On 14 July, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of striking a runway at Sanaa International Airport, and they responded in kind, attacking Abha Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. This was the first publicly acknowledged exchange of fire between the two sides since the end of the war (2015-2022). The Houthis did not attack their rival Yemeni government, the internationally recognised body based in Aden, even though it claimed responsibility for the strike against Sanaa Airport. But will the collapse of the four-year truce escalate into a full-scale war?
On Thursday, 23 July, the Houthis announced that they had struck two Saudi oil tankers – the Insilia and Laila – using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones in the Red Sea. They described the attacks as part of their “naval blockade” of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer. The Saudi Press Agency, citing an official source, reported that the strike against the Insilia caused a fire to break out in the tanker’s bow. The strike against Laila was only confirmed later. The attacks drove up global oil prices amid fears of disruption to shipping through the Strait of Bab Al-Mandab, one of the world’s most important corridors for the international transport of oil and gas.
Tensions ratcheted up further when Houthi leaders stated that Saudi interests could become targets if the kingdom participated in military operations against Iran or provided logistical support to US forces. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has sought to avoid direct involvement in these confrontations. While maintaining a policy of restraint, it continued to strengthen its defensive capabilities, tighten security along its southern border and support for Yemen’s internationally recognised government.
“The Saudis remain committed to restraint,” Abdullah Mahfouz, a specialist in regional military affairs, told Al Ahram Weekly. “They did not respond either to the Iranian attacks or to the Houthi attacks. They fully understand the dangers and the costs of war, despite their considerable military preparedness.” Riyadh rejects “all wars”, he added, pointing out that it has not retaliated against Iranian attacks during the war that the US and Israel unleashed against Iran on 28 February. Nor has it responded militarily to the Houthis, because it remains “committed to the truce and to a political solution to the Yemeni crisis”.
In keeping with the same principle, Riyadh opposes President Donald Trump’s suggestion that Syria should undertake the task of disarming Hizbullah in Lebanon. “Saudi Arabia will not finance such a move,” Abdullah said. According to Rabha Allam, a specialist in Syrian and Lebanese affairs, the new Syrian government has no desire to intervene militarily in Lebanon; nor would Syria’s Arab or Turkish allies support such a mission. “Saudi Arabia was instrumental in persuading the US to lift its sanctions on Syria, precisely because it wants to see an end to war,” she said.
The Saudis have a range of options for safeguarding their security, freedom of navigation, and energy flows. According to Abdullah, they can expand naval deployment, increase coordination with international forces operating in the Red Sea, enhance surveillance and early-warning systems, and strengthen the security of their ports and other vital infrastructure. Riyadh also has diplomatic options. It can intensify contacts with regional and international powers aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating further, while reserving the right to take defensive measures should Saudi territory or interests come under attack. Abdullah argues that the recent Houthi escalation against Riyadh aligns with Iran’s broader strategy. “Without this strategy, Iran would lose the war politically just as it has already lost it militarily,” Abdullah said.
According to Western press reports, Saudi Arabia has increased its use of the East-West Pipeline to transport oil from its eastern fields to ports on the Red Sea, whence it can be shipped through the Bab Al-Mandab Strait to Asian markets, thereby bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. To counter this, Iran appears to have turned to one of its “arms” – the Houthis – to obstruct Saudi oil exports, which are crucial to energy markets in both Asia and Europe. Barred by the US blockade from exporting its own oil, Iran has vowed not to allow the Arab Gulf states to export theirs until the blockade is lifted.
The Civil War in Yemen ended when UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg announced on 1 April 2022 that the two sides had agreed to a two-month truce, renewable by mutual consent. The ceasefire, which required the suspension of military operations on land, at sea and in the air, took effect the following day. Although it effectively expired in early June 2022 and neither side formally announced its renewal, hostilities did not resume. Instead, direct contacts were initiated between the belligerents and de-escalation continued. It was clear that both sides were keen to avoid further warfare and embark on a political process to resolve the Yemeni crisis.
The truce in Yemen paved the way for the Chinese-brokered restoration of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran in May 2023. In April 2023, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen travelled to Sanaa, where he met Mahdi Al-Mashat, chairman of the Houthis’ Supreme Political Council. Then, in September 2023, a Houthi delegation travelled to Riyadh for five days of talks with the Saudi leadership under Omani mediation. The discussions resulted in the drafting of a roadmap for ending the Yemeni crisis.
Yemen had been a security concern for Riyadh since the establishment of the Saudi Kingdom a century ago. Riyadh addressed this problem by forging deep diplomatic and political ties with Yemen’s leaders and sociopolitical elites. In the 1950s, it opened its doors to Yemeni workers, eager to secure employment in one of the world’s wealthiest oil-producing countries. However, it is important not to underestimate the deep social ties that have linked the two Arab neighbours for centuries – bonds that have been strengthened through intermarriage and kinship. In addition, according to Najib Sadiq, former editor-in-chief of the semi-official Aden-based newspaper 14 October, Yemeni and Saudi cultures share similar musical traditions, cuisine, national dress and closely related Arabic dialects despite their sectarian and doctrinal differences.
Despite the succession of different Yemeni leaderships – whether under the Hamid Al-Din monarchy or under the Yemen Arab Republic in the north, and whether Zaydi Shia or Shafii Sunni – Riyadh and Sanaa have always managed, as Sadiq put it, “to reach a consensus that maintained at least a minimum level of stable relations”. Riyadh provided Yemen with approximately $30 billion in aid between 1975 and 2025, according to the Saudi Aid Platform, financing more than 1,600 humanitarian projects, with more than 30 per cent allocated to addressing the humanitarian consequences of the Yemeni conflict. Whether channelled through the Yemeni government, the United Nations or UN agencies operating on the ground in Yemen, it supported 1,494 projects across 38 sectors.
“Saudi Arabia is alarmed by the transformation of the Houthis into a large, permanent military force on its southern border,” says Yemeni journalist Salah Al-Aaraji. “For decades, development projects in southern Saudi Arabia combined with Saudi development assistance to Yemen helped keep the situation stable – until the rise of the Iranian-backed Houthis. I believe Iranian support for the Houthis was never intended simply to establish influence over Yemen, but also to threaten Saudi Arabia.”
But the Saudi position remains unchanged. Unless developments on the ground fundamentally alter its calculus, it is averse to war in any direction or against any party. Saudi Arabia’s defence strategy is to make any war against the kingdom so costly that adversaries would prefer accommodation. This strategy, of course, also requires Saudi Arabia to remain willing to provide the economic assistance that it has extended for decades.
What has changed, rather, is the Houthis’ position. They began as a movement committed to armed struggle and they received support for that purpose. However, since 2022, as the de facto rulers of northern Yemen, they have had to shoulder the burdens of governing – a situation that could propel them in one of two directions. Either they must come to terms with the fact that the war is over and transform their movement into a conventional political party whose legitimacy is grounded in effective governance aimed at improving the lives of its citizens, or, deeming the burdens of governing too great, they might decide that ongoing war is the less costly option.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: