Ahead of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington this week, there were concerns that US President Donald Trump would put him on the spot in front of the cameras by casting aspersions against segments of Lebanese society or by attempting to cajole him into making concessions.
But in fact the meeting proved positive and convivial. The two heads of state seemed to agree on all of Lebanon’s most contentious issues, and when Aoun praised Trump as a sponsor of a peace project that would create a lasting legacy of regional security and stability, Trump returned the compliment.
He commended Aoun’s efforts to secure peace for Lebanon and pledged to support him in achieving that goal.
Aoun succeeded in striking a delicate balance. On the one hand, he reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing peace and ending hostilities with Israel, while on the other, he refused to compromise on Lebanon’s longstanding position that Israel must fully withdraw from Southern Lebanon.
In addition, while pledging to consolidate the Lebanese state’s monopoly over arms, he acknowledged the position of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, stressing the need to enable the displaced residents of the south to return to their homes and to begin reconstruction.
Aoun even praised Berri as “a statesman” whom he hoped would live to see the south rebuilt and free from occupation. Trump agreed with this assessment, stating that Berri would eventually endorse the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel once he saw that the process was succeeding.
In tandem with the Trump-Aoun meeting, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam visited Zawtar Al-Gharbiya this week, the first “pilot zone” for the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as part of the agreement.
Unlike neighbouring Zawtar Al-Sharqiya, which remains under Israeli occupation, Zawtar Al-Gharbiya had not been occupied by Israeli forces. Instead, the occupation forces levelled the village and then withdrew.
Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal also visited the town to assess the scale of destruction and oversee the army’s deployment. The Israeli withdrawal from and the LAF’s deployment in these pilot zones constitute the core of the framework agreement.
For more than five days, the LAF invited displaced persons from Zawtar Al-Gharbiya to be escorted into the town by members of the army’s engineering corps. The residents were able to inspect their homes, clear away war debris, and recover any belongings they wished to take with them.
They were then told to return to their temporary shelters. According to eyewitnesses, over 90 per cent of the town’s buildings have suffered total or partial destruction and utilities have been rendered completely inoperable. Although government agencies have begun repairing the water and electricity networks, it is doubtful that the permanent return of the displaced residents will be possible anytime soon.
Aoun’s supporters argue that his visit to Washington has made it possible to implement the framework agreement according to a Lebanese approach and that Lebanon has thus demonstrated its readiness to fulfil its commitments while Israel continues to procrastinate.
The US should therefore pressure Israel to accelerate its withdrawal from the south, especially given that the framework agreement does not specify a timeframe for the Israeli withdrawal, they say, adding that as long as the LAF is prepared to deploy, it can put Israel in an awkward position and generate increased American pressure on it.
A case in point occurred during the Trump-Aoun meeting, when Trump had his secretary of defence contact Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to keep him from launching further attacks on Lebanon that might undermine the implementation of the framework agreement.
Observers believe that Israel had intended to accompany the renewed US escalation against Iran with an escalation of its own in Lebanon, but that pressure from Washington pre-empted such a move.
This is precisely the significance of Aoun’s visit to Washington. Its success, however, rests on the continuation of that pre-emptive effect, in other words sustained US pressure to prevent Israel from prolonging its occupation of Southern Lebanon and from obstructing the implementation of the framework agreement.
The LAF released a statement ahead of Netanyahu’s expected visit to Washington on 28 July, condemning Israel’s violations of the framework agreement and its continued military actions, which it said were obstructing the army’s deployment in the agreed areas.
Aoun also presented a comprehensive vision of how the Lebanese state intends to implement the agreement, thereby showing that it cannot be reduced to a mere set of obligations or restrictions imposed upon Lebanon.
He argued that the LAF must be adequately equipped and funded to ensure the sustainability of its role across Southern Lebanon and to eliminate any military role for non-state actors. He also maintained that only the state should lead reconstruction activities.
Aoun said that Hizbullah would eventually be disarmed. However, he stressed that this could only occur through a broader approach that addresses what Hizbullah regards as the justification for its existence: the continuation of the Israeli occupation.
Once the occupation ends, he said, the rationale for Hizbullah’s continued existence as an armed force on Lebanese soil disappears. Aoun further stressed that Hizbullah consists of Lebanese citizens, not foreign mercenaries. He therefore proposed a programme of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) in an approach consistent with international theories on how to handle non-state armed groups in post-conflict settings.
While DDR approaches are widely supported in both international policy and academic circles, they have never been seriously entertained in the Lebanese context because the intense politicisation of the Hizbullah issue has inhibited efforts to promote technical and institutional frameworks for resolving it.
Aoun convincingly linked the success of any future disarmament process to three conditions: the end of the Israeli occupation, sustained military support for the Lebanese state through training and financing its army, and economic support through genuine reconstruction and the return of southern residents to their homes.
Hizbullah supporters minimised the significance of Aoun’s visit to Washington, criticised Salam’s simultaneous visit to Southern Lebanon, disapproved of the army’s handling of the residents’ return to inspect their homes in Zawtar Al-Gharbiya, and dismissed the Israeli withdrawal as a far cry from the genuine and full withdrawal they demand.
At the same time, however, they offered no practical alternative beyond tying Lebanon’s future to the course of negotiations between Tehran and Washington, negotiations that have recently stalled, raising the spectre of a return to full-scale war.
Aoun appears to have maximised his meeting with Trump in order to advance his position, not only vis-à-vis Israel but also his domestic political adversaries, most notably Hizbullah. He conveyed the impression, both at home and abroad, that his alliance with Berri was no less solid than Berri’s longstanding alliance with Hizbullah. Aoun was therefore able to project an image of Lebanese unity rather than discord.
He also appears to have outmanoeuvred Israeli efforts to persuade Washington to impose sanctions on prominent Lebanese officials whom Israel regards as pro-Hizbullah “hawks”. Aoun’s ability to project the image of a unified Lebanese state trumped the Israeli bid to capitalise on Lebanese divisions to fuel domestic discord.
Trump’s decision to restore direct flights from the US to Beirut, after nearly four decades, underscored Washington’s confidence in the Lebanese state’s ability to maintain security and guarantee the safety of American aircraft.
However, there are questions about whether Aoun’s success can withstand the challenges that lie ahead.
Will it survive Netanyahu’s meeting with Trump on 28 July, in which he will push the Israeli approach to implementing the framework agreement and attempt to undermine the convergence between Trump and Aoun?
Netanyahu will most likely argue that a complete Israeli withdrawal is impractical or that Israel lacks confidence in the LAF’s ability to complete the disarmament mission without an Israeli military presence on the ground. In either case, his aim would be to postpone the withdrawal of Israeli Occupation Forces from Southern Lebanon.
Hizbullah will pose another challenge. It hopes to derail Aoun’s efforts to establish a gradual process whereby the LAF assumes control of Southern Lebanon. It rejects the notion that partial Israeli withdrawals constitute gains for Lebanese sovereignty, pointing to Israel’s continued systematic demolition throughout the occupied southern towns.
Ironically, both Hizbullah and Israel share an interest in thwarting Aoun’s efforts to promote the Lebanese approach to implementing the framework agreement. Israel wants to avoid American pressure to complete its withdrawal before the parliamentary elections expected next autumn. Hizbullah wants to show that the Islamabad-brokered negotiations track, managed by Tehran, remains the more effective approach, despite its current setback and the renewed risk of military escalation around the Strait of Hormuz.
The next round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, scheduled to take place in Rome on 4 August, should provide a clearer indication of how the implementation of the framework agreement will proceed and which vision is likely to prevail in the coming phase.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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