The guns have fallen silent in the US war against Iran, but this is not the silence of a diplomatic breakthrough. After 13 consecutive nights of US strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliatory barrages against American bases and interests in the Middle East, a peculiar calm has settled over the region.
Yet, strictly speaking, there is no ceasefire. There is no signed agreement, and there is no jointly announced truce. This is a de facto pause and a strategic intermission born of military depletion and the inability to translate military escalation into political gains. It has paved the way for the resumption of diplomatic initiatives.
Leaks point towards intensive mediation efforts by Oman over the future of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, even as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is urging US President Donald Trump to intensify the pressure on Iran. Tehran, meanwhile, has publicly rejected direct negotiations with Washington while simultaneously acknowledging sustained consultations with Muscat over new maritime arrangements.
Oman has proposed a “regional coalition” to manage maritime security, search and rescue, and navigation in the strait. According to the proposal, funding for these operations would be voluntarily provided by regional states and the shipping industry.
The proposal provides a window into the technical complexities of any truce and the underlying power struggle. According to regional officials, the US is not a direct party to these talks but is being kept informed about them. Tehran, while engaging with the proposal, is expected to retain control over the strait, including the collection of fees.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry confirmed that consultations with Oman are ongoing, focusing on arrangements for the strait.
The proposal represents an attempt to move beyond the traditional binary choice between exclusive Iranian control and American naval dominance. Oman is effectively proposing a Gulf security mechanism in which regional actors assume greater operational responsibility while reducing the direct US-Iranian confrontation.
That Washington is reportedly not a formal participant in the talks, even while being continuously informed, is significant. It allows both Washington and Tehran to quietly test the practical arrangements.
Yet, significant questions remain unanswered about the contours of the Omani initiative and above all whether it has secured the endorsement, or at least tacit acceptance, of the wider Gulf states. Its ultimate significance will depend not only on the details of the proposed mechanism but also on whether regional actors view it as a genuine step towards de-escalation or merely another temporary arrangement designed to manage tensions.
An Iranian politician familiar with the Iranian leadership’s strategic thinking defended Tehran’s insistence on retaining the right to impose fees on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the dispute is fundamentally political rather than economic.
He told Al-Ahram Weekly that financial considerations were secondary, explaining that “it is not a matter of money at all, and revenue is a marginal, almost incidental issue. The real question is one of political authority: whoever regulates movement through the Strait of Hormuz effectively gains recognition as the principal security actor in one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways.”
No one knows how long the pause in the conflict will last. But leaks are talking about a 10-day ceasefire, reportedly designed to reopen the strait in exchange for lifting the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Iranian officials have stated that Tehran will suspend operations for only as long as the US halts its strikes. Trump, meanwhile, has acknowledged freezing any expanded military action after mediators requested time for diplomacy, while warning that he would not wait indefinitely.
According to The New York Times, US General Dan Caine, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Trump about the depletion of interceptor missile inventories. The leaks indicate that even the world’s strongest military operates under the constraints of logistics, industrial production, and strategic prioritisation.
A concern reportedly expressed by US Vice President J D Vance and senior military officials reflects something even broader. The challenge facing Washington is no longer about defeating Iran militarily; it is about determining whether further escalation produces diminishing strategic returns.
Some 13 consecutive nights of strikes on Iran demonstrated American military superiority but failed to produce Iranian capitulation. Instead, Tehran continued its retaliatory operations while maintaining enough military capability to threaten American interests throughout the region.
As the marginal utility of additional strikes declines while costs continue rising, Washington has shifted from coercion towards bargaining.
This explains Trump’s seemingly contradictory language. In one breath, he warned that if diplomacy fails, the US will return to “very powerful military action”. In the next, he described current contacts as “very friendly negotiations”. Far from being inconsistent, this is coercive diplomacy playing out in real time.
Tehran, however, is playing the same game. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei has said there are “no direct negotiations” with Washington. Instead, he has described two parallel tracks: indirect diplomatic exchanges through mediators and a military track dedicated to defending Iran and responding to American actions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Baghaei’s comments regarding the strait are especially revealing. He confirmed that “positive and constructive political and technical consultations with Oman” are taking place, while stressing that Iran “cannot allow the Strait of Hormuz to become a tool in the hands of aggressors to harm our national security.”
He also rejected American proposals concerning lateral maritime corridors and reiterated that Washington had failed to honour previous commitments regarding frozen Iranian assets.
Iran has emerged from the confrontation convinced that it has successfully resisted overwhelming American military pressure. This confidence explains why Tehran is reportedly seeking amendments to any future understanding rather than a return to the earlier 14-point framework.
Iranian officials now demand sanctions relief, access to frozen assets abroad, and revisions to earlier understandings. The unveiling of the upgraded version of its Hadid 110 suicide drone, which is now jet-powered, making it stealthier, faster, and deadlier than its predecessor, is another Iranian message conveying that the attacks against it have not affected its military manufacturing capabilities.
This new iteration of the drone poses a fresh challenge to US forces, as its increased speed and reduced radar signature make it more difficult to intercept.
Meanwhile, Tel Aviv is watching from the sidelines, with Netanyahu’s visit to Washington on Tuesday being a pivotal event that threatens to shatter the fragile truce.
According to The New York Post, Netanyahu is preparing to present Trump with intelligence he claims proves Iran has begun rebuilding its nuclear, missile, and drone programmes. Netanyahu’s objective is to persuade Trump that diplomacy itself has become strategically dangerous.
For Tel Aviv, even a temporary understanding between Washington and Tehran is a strategic loss. It believes that any reduction in pressure would allow Iran to advance its regional position.
On Tuesday, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz disclosed that while Israel is keen to strike Iran’s energy infrastructure, Washington has so far withheld its approval for such an escalation. His remarks offered a rare public glimpse into the strategic constraints shaping Israeli military options and underscored the decisive influence the US continues to exercise over the trajectory of the conflict.
Katz also revealed that American aircraft are launching operations against Iran from Israeli territory, a fact, he said, that Tehran is fully aware of. Defending Israel’s military doctrine of a “scorched earth policy”, he said that Israeli forces have destroyed roughly 70 per cent of the Gaza Strip and have effectively replicated what he described as the “Gaza model” in southern Lebanon.
Perhaps most significantly, Katz acknowledged that Washington’s approach to Iran is ultimately guided by a broader set of geopolitical calculations that do not always align with Israel’s priorities. The US, he suggested, is pursuing strategic interests that extend beyond Israeli security concerns, highlighting an increasingly visible divergence between the two allies over how far the confrontation with Tehran should go.
As a result, Netanyahu is walking a diplomatic tightrope. He cannot allow the US-Iran talks to succeed, yet he also cannot launch a full-scale war on his own. His strategy is to feed Trump intelligence that makes diplomacy untenable, to frame the conflict as an existential battle against a nuclear-armed Iran, and to position Israel as the indispensable guardian of US interests in the region.
The current truce is a contradiction in motion as a result. It is a de facto arrangement, a pause to prevent a complete collapse of the talks.
For Tehran, it is an opportunity to consolidate its gains and push for a longer-term solution that recognises its regional role. For Israel, it is a dangerous interlude that it is determined to end. For Washington, it is a temporary reprieve from a conflict it cannot win and cannot afford to lose.
Trump has demonstrated a willingness to use military force, but also pragmatism in pausing it. He is a transactional president, and the deal — the reopening of the strait, the stabilisation of oil prices, the ability to claim a foreign-policy victory — is a compelling reward. The alternative, as his own generals have warned, is a grinding, protracted conflict that depletes US resources.
Yet the core strategic dilemma is that Tehran is demanding the rolling back of the American military footprint across the region, while Washington is seeking to limit Tehran’s influence and regional reach.
These competing visions remain the central obstacle to any durable strategic accommodation. The current calm should therefore be understood for what it truly is: not reconciliation, but a strategic intermission.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 July, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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