The virtues of coalition

Abdel-Moneim Said
Wednesday 12 Aug 2026

Abdel-Moneim Said considers the regional moment in the light of three Gulf wars.

 

Thirty-six years have passed since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which prompted the formation of the Arab and international coalition to liberate it. The Second Gulf War, as it has come to be known, was preceded by the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The Third Gulf War began with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, leading to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Today, the region is embroiled in the fourth Gulf war. Although its primary belligerents are the US and Iran, the conflict’s impact goes far beyond them, involving two strategic chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf and the Bab Al-Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to establish a Defensive Maritime Coalition, endorsed by 14 Arab and Islamic countries. This initiative revives the spirit of the major coalition that was formed in the corridors of the UN and other international organisations to secure recognition of Palestine. 

The current Saudi-led initiative is explicitly a defence coalition, however. It aims to counter Iranian aggression against Arab states, whether it is carried out directly or through the network of proxy militias that Tehran has formed under the rubric of “forward defence” and “resistance and rejection”.  The coalition’s mission is to restore strategic balance in the region by safeguarding the internationally recognised right of innocent passage through the straits connecting the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In so doing, it will also perform an international role: safeguarding the free flow of global commerce and the balance between supply and demand in world energy markets.

It was my good fortune to witness the Second Gulf War – the war to liberate Kuwait – first-hand. At the time, I was serving as a political adviser at the Qatari Royal Court – a position I held from 22 August 1990 until 1 July 1993. During that period, I monitored the unfolding war hour by hour. After Kuwait was liberated, I observed the renewed focus on security in the Gulf. Few experiences in the life of a political scientist are of greater scholarly value than following a war live and the post-war arrangements that follow – in other words, witnessing history as it is made. The Arabs had much to be proud of in that war. Having determined that it was wrong for one Arab state to attack another, they rose above the din of the time – a din similar to the conflation between the Palestinian cause and right and duty we see today – to pursue a just cause. 

That principled position was sufficient to forge an effective Arab coalition that became an integral part of the US-led international coalition. Just as the Arab coalition was then essential to the legitimacy and honour of a successful military campaign, so too is it necessary today to restore equilibrium in a region weary of instability and the confusion between the fifth Gaza war and the fourth Gulf war. During the Second Gulf War, Arab participation was not limited to military operations; it also influenced strategy, such as the decision not to advance into Iraqi territory once Kuwait was liberated. No less significant is the Madrid Peace Conference that followed. This process paved the way to the Oslo Accords, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the first ever Palestinian Authority on Palestinian territory. 

The security of the Gulf has always been integral to Arab national security, as well as to the solidarity of Gulf Cooperation Council states. The US role in the Second Gulf War involved mobilising nearly half a million American troops. This, in turn, gave rise to a network of security agreements establishing logistical bases equipped to receive and maintain forces should Washington need to return to the region. These same bases were used during the current war, making them a reason for Iran’s missile and drone strikes which inflicted damage on the Arab Gulf states. It is likely, however, that the American attacks on Iran were carried out using US naval assets such as its aircraft carriers.

The chief virtue of the Saudi initiative to establish an Arab maritime coalition is that it would make its member states active participants in strategic planning for the next phase, whether in terms of military operations, diplomatic negotiations, or mediation efforts such as those currently being undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. Equally importantly, the coalition would have a strategic perspective covering the region as a whole, with the objective of achieving comprehensive regional stability. This would include advancing a solution to the Palestinian question and remedying the erosion of the nation-state in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The Second Gulf War was a response to a severe shock to regional security in the Middle East caused by an assault on the sovereignty of an Arab state. Today, in the fourth Gulf war, the danger is no less severe, as the region is subjected to acts of aggression and repeated violations of national sovereignty.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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