I have chosen to write not only from the perspective of a former diplomat but, and more importantly, as an Egyptian citizen who fully appreciates the magnitude of the challenges and pressures confronting Egypt from multiple directions and who holds the deepest respect for the political leadership and its measured positions aimed at safeguarding Egypt’s national interests across every domain.
What has prompted me to write at this particular moment is the unprecedented escalation of the dangers surrounding Egypt, most notably Israel’s decision to recognise the self-proclaimed entity of Somaliland followed by the opening of its diplomatic mission in Jerusalem.
These developments unmistakably confirm the trajectory of Israel’s strategic design – a comprehensive penetration of Africa and direct access to the Red Sea region. This is a threat whose implications for freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Bab Al-Mandeb cannot be underestimated and which also involves the militarisation of the southern Red Sea and the disruption of global trade and energy routes.
Such developments would pose both direct and indirect threats to the national security of Egypt and the littoral states, while also undermining Arab-Arab relations, disturbing the balance of Arab-African interests, and transforming vital maritime corridors into another arena for geopolitical competition in the Middle East.
I wish to present several ideas, some of which may be considered unconventional, for confronting and containing these dangers. I do so with full awareness that statements of condemnation or denunciations of regional and international decisions are no longer sufficient by themselves to deter the current Israeli government from pursuing its strategic objectives and hostile policies towards us.
Egypt must therefore adopt policies commensurate with the scale of this challenge and capable of protecting its strategic interests without undue concern over possible objections or reservations from external parties while simultaneously impeding these aggressive Israeli practices. My assessment may be summarised through the following considerations.
First, Egypt’s presence in Africa has become increasingly tangible, particularly since President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi assumed the chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2019. This has been reflected in the intensification of his meetings with African leaders, Egypt’s sustained commitment to hosting African summits and conferences, and, perhaps most notably, the hosting of the UN COP27 Climate Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh on behalf of Africa in 2022. That event embodied an Egyptian policy founded on shared interests rather than rhetorical slogans.
Second, I am confident that the political leadership’s efforts to maximise Egypt’s national interests aspire to a broader and deeper framework that transcends the current model of cooperation. Although this model has produced important successes, it remains largely confined to individual achievements and scattered projects that fall well short of the vast opportunities available for cooperation with Africa, a continent endowed with immense industrial, mineral, and energy resources, as well as exceptional investment opportunities.
Despite the shortcomings experienced by a number of African states in achieving sustainable economic and social progress, these very deficiencies constitute substantial investment opportunities.
Third, achieving a genuine Egyptian breakthrough in Africa requires the formulation of a comprehensive strategy incorporating clearly defined policies and programmes. Such a strategy should establish structured frameworks for cooperation with African partners through the effective participation of both public and private Egyptian institutions across multiple sectors, supported by mechanisms for organisation, implementation, monitoring, and periodic review to ensure continuous improvement and overcome obstacles.
It should identify areas in which Egypt possesses successful experience and which correspond to African priorities, including, but not limited to, the defence industries, economic and social reform, conventional and renewable energy, information technology, food security, water security, infrastructure, healthcare, pharmaceutical manufacturing, communications, information systems, banking, electricity, transportation, climate action, environmental protection, and other related fields.
Fourth, the effectiveness of such cooperation can be significantly enhanced by investing in one of Egypt’s rare comparative advantages: its soft power. When combined with the engine of shared interests, soft power can generate what is now widely described as “smart power”, bringing together art, culture, literature, tourism, aviation, media, sports, as well as the roles of both mosque and church, alongside economic interests to establish sustainable foundations for an enduring and expanding Egyptian presence throughout African states and societies.
Fifth, serious consideration should be given to adopting a new approach based on the joint entry into Africa in partnership with one or more international actors, such as the European Union. Given the increasingly constrained international environment and the growing strains in trans-Atlantic relations, the EU is likely to display greater interest in strengthening its engagement with Africa.
Under such circumstances, it may seek cooperation with a capable African partner, foremost among such partners Egypt, to achieve broader access by combining the comparative advantages of all the participating parties and creating greater capacity to address Africa’s mutual developmental needs in a manner that advances the interests of everyone involved. If consensus can be reached on this innovative approach, it could later be extended to partnerships with other major actors such as Russia, India, Brazil, and others.
Finally, while an African strategy of this nature promises considerable gains and substantial mutual interests for both Egypt and Africa, its success ultimately depends upon prudent and carefully planned management capable of consolidating a strong Egyptian presence within African states and societies. This should be pursued through the effective and well-considered participation of the private sector and a diverse range of national civil society organisations, while adopting a gradual strategy of constraining, containing, and ultimately limiting Israel’s expanding footprint across the African continent.
At the same time, Egypt should send a clear message to all concerned that actions carry consequences: harm will be met with harm, and pressure will be answered with pressure.
The writer is former assistant minister of foreign affairs.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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