap” between the signing of the MoU and the activation of diplomatic channels to enforce the ceasefire in Lebanon. This process involved two tracks. One, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, sought to secure a commitment to a ceasefire from Hizbullah. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri relayed the message that Hizbullah would fully abide by a ceasefire as long as Israel did, but he added that President Trump must commit to ensuring that Israel will halt its attacks on Lebanon.
In several statements, Trump indicated he could do this. Speaking to reporters in France, he said, “I’ve had a great relationship with Bibi, but now Bibi has to be more responsible with respect to Lebanon.” He added, referring to Israel’s lack of restraint, “And you don’t have to knock down an apartment house every time you’re looking for somebody. Because there are a lot of people in those apartment houses. And they’re not all Hizbullah, that I can tell you.”
The second diplomatic track entailed persuading Israel to “be more responsible” towards Lebanon. Tel Aviv calculated that it could undermine an Iranian-US agreement by provoking Hizbullah into retaliating against Israeli strikes and then blaming Hizbullah for the collapse of the ceasefire. This time, however, the US refused to play along.
Forcefully rebuking Israel for its behaviour, Vice-President Vance said, “you can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have.” Vance defended the agreement with Iran, which drew harsh criticism from within the Israeli cabinet. “If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have left anywhere in the entire world,” he said, taking the occasion to remind Israeli leaders that the majority of weapons in the Israeli arsenal were US-made and funded by US taxpayers.
These efforts led to a new, Qatari-brokered ceasefire agreement specifically concerning Lebanon, announced on Friday, 19 June. However, the terms only began to be reflected on the ground two days later. A relative calm settled over Lebanon as the 60-day negotiating phase stipulated by the MoU began in Switzerland. The opening round was attended by Vice-President Vance, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, underscoring the importance Washington attaches to these talks.
It is also noteworthy that this round focused on Lebanon, reflecting Iran’s insistence on the inseparability of Lebanon from a comprehensive agreement. This focus was reflected in a series of American contacts with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to halting Israeli attacks in Lebanon.
Marco Rubio spoke with President Aoun on Saturday, 20 June, to reiterate America’s support for Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty across the entirety of Lebanese territory. Two days later, on Monday, 22 June, Vance and Kushner called Aoun to discuss the steps needed to consolidate the ceasefire. The first round of talks thus reached an agreement to create a deescalation “working group” comprised of Iran, the US and Lebanon, with Qatar and Pakistan acting as facilitators.
This working group will replace the failed “mechanism” created under the 26 November 2024 ceasefire agreement and which was made up of the US, France, UNIFIL, Israel and Lebanon. Under that mechanism, Israel retained full freedom to strike at will across Lebanese territory, rendering any ceasefire meaningless. The new approach, by contrast, is premised on the assurance that Israel will cease the breaches that rendered previous truces meaningless.
On the other hand, the question of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon remains unclear. Tehran has made Israeli withdrawal a fundamental condition for completing negotiations with the US during the 60-day period; however, the Israelis remain bent on preserving what they describe as their “security gains” in the country.
Ahead of the next round of US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington, set for 23-25 June, discussions focused on the practical means to promote the Israeli withdrawal. In the previous round on 2 and 3 June, participants considered the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) take control of areas held by Israel. Hizbullah had rejected this concept, arguing that the occupation forces must withdraw fully and that until they do, Hizbullah would retain the right to attack them wherever they may be on Lebanese territory.
That emphasis on working out arrangements for the Israeli withdrawal is another measure of Iran’s “negotiating weight”. Previous rounds had focused on how to disarm Hizbullah in order to prevent Israeli strikes. Iran has imposed a new logic: Israel must comply with the ceasefire to end the war in Lebanon, enabling the implementation of the MoU so that the Strait of Hormuz remains open.
Remarkably, the tenor of statements coming out of Israel has duly shifted. In contrast to earlier stances insisting on retaining the so-called buffer zone, this week some Israeli officials have begun to speak of a “partial” or “symbolic” withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in line with the US-Iranian MoU.
But it is particularly noteworthy that Qatari mediation has succeeded in creating a practical linkage between the US-Iran and the Lebanese-Israeli negotiating tracks, in the form of the Lebanese Ceasefire Stabilisation Task Force. This linkage gives Lebanon significant additional leverage or at least offsets the pro-Israeli bias that has characterised the US management of the Lebanese-Israeli track.
President Aoun has acknowledged the positive impact of the US-Iranian MoU on Lebanon’s situation. Nevertheless, he has stressed that while his country welcomes help to end the war from whatever direction it comes, Lebanon is a sovereign country and no one is entitled to negotiate on its behalf.
Two questions remain. First, will talks in Washington produce an agreement that lasts beyond the 60-day negotiating period and ensures the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon? Or will they collapse after achieving the immediate objective of a temporary halt?
The second question concerns the little-mentioned Lebanese-Lebanese track. This refers to the negotiations between the government and Hizbullah over the latter’s disarmament to enable LAF to assume control over the entire Lebanese territory, in tandem with the Israeli withdrawal. This, moreover, is part of the larger question of the lack of a Lebanese consensus on the management of war and peace. So far, there is no roadmap for building that much-needed national consensus.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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