The 36th NATO Summit taking place in Ankara this week has several major aims, one being to mend the rift within the alliance caused by the war the US and Israel launched earlier this year against Iran.
Secondly, the participants will reassess prospects for either a diplomatic or military breakthrough in the conflict in Ukraine, which has been another source of trans-Atlantic tensions.
Thirdly, they will discuss the redistribution of the defence burden, while reaffirming their commitment to the target of allocating five per cent of national GDP to defence spending.
The recent war in the Gulf and other geopolitical developments have also driven home the urgency of crucial issues, especially the security of supply chains dependent on critical minerals.
In the lead-up to the summit, US President Donald Trump, echoed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, ratcheted up his criticism of key European allies over their failure to mobilise NATO support for the US in its war against Iran. Previously, Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had exchanged barbs over the same issue.
But a number of concrete indicators lead to the conclusion that NATO is undergoing an unprecedented revival since its establishment in the aftermath of World War II.
This is reflected in military spending, as evidenced by the largest defence budget in NATO’s history, and in broader transformations in the organisation’s defence posture, as epitomised by the Steadfast Noon exercise, which restored nuclear deterrence to the forefront of NATO’s priorities.
Such developments come on top of structural expansion through the admission of new members and the corresponding expansion in NATO’s geopolitical reach.
NATO’s resurgence, or “resilience” to use its own terminology, is a response to a critical transitional moment in the international order. This has been marked by China’s emergence as a global military power, the ongoing pressure Russia is exerting along NATO’s eastern flank, and the reconfiguration of security and defence lines across interconnected regions stretching from Eurasia through the Middle East.
Meanwhile, developments in the Indo-Pacific are overturning long-held defence approaches in Asia, as illustrated by the transformation in Japan’s defence outlook, bringing it closer to NATO, including through the deployment of military personnel to Ukraine for training purposes.
Amid such profound transformations, sharp differences in perspectives – and perhaps even priorities – are to be expected.
Whenever Trump attends a summit, it is nearly impossible to predict its outcome, especially given the scope given to the dynamics of deal-making.
The process was foreshadowed by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent remarks in Washington, where he hailed the alliance’s unprecedented $1 trillion defence spending target, which he attributed to Trump’s success in pushing NATO allies to increase their defence spending.
The practical implications of this will become apparent in the extent to which Trump steers NATO procurement contracts towards US defence firms and makes such contracts contingent on political conditions.
The 36th NATO Summit may also reshape internal patterns of cooperation among member states. Signs of closer Turkish-American relations had already emerged before the summit, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasising the centrality of the US role in NATO, while Trump reciprocated the compliment by saying he would attend the summit because it was being held in Turkey.
Turkey is capitalising on its status as summit host to reposition itself within NATO and to bolster its standing with Washington and the European powers. Turkey is the alliance’s second-largest military power, and the rapid growth of its defence industry has lent added value to this distinction.
Turkey’s continued exclusion from the EU’s €150 billion SAFE programme helps explain Erdoğan’s call for “a security network stretching from Texas to Ankara”. He is keen to ensure that Washington remains at the centre of any future European security architecture, aware that Turkey would be effectively excluded from a fully “Europeanised” defence order.
Many European countries have come to view Turkey in a more positive light, even if they are more reserved in expressing this. They approach Turkey primarily through a security lens. For example, in the event of a European shift towards advancing a diplomatic breakthrough in the Ukraine crisis, Turkey would play an indispensable role in light of its relationship with Russia.
While Europe is working to stimulate a renaissance in defence manufacturing, spearheaded by Germany’s decision to establish 16 new factories under the leadership of Rheinmetall four years ago, this ambition faces a number of obstacles.
The most important is the ongoing bilateral defence partnerships with the US, which are more robust than inter-European partnerships, despite repeated declarations of the intent to attain greater strategic autonomy.
The second is military supply chains, which call into play different vulnerabilities. Of particular importance is the so-called “sovereign market” for advanced technologies and critical minerals. At its 2024 summit, NATO identified 12 critical minerals essential to future defence industries. This was followed by a German-European initiative to establish an Infineon semiconductor manufacturing facility in Dresden.
Ultimately, events in Ankara may lead to a substantial redefinition of the North Atlantic compact. Structurally, they are likely to cement the transition away from complete reliance on the American security umbrella towards a model in which the US serves as the ultimate guarantor.
Strategically, they will advance the shift from direct American military commitments to a predominantly commercial and industrial role. Functionally, they will confirm the extent to which NATO’s defence vision has expanded beyond Europe to encompass Middle Eastern transit corridors, global supply chains, and strategic hedging against China.
Rutte has said that he looks forward to inaugurating “NATO 3.0”, the alliance’s third founding phase. “NATO 2.0” referred to the post-Cold War era. Ultimately, the success of “NATO 3.0” will hinge on how it manages the critical gap between reducing Europe’s military dependence on the US and the speed with which Europe builds its own defence capabilities.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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