In a region that has rarely seen an extended period of security and stability, let alone peace, a great many alliances, pacts, and defence and security agreements have been signed over the years.
They have come undone for various reasons, the most important of which have been their structures, imprecise objectives, lack of strong militaries that could act as deterrents, and foreign penetration. The region’s competing powers have also signed up to changing international alliances that have usually contributed to either their demise or slow unravelling.
Over the last seven decades, the Middle East has seen multiple attempts either within an Arab framework or within one that is more regional in scope to agree such pacts and alliances, whether Arab-Arab or Arab-regional in character.
One example of the latter was the Twin Pillar strategy pursued by the United States in the 1970s that depended on both Iran before the February 1979 Islamic Revolution and Saudi Arabia to ensure Gulf security in the context of American global strategy.
None of these pacts and alliances have included Israel despite American pressure and attempts to push for security arrangements that would bring Israel, publicly and officially, into some sort of regional security structure whatever its name might be.
Attempts have been made, and pretexts have been advanced, to endow these pacts and alliances with lofty goals. In the 1950s and 60s, they were framed as part of a Cold War logic of ideological confrontation between the capitalist West and the Communist Soviet Union.
After the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, the American strategy turned to attempts to draw the Arab countries and Israel into some sort of security architecture. Over the last ten years, this strategy has been framed as a Sunni-Israeli security partnership against Shiite Iran.
As far as Egypt is concerned, the test has always been the enemy against which such alliances have been constructed. Egypt has always been reluctant to enter into alliances based on religious or sectarian affiliations. In the 1950s, Egypt opposed such approaches. If some foreign power has wanted to push for a religious war mentality in the Middle East, or to divide the region along religious lines, Egypt has preferred, and rightly so, not to be a party to such schemes.
The military confrontation between the United States and Iran that dates back to June 2025 and February 2026 has been ringing alarm bells in the Middle East after almost six months of attacks and counterattacks between the two countries. There have been massive losses for the Gulf countries, and there are growing fears of uncontrollable escalation if the warring parties fail to find a way out of a strategic trap of their own making.
This situation has paved the way for a three-power defence and security pact between Saudi Arabia and two regional, Asian, and Muslim powers, namely Turkey and nuclear-armed Pakistan. The three countries signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement at the Al-Safa Palace in Mecca on 7 August, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif all affixing their signatures to it.
The agreement aims at strengthening joint defence and security cooperation among the three countries.
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said it reflects the “joint political will of the parties to ensure a region that is more secure and to unify their efforts to meet challenges and threats to the security and stability of the region.” Saudi Minister of Defence Khaled bin Salman added that it is the “foundation of a strategic framework for a long-term defence partnership”.
Turkish President Erdogan called the agreement a strategic step “to affirm defence and security cooperation based on collective deterrence”. He made a point of insisting that it does not target any particular country but aims at supporting peace and stability in the region, in addition to fighting terrorism and promoting joint military-industrial cooperation. He stressed that it is in line with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the right of member states to collective self-defence.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told a Turkish media outlet on 8 August that the agreement is not “expansionist” and that “states that don’t attack the three members will not be targeted.” He added that Erdogan wants to widen the agreement to include other countries in the region while insisting that it “will remain defensive” in nature.
He said that the pact is drawn up along the lines of Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which stipulates that any attack on a member country in the alliance will be considered an attack on all of them. He also said that a ministerial committee as well as a general secretariat based in Mecca will be set up.
It is interesting to note that Turkey’s anti-disinformation service stressed in a post on X that “the agreement is not in contradiction with the commitments of Turkey’s existing international alliances, including those at the heart of NATO” and that “Turkey’s development of regional partnerships is not an alternative to its NATO membership.”
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohamed Ishaq Dar said the agreement reflected the commitment of the signatories to further strengthening their collective security and to promoting peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond.
As far as regional reactions to the Mecca Agreement are concerned, the Iranian one has proven interesting. Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi welcomed the agreement, saying that it called for greater solidarity among Muslim-majority countries. He urged the parties to rely on their own capacities and to try to end the escalating tensions in West Asia.
Last but not least, one further element should be considered when analysing the Mecca Agreement, which is that it represents the first official collective defence agreement among regional powers that includes a nuclear power. This could have far-reaching ramifications in the Middle East and South Asia.
Last Thursday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote on X that he had received a phone call from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and that the two men had exchanged views on the current situation in West Asia. He added that they had reviewed “progress on various aspects of the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership”, which “continues to grow from strength to strength”.
This is of great concern to Egypt – one of many in the fast-moving strategic landscape of the Middle East.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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