The European Union led by Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas has enthusiastically accepted the Washington-brokered framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon that aims to disarm Hizbullah, withdraw the Israel Occupation Forces (IOF) from Lebanon, and implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ending the war between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon.
It has committed itself to delivering a €100 million aid package to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to support the deal and has indicated its willingness to send a possible EU security mission in 2027.
But with deep-rooted geopolitical divides and issues of sovereignty undecided, there are huge practical and political challenges in implementing the deal on the ground, according to observers of the region.
The weak position of the Washington-brokered truce is clear in the present frantic diplomatic climate. It assumes a delicate balance between competing interests, according to former Lebanese ambassador Masoud Maalouf in comments to Al-Ahram Weekly.
Washington is seeking to head off domestic pressures and quell economic tensions caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of the US-Israeli war on Iran and the ensuing surge in energy prices.
But Israel is attempting to derail US-led diplomatic efforts towards a sustainable peace deal in Lebanon led by its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Maalouf said that Netanyahu will not accept any deal with Iran that does not lead to regime change in Tehran and the dismantling of the Iranian military. Israel has been upping the ante on the Lebanese front, where Iran wants to see a comprehensive ceasefire.
Syria is not in a position to act as a buffer in the conflict as it is internally unstable and is apprehensive of Iran.
The diplomatic deadlock reflects the unstable security situation on the ground. Lebanese military commentator Ahmad Rahal told the Weekly that the regional security landscape is being reshaped, with the emergence of new actors.
Lebanon and Syria are suffering from a massive “loss of sovereign decision-making power,” he said.
There are various security pressures facing Syria in the north and south of the country, where Israel continues to make incursions. The US has yet to give details of a realistic plan to disarm Hizbullah or reconcile the divergent interests of Lebanon’s domestic political groups, he said, making the implementation of the agreement uncertain.
Regional dynamics have drawn attention to the limited diplomatic space available to Syria in the Lebanese crisis and Ankara’s increasing unease about the balance of power in the region.
Syrian commentator Ayman Abdel-Nour told the Weekly that Damascus is not looking for a military solution but rather is working as a political “facilitator” in the crisis, aiming to keep lines of communication open with different Lebanese political and sectarian circles with the objective of achieving stability.
Syrian envoy Asaad Al-Shaibani recently visited Beirut with the message that Damascus aims to respect the sovereignty of Lebanon and does not intend to carry out a military intervention that would raise sectarian tensions.
These diplomatic endeavours have not necessarily reassured other regional countries, however.
“They are threatening Turkey’s position”, said Joe Hammoura, an expert on Turkish affairs, in an interview with the Weekly.
Israel and Turkey are emerging as the region’s chief competitors with Iran, and Ankara would consider any involvement by Syrian forces in Lebanon as a form of power-sharing between Damascus, Israel, and the West that might ultimately hinder Turkey’s influence in the region, Hammoura said.
Damascus has ruled out any military measures for the time being, but the Syrian regime could be forced to accede to external demands if these were made by the US or Israel, he added.
Western attempts to play the middleman in the crisis have also been limited by the failure to come to a policy consensus within the European Union and the fact that Washington’s foreign policy agenda is overwhelming designed to serve its own interests.
Lebanese affairs expert Tamam Noureddine said that the EU’s role in the region is insignificant in comparison to that of the US. Beirut earlier refused to accede to requests from France to formally ask the EU for a larger presence in the country, fearing that this could face a lukewarm response from Washington and the cancellation of US support for the Lebanese economy.
“Lebanon’s level of disillusionment about the decrease in direct French engagement relative to other projects run by French President Emmanuel Macron has increased among the Shia community in Lebanon,” Noureddine told the Weekly.
The EU’s foreign policy agenda is divided politically between the proponents of greater security engagement, supported by France, and those who want to engage through economic means, supported by Germany.
Any move by the EU or France to intervene in terms of security will depend on a formal request from Lebanon and Washington’s approval.
The new security architecture raises an array of issues over constitutional and international law and the use of foreign troops in Lebanon. International law expert Wassim Shmayssani said that the hosting of a foreign force in Lebanon would affect state sovereignty, and if the government were to give a foreign power the right to carry out actions in Lebanon without a treaty or constitutional amendment, this could amount to a violation of the law.
Shmayssani said that there are clear differences between forces deployed under the auspices of UN and other regional or bilateral forces, such as the proposed EU mission, which would have to make an agreement with the Lebanese state.
Any offer to “hand over” political or security matters in Lebanon to the Syrian authorities would be contrary to the principle of “non-intervention” enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter and would negatively affect Lebanese sovereignty.
While the Washington-brokered deal between Israel and Lebanon, with the support of the EU, is an important diplomatic achievement, it will depend on a complex matrix of regional interests for its implementation.
Stabilising Lebanon and implementing UN Resolution 1701 will not only depend on a consensus among Lebanon’s communities and the LAF, but also a delicate balancing of US, Israeli, Syrian, Iranian, and Turkish strategic interests.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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