The night that nothing leaked

Nermeen Al-Mufti in Baghdad , Tuesday 30 Jun 2026

Iraq’s counter-terrorism services executed an unprecedented anti-corruption crackdown in total secrecy in the capital this week.

The night that nothing leaked
Iraqi security personnel find cash during an anti-corruption raid

 

For years, major political and security operations in Iraq have almost always been preceded by leaks, rumours, and speculation. But in the pre-dawn hours of Sunday, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) quietly launched one of the country’s broadest anti-corruption operations under an extraordinary veil of secrecy.

When Iraqis woke up later that morning, the surprise was not just the crackdown itself, but that almost no one had known about it before it began. While most media outlets were covering what appeared to be an ordinary day, the CTS executed dozens of arrest warrants against MPs, politicians, and current and former government officials in Baghdad and several other provinces.

The operation was marked by an unprecedented level of secrecy and discipline, qualities that many observers believe were decisive to its success.

Within hours, the Iraqi News Agency (INA) began releasing the names of the first group of detainees, announcing that the campaign had targeted dozens of suspects accused of illicit enrichment, unexplained wealth, and abuse of public office.

Those arrested included current and former MPs as well as senior officials. The agency also reported that the Kurdistan Regional Government had handed over MP Ziyad Al-Janabi to the federal authorities after his arrest in Erbil, a move reflecting an unusually high level of coordination between Baghdad and Erbil in executing the warrants.

From the early hours, it became clear that the operation was more than a routine security campaign. The government announced that all the arrests had been carried out under judicial authority and pursuant to warrants issued by the courts.

Iraq’s Commission of Integrity stated that the operation was the product of close cooperation between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, with direct backing from Prime Minister Ali Faleh Al-Zaidi, Chief Justice Faeq Zaidan, and the head of the Commission of Integrity, describing it as one of the most complex anti-corruption operations undertaken since 2003.

The decision to assign the arrests to the CTS was also significant. Long associated with combating terrorist organisations, this elite force found itself confronting a different adversary this time around in the shape of corruption.

Analysts believe it was selected because of its discipline, operational secrecy, and ability to conduct simultaneous raids without compromising operational security, preventing suspects from fleeing or destroying evidence before the security forces arrived.

According to the INA, the investigation originated from confessions made by Adnan Al-Jumaili, a former deputy oil minister and former director of the country’s Baiji oil refinery. His testimony reportedly expanded the investigation to include senior political figures, MPs, and high-ranking officials.

Yet the greatest shock for the public was not the confessions themselves but the assets authorities said they had seized. According to official statements, investigators confiscated billions of Iraqi dinars, millions of US dollars, large quantities of gold, dozens of properties, and luxury vehicles.

Iraqi television channels and social-media platforms were soon flooded with images of the seized cash, gold, and valuables, offering many people their first real glimpse of the scale of the corruption they had long heard about in official reports but had rarely seen so vividly documented.

The list of detainees included figures representing different political currents within Iraq’s fragmented political landscape. Among them was Muthanna Al-Samarrai, head of the Azm Alliance and a sitting MP who had previously been a candidate for speaker of parliament before withdrawing as part of a political agreement among the Sunni parties.

Also arrested were MP Ziyad Al-Janabi, who chaired the parliament’s Integrity Committee during the previous legislative term, and MP Alia Nassif, who served as deputy chair of the same committee, in addition to several current and former legislators and executive officials.

The cases quickly moved beyond government institutions into the public sphere. Iraqi television channels aired reactions from citizens in Baghdad and across the provinces, where many welcomed what they described as a long-awaited step towards restoring the rule of law and holding accountable those accused of misappropriating public funds.

In cafes, markets, and workplaces across the country, discussions of the arrests and the images of seized wealth overshadowed nearly every other news story. Many people called on the authorities to complete the investigations without yielding to political pressure.

Support also came from across the political spectrum. Political parties, parliamentary blocs, and public figures issued statements welcoming the campaign, expressing support for the judicial process and praising what they described as the government’s determination to pursue corruption cases.

Several statements declared their support for Al-Zaidi, emphasising that the true measure of success would not be the number of arrests made but the judiciary’s ability to complete prosecutions and recover stolen assets regardless of the defendants’ political positions or party affiliations.

Amid these developments, some media outlets circulated reports suggesting that agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had participated in aspects of the operation. However, neither the Iraqi nor the American authorities have officially confirmed these reports, leaving them unverified.

Although the campaign is still in its early stages, it has revived a question that has haunted the Iraqi state for more than two decades: can the country’s institutions transform high-profile arrests into judicial convictions and recover stolen public assets, or will this episode, like many before it, become entangled in political bargaining and competing centres of power?


* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.

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