The US-Iran confrontation has evolved beyond a bilateral security crisis into a multidimensional geopolitical competition involving the world’s major powers. What initially appeared as a regional military escalation is increasingly becoming a test of the emerging international order, in which China and Russia seek to reshape global power dynamics while the United States attempts to preserve its strategic dominance.
The significance of the crisis extends far beyond the Gulf, encompassing maritime security, global energy markets, sanctions policy, supply chains, and the broader competition between a US-led international order and an increasingly assertive Sino-Russian partnership.
From a realist perspective, the US-Iran confrontation reflects the anarchic nature of the international system, where no central authority guarantees states’ security. Consequently, the major powers prioritise national interests, survival, and the balance of power over ideological considerations.
In this context, China and Russia seek to prevent excessive US influence in the Middle East, while Washington aims to preserve its strategic dominance. The crisis therefore illustrates the realist concepts of power competition, the security dilemma, and strategic balancing, as each actor’s efforts to enhance its security inevitably reshape the broader regional and international balance of power.
Recent remarks by US President Donald Trump urging both Beijing and Moscow to refrain from supporting Iran illustrate that Washington no longer views Tehran in isolation. Instead, Iran has become part of a wider geopolitical equation that links the Middle East with Ukraine, Indo-Pacific competition, sanctions policy, and great-power rivalry.
The situation can be understood from three perspectives: the political and strategic dimension, the economic and energy dimension, and the military and intelligence dimension.
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC: With regard to the first perspective, the political and strategic, China and Russia are pursuing a strategy of strategic balancing rather than military alignment.
Both powers reject a direct military confrontation with the United States, yet neither is willing to permit the strategic isolation or collapse of Iran, which they regard as an indispensable pillar of the emerging multipolar order.
For China, Iran represents far more than an energy supplier. It occupies a critical geographic position within China’s Belt and Road Initiative, connecting East Asia to Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Any prolonged conflict that destabilises Iran would threaten Chinese investments, interrupt trade corridors, and undermine Beijing’s long-term vision of Eurasian connectivity. Consequently, China continues to reject military intervention while promoting diplomacy and positioning itself as a responsible international mediator.
At the same time, Russia approaches the crisis from an entirely different strategic perspective. Russia sees every additional American military deployment in the Middle East as potentially reducing its political focus, financial resources, and military flexibility in Eastern Europe and Ukraine.
However, Russia equally understands that an uncontrolled regional war could justify a larger and more permanent US military presence throughout the Gulf, which is seen as an outcome fundamentally inconsistent with Russian strategic interests. Moscow therefore seeks a carefully managed balance: sufficient tension to constrain American strategic flexibility, but not enough to trigger regional collapse.
Trump’s rhetoric reflects his traditional transactional approach to diplomacy. His warnings directed towards Beijing and Moscow can be interpreted as an attempt to merge multiple geopolitical issues into one negotiating framework. The implicit message is that cooperation or restraint in supporting Iran could influence future negotiations on Ukraine, sanctions relief, NATO, or broader US-Russia relations.
Such linkage diplomacy has become an increasingly visible feature of American foreign policy.
ECONOMIC AND ENERGY: The second perspective, the economic and energy dimension, constitutes perhaps the single most important variable shaping Chinese and Russian calculations.
China remains the largest purchaser of Iranian crude oil, making uninterrupted energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz a strategic necessity rather than merely an economic preference. Any sustained disruption would significantly increase transportation costs, fuel inflation, and place additional pressure on China’s post-pandemic economic recovery.
The significance of Hormuz has become even greater following persistent instability in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. The continued disruption of Red Sea shipping has already forced numerous commercial vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, extending transit times, increasing insurance premiums, and raising freight costs.
Should instability simultaneously affect both Bab Al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz, nearly the entire maritime energy corridor linking the Gulf with Europe and Asia would come under unprecedented pressure.
Such a scenario would likely trigger a sharp surge in international energy prices. Analysts have repeatedly warned that any prolonged interruption to Gulf oil exports could push Brent crude well above $100 per barrel, particularly if markets begin pricing in sustained supply disruptions rather than temporary military incidents. Beyond oil prices themselves, higher shipping insurance, elevated liquified natural gas (LNG) transportation costs, and broader supply-chain disruptions would amplify inflation across both developed and emerging economies.
For China, such developments would threaten its industrial production and export competitiveness. For Europe, which has spent years reducing dependence on Russian energy, another major energy shock would further complicate economic recovery and increase pressure on governments already confronting inflation and slower growth.
Russia, by contrast, which initially benefitted from higher oil prices especially at the beginning of the military operations, could see its export revenues strengthened and partially offset the impact of Western sanctions.
However, the Russian energy company Rosneft has recently reduced its export volumes by approximately 30 per cent following Ukrainian strikes targeting Russia’s oil infrastructure and refining facilities. As a result, the energy factor has become relatively less significant in shaping Russia’s calculations, as Moscow is currently prioritising the protection and restoration of its domestic energy infrastructure over expanding external energy exports.
However, Moscow recognises that prolonged instability could eventually damage global demand, accelerate energy diversification policies, and justify expanded Western naval deployments throughout strategic maritime chokepoints. Accordingly, Russia prefers elevated geopolitical risk without allowing the crisis to spiral into systemic disruption.
Another important economic development concerns Trump’s proposal to integrate Iran into broader sanctions legislation targeting Russia. Such an initiative reflects an effort to merge the Russian and Iranian sanctions regimes into a unified pressure campaign centred on energy exports.
Secondary sanctions targeting countries or companies purchasing Iranian crude would inevitably affect China, transforming sanctions from bilateral instruments into mechanisms of wider geopolitical competition. The result would be increasing fragmentation of global energy markets into competing economic blocs.
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE: The third perspective, the military and intelligence dimension, indicates that from a military perspective both China and Russia continue to exercise deliberate restraint.
Neither appears willing to risk direct confrontation with American forces on Iran’s behalf. Instead, both rely upon long-term defence cooperation, military diplomacy, technological exchanges, and strategic coordination.
The sophistication demonstrated in some recent Iranian missile and drone operations has prompted widespread discussion regarding the evolution of Tehran’s military capabilities. While speculation persists regarding possible external intelligence assistance, no publicly available evidence conclusively establishes direct operational intelligence support by either China or Russia during specific military operations.
More to the point, Iran has substantially improved its indigenous missile, drone, surveillance, and command capabilities while maintaining long-standing defence relationships with external partners.
The more significant development may therefore lie not in direct battlefield support but in the gradual emergence of a more integrated Eurasian defence network characterised by technology sharing, joint military exercises, intelligence dialogue, and strategic coordination among Russia, China, Iran, and other regional partners. Such cooperation gradually reshapes the regional military balance without requiring formal alliance commitments.
There is also a final dimension to be added to the other three, which is diplomatic pressure and international crisis management.
China has emerged as one of the strongest advocates of de-escalation, emphasising dialogue, respect for state sovereignty, and negotiated settlements. Interestingly, despite their broader strategic disagreements, Beijing and several European governments increasingly share a common interest in preventing further escalation because both face severe economic consequences from disruptions to maritime trade and energy markets.
This convergence creates opportunities for coordinated diplomatic pressure aimed at protecting international shipping lanes, safeguarding freedom of navigation through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab and reviving regional dialogue before military escalation reaches a point where economic consequences become irreversible.
Ultimately, neither China nor Russia seeks a military victory for Iran nor a direct confrontation with the United States. Their objective is considerably broader: preserving regional strategic equilibrium, preventing regime collapse in Tehran, protecting critical energy routes, resisting American strategic predominance, and accelerating the transition towards a multipolar international system.
The crisis therefore represents far more than a confrontation over Iran and has become a defining arena in the broader contest over the future distribution of global power, the resilience of international energy markets, and the structure of contemporary geopolitics.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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