Despite the growing number of optimistic reports suggesting that the United States and Iran are close to concluding a comprehensive peace agreement, some attributed to US President Donald Trump himself, there is enough in terms of precedent, evidence, and available information to warrant scepticism.
Indeed, the reasons for pessimism appear far stronger than the grounds for optimism.
The most troubling precedent is Trump’s repeated willingness to abandon negotiations with Iran in favour of military action, whether in response to Israeli pressure or in line with Israeli strategic thinking.
The pattern began with his withdrawal from the international nuclear agreement with Iran during his first term. It continued with the surprise joint US-Israeli air campaign launched in late February while negotiations, mediated and hosted by Oman, were making measurable progress. Most recently, the airstrikes resumed despite the ceasefire, or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), reached in June.
Another significant precedent concerns Trump’s decision to launch the first phase of the current military campaign against Iran. It has now become clear, according to some high-ranking American sources, that the decision to do so followed consultations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
During those discussions, Netanyahu reportedly presented Trump with a scenario predicting the swift collapse of the Iranian regime under the weight of popular unrest once its leadership had been eliminated and its centres of power crippled through concentrated strikes on political leaders, military installations, and nuclear facilities.
Against that background, it is difficult to accept the reports circulating in the region claiming that Netanyahu returned from his most recent visit to Washington empty-handed, or that he received a cold welcome at the White House, signalling a deterioration in his relationship with Trump.
Equally difficult to believe is the suggestion that the Israeli prime minister sought the meeting solely to discuss Gaza or to secure American guarantees that any future US-Saudi civilian nuclear agreement would remain conditional on Saudi Arabia’s normalisation of relations with Israel.
Such interpretations overlook the wider strategic context, particularly with Israel heading towards a decisive general election in late October and the United States approaching congressional midterm elections in early November. The outcome of the current confrontation with Iran could weigh heavily on both.
For that reason, the pessimistic account of the Trump-Netanyahu meeting published by American journalist Jeffrey Silverman, who is based in Tbilisi, Georgia, deserves to be taken seriously. This is where the information referred to at the outset of this article becomes important. Far from reinforcing optimistic expectations, it points in the opposite direction when considered alongside recent precedents and developments.
There is good reason to assume that Silverman’s information originates with Russian intelligence. Moscow has demonstrated on more than one occasion its ability to penetrate senior American political and security circles. But what exactly does Silverman’s report claim?
According to his account, Netanyahu persuaded Trump that the air campaign should be followed by a ground offensive against Iran conducted on two fronts. The first would target southern Iran and the Iranian islands in the Gulf, with US Marines carrying out the operation. The second would involve a Kurdish offensive launched from the Iranian-Iraqi border region near Iran’s frontier with Turkey.
Silverman describes this as an American-Israeli proxy war. He expects the two-pronged assault to begin in early autumn, arguing that only the extreme summer heat and shortages of drinking water have delayed its execution.
Several well-established facts lend credibility to parts of this scenario. Israel has long maintained close ties with armed Kurdish groups operating in northern Iraq and in the border region linking Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, providing varying degrees of coordination, funding, and military support. Nor is Israel’s intelligence presence inside Iraq, facilitated by American cooperation, a closely guarded secret. Added to this is the extensive American military presence and political influence throughout Kurdish areas, particularly in northern Iraq and northeastern Syria.
To argue that Silverman’s report should be taken seriously is not to suggest that the scenario he outlines is inevitable or that events will unfold exactly as he predicts. Cooler heads within the Trump administration, especially those wary of Netanyahu’s ability to shape American decision-making, may yet succeed in restraining the president.
What is beyond doubt, however, is that the implementation of such a plan would risk opening the gates of hell across the region. The consequences would extend well beyond a direct confrontation involving Iran, Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states. Iraq could once again become engulfed in widespread instability, while Turkey would face renewed pressure from resurgent Kurdish separatist aspirations, producing precisely the kind of regional chain reaction long described in international relations as a domino effect.
Several of these fronts are already tense, and some have been active since the American-Israeli air campaign against Iran began on 28 February. Yet that is one thing. The deferred inferno of autumn envisioned in Silverman’s report, apparently based on Russian intelligence assessments, is something altogether different.
Should such a scenario come to pass, neither its geographical reach nor its ultimate consequences can be predicted with any certainty.
The writer is former editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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