Lebanon’s new US-brokered framework agreement with Israel has triggered an intense political split in Beirut, with critics warning it could reopen the country’s civil war fault lines if implemented by force.
The deal, which ties Israeli withdrawal and security arrangements to Hizbullah’s disarmament and to the Lebanese state taking control on the ground, has become the centre of a national debate over sovereignty, war, and the risk of internal conflict.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has led the rejection camp, calling the agreement a “diktat” rather than a real accord and saying it “will not pass”.
He warned that the framework could deepen internal divisions and “open the door to sedition,” while also comparing it to the 17 May 1983 agreement in a reference loaded with civil-war-era memory in Lebanon.
Berri’s allies and other Hizbullah-linked voices have gone further, saying that forcing the agreement’s implementation could push Lebanon towards civil war. Their argument is that any attempt to disarm Hizbullah through state coercion, especially under foreign pressure, could spark a dangerous domestic confrontation.
Supporting this view, Hizbullah MP Ali Al-Miqdad also drew a direct parallel to the 1983 accord, claiming that the current draft is even more detrimental to Lebanon’s interests.
“With this agreement, it is as if the occupation of our country has been made legal,” Al-Miqdad stated. “No talks on ending the state of hostility with the Zionist entity can be held with the existence of occupied sovereign territory.”
This opposition is rooted in a fundamental rejection of direct negotiations with Israel, particularly without neutral international guarantors.
Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly, Hizbullah public relations official Youssef Al-Zein noted that several Lebanese political forces share this reluctance to return to a negotiating table lacking balanced oversight.
Al-Zein pointed to past diplomatic failures, such as the long-unimplemented Sharm El-Sheikh accords for the Gaza Strip, as evidence that international supervision often fails to deliver on the ground. He also argued that the US bias towards Israel prevents it from acting as a neutral mediator.
Addressing the recovery of the country, political analyst Kassem Kassir told the Weekly that the early recovery process in the southern towns of Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut (Dahiyeh) would be futile without firm guarantees protecting the country from further Israeli attacks.
Kassir explained that without these assurances, Israel could exploit security gaps to repeatedly destroy newly rebuilt infrastructure.
He noted that a strategic consensus has emerged among the opposing parties that the current draft of the agreement serves to legitimise the occupation and jeopardise the safety of displaced populations, meaning any final framework must instead be achieved through national consensus within Lebanon’s official constitutional institutions.
On the other side, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has framed the framework agreement as a rare opening for Lebanon. He described it as “the greatest opportunity Lebanon has had to emerge from disastrous conditions,” arguing that the state must regain full control and that the agreement could help restore sovereignty and stability.
Geagea has also said that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are effectively negotiating out of necessity, not choice. In his view, the Lebanese government must lead the file because the alternative is continued paralysis under Hizbullah’s armed influence, which he said has weakened the state’s ability to act.
In the latest wave of reactions, Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros Al-Rahi, Druze political leader Walid Jumblatt, and Druze leader Marwan Hamadeh have also emphasised that Lebanon cannot compromise on its sovereignty, though each approached the negotiations from a distinct perspective.
Al-Rahi stated that Lebanon “will not compromise on its rights” during the US-hosted talks. He emphasised that President Aoun represents all the Lebanese and does not speak from a sectarian standpoint, framing the negotiations as a national issue rather than a confessional one and rejecting any attempt to turn the talks into sectarian bargaining.
Jumblatt has adopted a more cautious position. While calling for a “clear final framework”, he warned against vague, open-ended formulas that could repeat past diplomatic failures, explicitly citing the Oslo model used in the Oslo Accords of the 1990s as a cautionary example.
He argued that the deal must leave no “grey areas”, insisting that Israel must withdraw completely from Southern Lebanese territory and that the ceasefire, the UN monitoring forces UNIFIL’s role, and Lebanese sovereignty must remain central.
Jumblatt also asserted that Lebanon must not be used as a battlefield for broader regional bargaining. Rejecting “Israeli dictates”, he proposed that any disarmament process must proceed in parallel with Israeli withdrawal and the strengthening of the Lebanese army in a stance that is less confrontational than Hizbullah’s but remains sceptical of an incomplete or imposed agreement.
Marwan Hamadeh, meanwhile, aligns with the camp supporting state authority and a negotiated exit from the crisis. His broader political alignment reflects the pro-state position: accepting negotiation, provided it protects Lebanese rights, restores the state’s monopoly on force, and avoids dragging the country into another internal breakdown.
Despite these differing perspectives, procedural objections persist regarding the domestic management of the negotiations. Al-Zein criticised the executive branch for conducting talks unilaterally, contrasting the process with past maritime border negotiations with Cyprus, which were submitted to parliament.
He noted that the cabinet was not briefed on the Lebanese delegation’s mandate until late in the process, leaving out key political partners.
Amal Movement Political Bureau Member Hassan Kabalan echoed these concerns, warning that the agreement risks importing external political deadlocks into Lebanon. He emphasised the necessity of a broad national dialogue led by Berri and Hizbullah to preserve domestic unity.
Additionally, Kabalan pointed out that the draft ignores international resolutions regarding Palestinian refugees, which runs counter to the Lebanese constitution’s explicit prohibition of their permanent settlement and naturalisation.
Regarding the technical details of the disarmament and withdrawal, representatives of the Hizbullah-Amal alliance have outlined specific parameters. Al-Miqdad insisted on a clear, total Israeli withdrawal not exceeding 60 days, with the Lebanese army immediately taking control of any territory south of the Litani River as Israeli forces exit.
On the question of weapons, Al-Zein proposed a phased approach. “The resistance is saying that if the Israeli forces pull back completely south of the Litani River, then there is an agreement that [security] will not be in the hands of the resistance but in the hands of the Lebanese army and the state,” he said.
He added that the status of weapons north of the river must be resolved through internal consensus under a National Defence Strategy. Kabalan agreed, stating that disarmament must be addressed through a domestic defence framework rather than imposed externally.
The result is a sharp national divide: one camp sees the deal as a path out of conflict, while the other sees it as a dangerous imposed settlement that could trigger a new crisis.
For many Lebanese, the argument is no longer only about borders or weapons, but about whether the state can assert its authority without dragging the country into another internal rupture.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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