A few days before the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the US and Iran, an Emirati security delegation held the country’s first official meeting with Iranian counterparts since long before the war. Later, Bloomberg carried an extensive report about how Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE national security adviser, is now leading efforts to mend relations with the UAE’s adversary across the Gulf.
The UAE was the target of more missiles and drones than any other Gulf country during the three-month war. Unlike other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, it took a hardline position against Iran. But after US President Donald Trump decided to stop the war, Abu Dhabi felt it had to change tack. It is now apparent that the US-Israeli military campaign did not eliminate the Iranian threat to neighbours, but rather left those neighbours to deal with tough consequences.
Since the onset of war by the end of February, the GCC countries’ official position was that “this is not our war”; they did not return fire when attacked by Iran in retaliation for Israeli and American strikes. That stance was not held unanimously by the GCC, but by each country individually. Oman, Qatar and to some extent Saudi Arabia were publicly for an end to the war even if they condemned Iranian attacks on their territories. The UAE, Bahrain and to some extent Kuwait took a more aggressive position. The hope was that war would lead to the fall of the Iranian regime, as the Israelis were clear they wanted regime change in Tehran. The GCC countries would have welcomed that as it would have stopped Iran’s meddling in their internal affairs, using its proxies in the region and maintaining the threat of ballistic missiles.
Gulf countries already had a taste of ballistic-armed Iran, with thousands of missiles and drones hitting targets in almost all the GCC countries and Jordan, along with Israel. According to some Gulf commentators, Iranian attacks have shaken confidence in long-standing security arrangements. “Gulf States have emerged as the war’s main losers – spectators to decisions that reshaped their security landscape and now left to absorb the fallout,” as Reuters put it. To the dismay of Israel and the GCC, the Americans opted for negotiations after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatened dire economic consequences. Trump said last week that if he hadn’t made the deal there would have been a global recession. The Gulf suffered the consequences of a war not of its choice and is left to face consequences not to its liking.
Gulf sources told Reuters this week that the deal is already reshaping strategic thinking: eroding confidence in US protection, entrenching Iran as an enduring regional force and accelerating a shift towards accommodation rather than confrontation.
The fallout from the war is doing rather more than reshaping Gulf relations with the US or future relations with their adversarial neighbour, Iran. It is deepening the fissure within the GCC itself. Behind-the-scenes tension between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi preceded the war on Iran. Despite this, when both countries were hit by Iranian missiles and drones which Tehran claimed targeted American military bases and installations, it appeared as though the two countries would overcome their differences. But judging by media exchanges between Saudis and Emiratis it seems the chasm has widened. The Sultanate of Oman got its share of criticism from the UAE and the rest of the Gulf for its conciliatory stand on Tehran. When the Americans almost shut down the Omani back channel to Iran, Qatar played an active role as a replacement, as one Dubai-based analyst told Al-Ahram Weekly. Doha coordinated closely with Riyadh and Cairo, and though it kept Abu Dhabi in the loop, it was not influenced by its harder stance on Tehran.
The Kuwait-based Reconnaissance Research Centre produced a preliminary assessment of the Iran-US MoU trying to answer these questions: What might the Gulf lose by the US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding? If the settlement grants Iran sanctions relief, economic rehabilitation, and political and security guarantees, then where do Gulf interests stand in this equation? And does the Gulf appear as a partner in shaping the new arrangements or as their potential financier?
In the details, the centre’s assessment concludes that a possible deal would mean that the Gulf countries will lose their victim status as the deal focuses on rehabilitating Iran and ignoring the price they paid in the crisis. Withdrawal of American forces from the region would mean “shrinking the security shield and tilting the balance of power in Iran’s favour”. There would also be possible financial repercussions as “regional partners might have to participate in the $300 billion reconstruction fund.” Finally, the focus on Iranian interests rather than GCC concerns might present a “domestic challenge threatening popular trust in political and security choices”.
For the researchers of the Kuwaiti centre and many others in the Gulf, it seems the Trump administration may go for a final deal that ignores Gulf concerns. If a final deal is reached based on the signed MoU, Tehran will probably retain most of its previous arms of power in the Gulf.
Moreover, the Iranian post-war policy might take advantage of Gulf differences and turn them into winning cards for future arrangements in the region. For example, Iran will probably improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, a process restarted through Chinese mediation in 2023. As the UAE withdrew from the Saudi-led OPEC, Tehran could come back as a vital member. Once Iran reconstructs its energy sector it will capitalise on its relations with Russia, which shares leadership of the OPEC+ coalition with the Saudis. Energy will also be a proper field to enhance Iranian relations with Qatar as both countries share the large offshore gas field in the Gulf.
There are still a few parties in the Gulf hoping that a final deal will not be reached before their concerns are accommodated. Proponents of the Abraham Accords hope that Israel might succeed in sabotaging the deal and keeping Iran under pressure until its regime falls. Others bet on the assumption that if the war unified the Iranian people in support of the regime, peace might be a catalyst for domestic protests that will eventually oust the regime.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 25 June, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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