The 14-point US-brokered Framework Agreement concluded between Lebanon and Israel last week imposes far more stringent obligations on Lebanon than on Israel, leading some critics to describe it as a capitulation.
The first provision – the mutual recognition of the right to exist in peace – effectively secures Lebanon’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a state in historic Palestine. It thus marks a clear departure from the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which established a military ceasefire without politically recognising Israel or settling final territorial questions.
In Lebanese political discourse, Israel has continued to be referred to as the “occupying power”. While the Framework Agreement does not alter the legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it is another step towards delinking the Palestinian cause from the broader Arab framework.
Some have characterised the agreement – in which Israel and Lebanon declare “their intention to conclusively end the conflict, address its underlying causes, and to therewith formally conclude any state of war between them” – as a prelude to a comprehensive peace treaty – or a kind of Oslo process.
One of the more striking aspects of the agreement is that it makes Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories contingent upon Lebanon. The Israeli withdrawal has been linked to the ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to impose the state’s monopoly on arms by disarming non-state groups, namely Hizbullah. There is no clear timetable for this process; nor are there guarantees of Israeli compliance.
Under Articles 2 through 4 of the agreement covering the “redeployment of Israeli forces outside Lebanese territory,” the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces would proceed in stages. The LAF would deploy in designated “pilot areas” to disarm Hizbullah, and the success of the operation would be jointly assessed by the US and Israel. Only then would the occupation forces “redeploy” outside the pilot area.
As critics have pointed out, since Israel retains the right to evaluate the LAF’s performance, it will continue to have a pretext for reneging on its commitment to withdraw, especially given the absence of an independent assessor. The details of this phased process have yet to be fleshed out in a “Security Annex” to be negotiated between Lebanon and Israel under US auspices. At present, the two sides have only agreed on two “pilot zones” of unspecified size and location.
Given the open-ended nature of the process, it appears that the Lebanese government has approved the presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory for as long as it takes. That could be very long, since Lebanon has undertaken to disarm Hizbullah not only in the south of the country but throughout Lebanese territory.
In Article 5, Israel claims that its operations in Lebanon were “solely a consequence” of Hizbullah attacks and that disarming and dismantling the group “in all of Lebanon”, along with “additional security arrangements”, would eliminate any future need for such operations.
Taken in conjunction with the other provisions, this effectively gives Israel a green light to continue military actions across Lebanon until Israel alone determines that Hizbullah’s military infrastructure has been dismantled in every corner of the country.
Lebanon has reaffirmed its commitment to “restoring” its full sovereignty over all its territory and to “rebuilding” its monopoly on the use of force and its exclusive authority over decisions concerning war and peace.
In Article 6 of the agreement, it states that the Lebanese government “rejects the claims of any state or non-state actor to use force on its behalf without its explicit authorisation”. It is unclear whether “state or not-state actor” also includes Israel.
The following article states that nothing in the agreement prevents its parties from “exercising their inherent right to defend themselves, as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with applicable international law, reaffirming that no third party may exercise that right on their behalf.”
They further “share the objective of a secure, rebuilt Lebanon, under full Lebanese state sovereignty, in which no non-state armed group poses a threat to Israel, Lebanon, or citizens of either country.”
The following article imposes a further security-related condition on Lebanon, stating that “Lebanon commits to a rigorous, performance-based programme to enable the capacity of the LAF to assert full military and security control within Lebanon in accordance with security arrangements, agreed upon within the framework of negotiations, and to implement the disarmament of all non-state armed groups and exercise effective authority across Lebanon.”
Any new US assistance will be “strictly conditioned” on the “verifiable” success of the LAF’s mission. Washington has also volunteered to “rally international partners” to support reconstruction, economic recovery, and humanitarian assistance, as long as Lebanon commits to “preventing funds from flowing to any entity, organisation, or individual affiliated with non-state armed groups.”
Amid all the caveats, it is noticeable that Israel has been relieved of all responsibility for bearing the costs of the immense destruction it has inflicted on Lebanon – for the razing of southern villages, water and energy infrastructure, schools and other civilian structures.
Instead, the onus of the reconstruction is placed on the Arabs and other partners, whose efforts will be coordinated by the US. Under the terms of the agreement, Southern Lebanese residents will also be barred from receiving assistance from Iran, which had offered reconstruction and other humanitarian assistance to Southern Lebanese communities in the aftermath of previous Israeli invasions, particularly in 2006.
The assumption is that this will weaken the bonds between these predominantly Shia communities and Iran and Hizbullah.
The two parties have also agreed to “work to establish working groups to draft the full comprehensive peace and security agreement” and “to achieve the goals of the framework, the two governments will immediately establish complementary tracks of ongoing direct engagement, facilitated by the United States.”
These steps are to go into effect “upon the signing” of the agreement, which means that drafting a comprehensive peace agreement is expected to begin immediately while the withdrawal of Israeli forces can be extended indefinitely.
In addition, Lebanon has effectively agreed to relinquish the right to bring legal proceedings against Israel in international legal forums, arguably including efforts to seek accountability for alleged war crimes.
Article 13 includes “the cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora” among the good-faith measures the parties are expected to undertake. Even if individual victims retain the right to seek justice through international tribunals, they would be unlikely to enjoy the diplomatic or legal support of their government.
The agreement clearly reflects the pro-Israeli bias of the American mediator and Lebanon’s lack of leverage, a product of Israel’s military superiority and its unrestrained use of violence. The text also reflects the complete disconnect between Hizbullah’s battlefield achievements against invading Israeli forces and the Lebanese negotiating team, which cast it as a threat to the Lebanese state.
Some have suggested that the US pushed for a hasty conclusion of the negotiations over the wording of the text for fear that changes on the battlefield or Iranian influence through the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US could strengthen Lebanon’s negotiating hand.
While Lebanon may feel at a disadvantage in this process, it did not have to concede so much freedom to Israel to continue wreaking destruction across the south of the country. Nor was it necessary to task the LAF with a politically sensitive mission amid the local population of the south and agree to the linkage between Israel’s withdrawal and its successful completion of its mission.
Likewise, it was not obliged to sign an agreement that envisages normalisation with Israel, without making steps towards this end contingent on the complete withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces. It did not need to sign away its rights under international law to prosecute Israel for alleged war crimes, including the many attacks on medical personnel, journalists, civilian infrastructure, or to seek reparations for the damage Israel caused.
It is unlikely that this controversial agreement will endure for long. On the one hand, its fate depends on developments surrounding the US-Iranian MoU. On the other hand, it must be approved and ratified by the Lebanese parliament, a prospect that appears highly unlikely given the outcry it has provoked well beyond Hizbullah’s supporters, including among political blocs that had endorsed the direct negotiations with Israel.
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has come out against the agreement, and he is expected to mobilise action in parliament to prevent its ratification.
The principal obstacle to the implementation of the agreement may emerge from another direction, however. The Israel announcement that it has withdrawn from areas north of the Litani River was revealing. Israeli forces never held those areas to begin with but only bombarded them from the air. The ruse has been described as the first of many Israeli acts of procrastination and evasion.
Two days after the agreement was signed, an Israeli officer was killed in Deir Siryan, suggesting that the Lebanese resistance remains determined to fight the occupation of the south. Like the Lebanon “truce” of recent weeks, the framework agreement seems likely to remain little more than words on paper.
It has been likened to the 17 May 1983 agreement following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. That agreement collapsed within a year of its signing.
Since then, however, the LAF has become a cohesive professional institution rebuilt on national foundations after the Civil War. It operates in accordance with a military doctrine that will not allow it to be used to carry out military operations on Israel’s behalf.
More importantly, it will not become embroiled in confrontation with the Lebanese people, nor will it allow itself to be drawn into internal strife. Ultimately, this is the greatest challenge raised by the agreement, which, if implemented, could become a time bomb that could shatter the civil peace in Lebanon.
The writer is a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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