Between 6 and 8 July, the Strait of Hormuz once again became the stage for a high-stakes confrontation.
Three vessels attempted to transit the strategic waterway without heeding directives from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), namely the Al-Rekayyat, a Qatari-owned liquified natural gas (LNG) tanker, the Wedyan, a Saudi-flagged oil carrier, and the Cyprus Prosperity, a Liberian-flagged commercial ship.
Their defiance drew a swift response, as Iranian naval forces launched direct attacks on all three ships. The incident immediately reignited US-Iran tensions, ushering in a fresh round of military exchanges and signaling the start of yet another round in the Gulf’s maritime standoff.
At present, there are no political understandings in place to manage the Strait of Hormuz, a vacuum that has reignited military operations as each side seeks to impose its own version of a fait accompli.
On the operational level, two distinct maritime routes have emerged. The first runs north and south of Iran’s Larak Island, a corridor Tehran insists vessels must use and is attempting to enforce compliance with through force.
The second is the passage cleared by the US Navy in June, where American destroyers now undertake missions to escort only a handful of ships at a time. Despite Washington’s repeated assurances that “all ships can pass” the strait, the reality in the region suggests otherwise.
Securing safe transit through the strait remains an elusive goal that is fraught with risk and contested at every turn.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) has made it clear that its top priority is neutralising Iran’s naval arsenal, which it views as a two-pronged threat.
The first part of this is Iran’s extensive surveillance and reconnaissance network deployed along the Gulf coastline that is capable of tracking vessels and relaying targeting data.
The second part is the weapons systems themselves, notably air-defence platforms such as the Majed and Saqr-358, which have already downed advanced MQ‑9 drones. Operating in complete radar silence, these systems rely on ambush tactics, forcing the US to integrate reconnaissance drones with suppression assets like F‑16CMs armed with lightweight GBU‑54 bombs.
Iran’s offensive portfolio is equally diverse, ranging from Noor‑2 and Ghadir anti-ship missiles to longer-range Soumar and Talaieh cruise systems backed by strike drones including the Shahed‑136 and Hadid‑110.
Mounted on mobile launchers, these weapons can fire and withdraw rapidly, complicating detection and placing heavy demands on US dynamic targeting teams. To counter this, Washington has deployed FLM‑136 drones of the LUCAS class, designed to sustain pressure against such elusive threats.
The third pillar of Iran’s naval doctrine lies in fast-attack craft like the Zolfaghar that are capable of speeds near 40 knots and are armed with Kowsar guided anti-ship missiles, often working in tandem with Ghadir-class midget submarines.
US forces have responded by striking these assets both at sea and inside Iranian ports, even employing, for the first time, Saronic Saber suicide USVs (uncrewed surface vessels) to penetrate the port of Bandar Abbas and hit submarine repair facilities.
Beyond such direct engagements, CENTCOM continues to target ammunition depots by Tomahawk missiles fired from Navy destroyers and HIMARS missiles fired from land in efforts to contain Iran’s broader arsenal.
According to CENTCOM, up until now the US has attacked 80 Iranian military targets including more than 60 IRGC small boats, air-defence systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, ammunition storage facilities, communication networks, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s coastline, in addition to civilian infrastructure such as bridges.
On the other side of the conflict, Iran has not altered its combat tactics, maintaining a dual-track response.
Defensively, the IRGC continues to target shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, with seven oil tankers having already been struck, alongside attempts to hit US naval vessels. Offensively, Tehran has expanded operations beyond its borders, launching complex attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain that combine swarms of drones, cruise missiles, and a limited number of short-range tactical ballistic missiles such as the Fateh‑110 and Zolfaghar.
Equally significant is Iran’s interdiction campaign designed to disrupt US air operations, reduce sortie rates, or force American aircraft into defensive roles.
Missile and drone strikes have been concentrated on US air bases, particularly the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan which hosts the largest concentration of American fighter jets. These medium-range strikes employ a mix of long-range suicide drones like the Shahed‑136 and Shahed‑238, the newer Kaman‑99, and ballistic systems including the Emad and Ghadr. By saturating defences with these weapons, Iran seeks to draw attention away from more advanced missiles such as the Kheibar Shekan and Qassem Soleimani.
The recent attacks have also showcased hybrid systems that combine extended range with enhanced manoeuverability, underscoring Iran’s evolving arsenal. The latest waves of strikes have inflicted casualties among US personnel, highlighting the growing intensity of the confrontation and the risks posed by Iran’s layered and adaptive approach to both defensive and offensive operations.
Currently, US operations can be understood as preparatory strikes paving the way for larger campaigns. So far, they have reached ten waves of attacks, each lasting around 90 minutes, while simultaneously calling in reinforcements.
Over the weekend, additional fighter aircraft were observed arriving in theatre, including F‑15s from the US base at Lakenheath in the UK accompanied by aerial refueling tankers positioning themselves for deployment across the Middle East.
The US Air & Space Forces magazine has reported that “the Pentagon is rushing more warplanes to the region, deploying additional Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-35 Lightning II fighters to the Middle East. Among the warplanes being sent are F-16s from the 480th Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, and F-35s from the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath, UK”.
Iran appears to have retained a functioning system that enables it to keep launching guided munitions and sustain combat operations.
As analyst Jim Lamson noted in his study for the Freeman Air & Space Institute at King’s College London, “there is one caveat to the assessed severe, immediate, and short-term impact on Iranian missile and drone production: the possibility that MODAFL [the Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics] and the IRGC have stockpiled finished components at their underground production sites, from which they could assemble dozens — if not hundreds — of new missiles and drones in the short term.”
Supporting this view, Lamson said that “an Israeli report in April warned that Tehran was working around the clock to assemble surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles using existing components. In May, the CIA similarly assessed that Iran had managed to complete some missiles that were already near-finished when the war began.”
“Taken together, these findings highlight the resilience of Iran’s military production system: while long-term capacity has been degraded, short-term stockpiles allow the IRGC to continue fielding new weapons and maintain pressure in the ongoing confrontation.”
The Gulf states remain firmly committed to a defensive posture, reinforcing their air-defence networks with systems from diverse origins rather than relying solely on THAAD and Patriot batteries.
Italy and France have deployed additional air-defence batteries to bolster Gulf defences, while Saudi Arabia has requested AGR‑20 APKWS missiles designed for drone interception and carried by F‑15 fighters. This emphasis on defensive weaponry reflects a deliberate strategy to contain the damage as much as possible amid the ongoing war between Iran and the US.
We now stand before two adversaries that have absorbed the lessons of this year’s confrontations. The US continues to wager on the strength of its air and missile campaigns, seeking to reduce costs by integrating unmanned systems in a tactic that it has in part learned from Iran.
Tehran, meanwhile, remains committed to endurance and persistence, relying on its ability to strike back repeatedly. Though its responses may be limited in scale, they have proven undeniably impactful, focusing on the centre of gravity of US forces.
Both sides are locked in a grinding war of attrition in a cycle that can only be broken by political agreement and the consolidation of influence in the Gulf. Neither has yet played all its cards, which means the story is far from over and the conflict is certain to continue.
The writer is a researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
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