As US military strikes against Tehran resumed this week, Houthi threats to the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and against neighbouring countries escalated. Following an attack on a Saudi vessel just a few days ago, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg warned of the consequences of resumed Houthi attacks on commercial ships and the resulting renewed disruptions to Red Sea navigation.
The Houthi movement is seeking to gain control of strategic positions that would allow it direct oversight of the Bab Al‑Mandab Strait, through which about 12 per cent of global trade passes. The aim of these manoeuvres is to shift from aerial and maritime attacks to establishing on‑the-ground dominance, thereby enhancing its capacity to threaten international shipping lanes, including the Suez Canal.
This poses risks to Egypt’s interests and national security, raising urgent questions: Can the Houthis close Bab Al‑Mandab? What dangers would Egypt face if such a closure occurred? And how might Egypt respond to this scenario should it materialise?
From a military and operational standpoint, the Houthis cannot completely or permanently “close” the Bab Al-Mandab Strait in the traditional sense, such as establishing a physical blockade or completely halting maritime traffic. However, they retain the capacity to enforce a “de facto closure” or severely disrupt commercial shipping, as demonstrated during recent crises such as the Israeli war on Gaza and the US-Israeli conflict with Iran.
At the same time, the primary constraints preventing total closure lie in the status of the waterway and the surrounding military presence. As an international strait of paramount strategic importance to the global economy, the Bab Al-Mandab is heavily monitored by multinational naval forces and international coalitions, including those led by the US, the European Union, and other partner nations. These are deployed in the area and on the high seas to deter attacks and secure the maritime corridor.
The Bab Al-Mandab Strait lies between Yemen in Asia on the one side and Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa on the other. Gaining total control over the strait would require dominance over both sides of the waterway, a capability the Houthis currently lack.
In addition, any serious attempt to fully close the strait and halt global trade would trigger swift military retaliation and pressure, opening the door to large-scale deterrent strikes against Houthi positions and military infrastructure. This makes a total blockade extraordinarily costly and entirely unsustainable.
However, should the Houthis impose a complete closure or severe, sustained disruption at the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, Egypt would be among the hardest hit. Egyptian national and economic security are deeply intertwined with Red Sea navigation, and Egypt views the Red Sea as a strictly Arab domain integral to its core security. A closure would allow a non-state militia to control a vital chokepoint, curbing Cairo’s ability to secure its southern maritime frontier.
Furthermore, a total blockade would trigger heavy, permanent military intervention from global powers like the US and European coalitions to safeguard international trade. This foreign military buildup near Egypt’s southern border would restrict Cairo’s strategic manoeuverability and heighten the risk of regional escalation.
This forces the Egyptian leadership into a difficult dilemma: maintain neutrality to avoid being drawn into an external war and saving regional alliances at the expense of devastating economic losses or join naval coalitions and risk direct conflict with the Houthis and their regional backers while opening a new front to the south.
Moreover, deteriorating Red Sea navigation would bring international pressure from partners like the US and EU for greater Egyptian military involvement to reopen the waterway. This directly conflicts with Cairo’s foreign policy framework, which prioritises de-escalation and avoids direct intervention.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS: As for the economic effects of any closure of the strait, as the Suez Canal is the natural northern gateway to the Red Sea, any closure of the Bab Al-Mandab would result in instant maritime paralysis.
Previous Houthi strikes on commercial shipping in the Red Sea slashed canal revenues by over 50 to 60 per cent at their peak as vessels rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope. A complete blockade of the strait would strip Egypt of billions of dollars annually of hard currency that is vital to the national economy.
Moreover, Egyptian import and export flows would face direct damage. Vessels heading to Egyptian Red Sea ports or transiting the canal would be forced to take lengthy, expensive alternatives, driving up freight and insurance premiums. This cost surge would hit the domestic market immediately, sparking a fresh wave of inflation and raising the prices of raw materials and essential goods.
Closing the strait would cripple operations across the Suez Canal Economic Zone, eroding the investment appeal of surrounding ports like Ain Sokhna and East Port Said. Critical commercial operations including bunkering, maritime logistics, and transshipment services would face a severe downturn.
Should the closure of the Bab Al-Mandab Strait persist, global corporations and major economies would seek permanent alternatives, including overland and maritime routes across Asia and Europe or around the Cape of Good Hope. If shipping lines adapt to these alternative corridors, the long-term strategic standing of the Suez Canal could be significantly eroded.
How to handle the above threats is an important question. Handling Houthi threats in the Red Sea requires a balanced mix of military deterrence, preventive diplomacy, and regional-international coordination. The goal is to safeguard Egypt’s economic lifeline of the Suez Canal without getting dragged into a costly war of attrition that undermines domestic and regional stability.
Cairo must also leverage behind-the-scenes intelligence and security channels with the Houthis and Tehran. These communications serve to convey a firm and direct message: any compromise of Red Sea security and shipping lanes would cross a red line for Egyptian national security.
Egypt must reinforce its view to regional stakeholders and the Houthis that targeting Red Sea shipping serves no broader regional cause. Rather, it directly harms Arab nations and local populations, particularly in Egypt and Yemen. Cairo should also exert sustained diplomatic pressure on Iran and influential regional actors to curb military risk-taking by non-state networks near critical maritime chokepoints.
To maintain comprehensive deterrence without direct entanglement, the Egyptian Navy must preserve a robust presence, particularly through forces stationed at the Berenice Military Base on the Red Sea, in order to secure territorial waters and strategic maritime access points.
Crucially, Egypt should refrain from offensive operations inside Yemeni territory to avoid repeating historical wars of attrition. Cairo can deploy naval patrols to safeguard commercial convoys heading towards the Suez Canal while providing advanced reconnaissance and security cover across its southern maritime domain. This strategy requires upgrading air defences, early warning systems, and countermeasures against uncrewed aerial vehicles and explosive sea drones to deter indiscriminate attacks against shipping.
Effective coordination requires reactivating and championing the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Jordan, and other littoral states, in order to establish Red Sea security primarily as a shared regional responsibility.
On the international front, Cairo should maintain information-sharing and intelligence coordination with formations such as the Combined Maritime Forces to protect shipping lanes. Egypt must do this while preserving its independent decision-making and avoiding full integration into international coalitions that could further internationalise the crisis or advance external agendas.
Deepening security and defence ties with nations south of the strait, including Djibouti and Somalia, would ensure an intelligence and security foothold capable of monitoring movements along the African coastline.
Egypt’s most effective approach lies in smart and non-confrontational deterrence. This entails maintaining a formidable naval strike and deterrence force near its southern borders, deploying diplomatic and security leverage to keep communication channels open, and collaborating with regional partners to prevent the Red Sea from devolving into an open arena for international conflict.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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