Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s visit to Istanbul on 10 July at the head of a delegation that included officials responsible for energy, public works, environment, and security coordination was not an isolated event.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is expected to follow suit before the end of the month, on his way back from an anticipated trip to Washington to meet US President Donald Trump.
These moves to strengthen bilateral ties come soon after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks in which he said that Turkey’s security begins with that of Damascus and Beirut. Until recently, Ankara tended to regard Syria as its first line of defence. Adding Lebanon to the equation signals a significant shift in the Turkish regional doctrine.
Ankara is concerned by the ongoing Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon and by Israel’s growing predominance in the region, reflected in the recent US-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel.
Erdogan has emphasised his country’s support for Lebanon’s independence and for the preservation of its territorial unity and integrity. He has also called for sustained pressure on Israel to withdraw fully from Lebanese territory.
Turkey’s increased interest in Lebanon is motivated by the need to fill a strategic vacuum created by the decline of Iranian influence. It seeks to establish itself as a significant player in Lebanon to ensure that the country is not left without strong regional backing.
The Turkish approach also complements Arab efforts, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to strengthen the authority of the Lebanese state. This entails establishing the state’s sovereignty over the entirety of its territory, securing its exclusive monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and preventing the collapse of civil peace and the outbreak of internal strife.
At the same time, Ankara has made its impartiality clear: it will not favour one Lebanese faction over another nor enter into agreements with any Lebanese parties other than the state itself.
This was reflected in Salam’s visit, in which he met with Erdogan. The agenda mainly focused on reviving the bilateral free-trade agreement between the two countries, strengthening security coordination and border control, and expanding cooperation in infrastructure and energy investment.
Turkish-Lebanese relations cooled somewhat after Lebanon signed a maritime border demarcation agreement with Cyprus in November 2025 within the framework of offshore natural gas exploration and drilling arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Ankara strongly opposed the agreement, which it felt conflicted with Turkish energy interests in the region. Turkey’s image in Lebanon, while generally positive, has also been affected by the historical grievances of Lebanon’s Armenian community, which continues to hold Turkey responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against their ancestors in Anatolia just over a century ago.
However, recent geopolitical developments have shown that the partnership with Turkey is worth cultivating. Since the overthrow of the Al-Assad regime in Damascus a year-and-a-half ago, Turkey has been able to furnish a substantial protective umbrella for Syria while the new Syrian government consolidated its rule in Damascus.
The growing international legitimacy of Syria’s new rulers also owes itself in large measure to Turkish diplomacy.
Turkey, alongside Saudi Arabia, was instrumental in persuading the US to lift the sanctions on Syria, overcoming Israeli pressure to perpetuate them until Syria agreed to conclude an inequitable peace treaty conceding territory in the Golan Heights to Israel.
Turkey’s efforts on behalf of the new Syrian government also helped convince Washington to pressure Israel into halting the air campaign it had carried out against Syria since the fall of the Al-Assad regime.
Unfortunately, US pressure did not extend to stopping the ongoing Israeli ground incursions into Syria in Quneitra, western Daraa, and at times as far north as the Damascus governorate. Israel continues to occupy approximately 350 square km of territory in addition to the occupied Golan Heights, territory that had previously been reserved for the deployment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).
Nevertheless, Syria enjoys greater calm and stability now that Washington has come around to the Turkish view that a stable and unified Syria serves US interests in the region, in contrast to the model of a divided, war-ravaged Syria that Israel sought to perpetuate.
This background helps us to understand the significance of a potential Turkish role in Lebanon. Israel seeks to perpetuate its presence within the area it has unilaterally designated as a security buffer zone. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has a personal stake in this, as he needs to keep Lebanon available as a theatre for military escalation as a means to mobilise support from the Israeli far right ahead of the parliamentary elections expected to take place in the autumn.
Turkey could throw a spanner into these plans by persuading Washington that bringing a permanent end to the war in Lebanon serves regional interests and, by extension, US interests.
This does not require a Turkish military presence in Lebanon or even a Syrian presence serving as Turkey’s proxy in Lebanon. Instead, Turkey could draw on its strengths as a regional power to build up the pressure on Israel from Washington and other quarters to fully withdraw its forces from Lebanon.
The prospective Turkish role in Lebanon has a major economic dimension that complements the important part the country is playing in Syria’s reconstruction. It includes channelling investment and technical expertise, in cooperation with Arab Gulf and international partners, into the reconstruction of Southern Lebanon and the revival of the Lebanese economy.
It may also entail technical and logistical assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and security services as they strive to assert the state’s sovereignty across the entirety of Lebanese territory and tighten the security of the Lebanese-Syrian border, which affects Turkey’s own border security.
In this regard, the Turkish role differs fundamentally from that of Iran. Whereas Turkey aims to strengthen state institutions, promote the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, prevent security breakdown, and strengthen border security, Iran has traditionally sought to draw regional states into its orbit, relying on its network of non-state actors whether in Lebanon or in Syria before the fall of Al-Assad, in Iraq, or in Yemen.
Turkey has already started implementing its approach in Syria, where it has been helping the new authorities in Damascus to reduce weapons outside the control of the state and to dismantle armed groups.
However, these efforts will most likely remain incomplete unless they extend into Lebanon due to the porous Lebanese-Syrian border that hampers efforts to secure the Syrian-Turkish frontier.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the anticipated Turkish role in Lebanon is that it forms part of a confluence of regional powers determined to isolate the perpetually war-thirsty Israel by forging a coalition of states committed to ending conflict and establishing a just peace.
Accordingly, Turkey’s role inherently complements Egypt’s efforts to end the war in Gaza, Pakistan’s efforts to end the US war against Iran, and the Saudi Arabian and Qatari initiatives to promote de-escalation and dialogue in Lebanon.
A central objective of these regional efforts is to ensure that Lebanon is not alone when facing Israel in the US-sponsored negotiations. They seek to strengthen Lebanon’s negotiating position so that it can defend its interests at the negotiating table instead of buckling under the weight of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority.
In practical terms, this would separate the Lebanese-Israeli negotiating track from the parallel Iran-US track in a manner that would not weaken Lebanon’s position but rather strengthen it through the support of its regional partners and allies.
Through its prospective role in Lebanon, Ankara stands to gain in many ways. It will reinforce its strategic presence in the Middle East, build new bridges of development linking countries in this region with Europe, and consolidate its image as a reliable guardian of Europe’s southeastern gateway and NATO’s frontier at the edge of the Middle East.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 16 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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