US President Donald Trump announced on 31 July that Hamas had accepted a new US-sponsored agreement with Israel involving the relinquishment of its weapons in the framework of a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
The agreement thus entails implementing the second phase of the 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza announced on 10 October last year following Egyptian and Qatari mediation.
Disarmament is a sensitive issue for Hamas, given its distrust of Israel’s willingness to live up to its commitments. Since the so-called ceasefire went into effect last October, Israeli attacks have killed over 1,100 Palestinian civilians and Israeli forces have expanded the area under their direct control in the Gaza Strip.
But Hamas stated that it accepted the agreement in order to alleviate the suffering of the people in Gaza.
Hamas’ disarmament hinges upon an Israeli withdrawal and the assumption of the administration of the Strip by the Palestinian National Committee. Formed by the Trump-appointed Board of Peace, this consists of Palestinian technocrats, and it would be entrusted with collecting and storing the weapons relinquished by Hamas, while an international force would work together with the Palestinian police to maintain stability in the Strip.
Meanwhile, just over two years ago on 10 July 2024, the late secretary general of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, said that “Hamas is negotiating on behalf of everyone. Whatever Hamas accepts in Gaza, we will all accept.”
Less than three months later, Nasrallah was assassinated in a fortified bunker dozens of metres below the ground during a wave of Israeli bombing. Over the next 66 days, the Israeli attacks intensified, causing significant degradation of Hizbullah’s military capabilities.
However, much has changed in the two years since Nasrallah stated that the Lebanese resistance movement was taking its cue from the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, and today Hizbullah is unlikely to accept what Hamas has accepted.
The second round of the war in Lebanon was sparked by the assassination of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, which predictably galvanised Hizbullah to join Iran in the war the US and Israel had launched against it.
Israel intensified its attacks across Southern Lebanon and in the Lebanese capital Beirut in response. On 2 March this year, the Lebanese government condemned what it described as Hizbullah’s “unilateral decision” to enter the war and issued a decree criminalising its military activities.
The rift between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government has widened since, as the latter has moved to regain the initiative and assert its authority over national decision-making. That authority extends to decisions not only about entering a war but also about ending the state of war with Israel.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has insisted that no one can negotiate on Lebanon’s behalf except its official authorities. Only they had the right to negotiate and conclude agreements aimed at liberating occupied Lebanese territory, he said, and towards this end the government announced that it would enter into US-facilitated negotiations with Israel.
Hizbullah categorically opposes direct negotiations for as long as Israel continues to occupy Lebanese territory, and it has stated that it will reject any outcome arising from them. On the other hand, it supports negotiations between Iran and the US and regards them as the key to securing a ceasefire that it can honour.
The Lebanese and Palestinian resistance fronts thus seem to be moving in different directions. Hamas has agreed to relinquish both its weapons and its control over Gaza in favour of a national committee comprised of technocrats, albeit predicated on a genuine Israeli withdrawal under the supervision of an international force tasked with maintaining order.
Hizbullah, by contrast, continues to conduct a campaign of vilification against the Lebanese government, accusing it of treason for seeking to remove weapons from its control and to establish the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the country’s only legitimate military force.
From Hizbullah’s perspective, it cannot follow the same course as Hamas. It continues to view its role in Lebanon as a crucial element in Iran’s strategy to counter US hegemony in the region. This is why Hizbullah believes that sparing Lebanon further bombardment by Israel and securing the liberation of Southern Lebanon must form part of a broader agreement approved by Iran.
Last year, Hizbullah explicitly rejected extending the provisions of the Egyptian initiative in Gaza to Lebanon when the head of Egyptian intelligence visited Beirut in October and warned of further deterioration in the conflict. Hizbullah rejected freezing its military operations and transferring its weapons to the LAF in tandem with an Israeli withdrawal.
The reason Hizbullah has complied with the current fragile ceasefire is that it arose from the US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 18 June rather than the US-sponsored tripartite framework agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel on 26 June.
While Hamas is prepared to step aside in favour of the National Committee in Gaza in the hope of ending the Israeli genocide, Hizbullah views the Lebanese authorities as a coterie willing to surrender Lebanon’s national rights.
Hizbullah also rejects the framework agreement, arguing that its core component – the Israeli withdrawal from the so-called “pilot zones” in Lebanon – is insufficient to ensure the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Hizbullah had previously undermined a plan to deploy the LAF south of the Litani River, which began to be implemented in late 2025, by firing six rockets into northern Israel on 2 March.
There is reason to doubt whether Israel will adhere to any of the commitments it makes to withdraw from Gaza or from Southern Lebanon. While Hamas is cooperating with regional and international powers seeking to alter the balance of power on the ground and increase the pressure on Israel to comply with its commitments, Hizbullah insists that it will not be the first to make concessions.
Before it surrenders its weapons and agrees to the deployment of a regional or international force, Israeli forces must withdraw fully from Lebanese territory, it says. Moreover, Hizbullah believes that any such arrangement must form part of a broader regional agreement involving Iran, rather than a piecemeal process that addresses each conflict separately.
Hizbullah’s stance seems closer to that of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which believes that the resistance should not relinquish its weapons before Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza and reconstruction operations have begun.
It is a position that reflects a profound distrust not only of Israel but also of international and regional actors that seek to rescue Lebanon or Gaza from Israel’s ruthless brutality. For Hizbullah, Iran is the only exception in this regard.
While it is likely that Israel will attempt to undermine US efforts to end the war, Hizbullah may also see it as in its interests to thwart arrangements that would compel it to make painful concessions and fundamentally alter its nature as a resistance movement.
These arrangements would also strip it of much of its influence as a political force in Lebanon and as an extension of Iran’s regional influence, which it views as a factor in its success as a resistance movement. Accordingly, it sees Aoun’s preference for direct negotiations with Israel, independently of the US-Iranian track, as shortsighted.
Hizbullah argues that far from prioritising Lebanon’s national interests, as Aoun claims, this approach compromises Lebanese sovereignty while failing to appreciate the dynamics of the regional balance of power.
This helps explain why Hizbullah and the Lebanese government are poles apart. Whereas the latter seeks to remove Lebanon from Iran’s sphere of influence and bring it into the fold of an Arab-Turkish alliance that supports the US-sponsored agreement, Hizbullah believes that keeping Lebanon within Iran’s sphere of influence is the surest way to safeguard Lebanon’s interests, restore its rights, and liberate its territory.
Hizbullah’s view reflects a narrow conception of Lebanon’s interests viewed through the prism of Iranian influence. It also reveals a leadership crisis and a power vacuum that has persisted since the assassination of Nasrallah.
Nasrallah had the political acumen to recalibrate his positions and priorities in response to a realistic assessment of shifts in the balance of power. He also possessed the political stature and authority to make bold decisions without fearing a decline in his popularity or erosion of his support base.
The current leadership of Hizbullah, by contrast, seems unable to see beyond Tehran’s strategic outlook.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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