The Strait of Hormuz cannot be managed without Oman, nor can an agreement with Iran be reached in the absence of Muscat. This is the rule of thumb as far as Oman’s role in the strategic landscape is concerned. Oman enjoys one of the strongest and most stable relationships with Tehran. It is also a strong partner of the West’s and an indispensable part of the Gulf.
Since the early 1980s, Oman has sought to promote regional de-escalation regardless of the conflict in question: from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) to the Kuwait crisis (1990) to the invasion of Iraq (2003) and, most recently, the successive crises involving Iran. It has also maintained close coordination with other Gulf states and Western partners, never neglecting major powers such as China and Russia, or even poorer countries such as its neighbour Yemen.
This policy has not broken down so far, despite the difficulty of maintaining such a delicate balance. The picture is not all rosy, however. At times, it is difficult to reconcile adversaries due to their competing visions. Oman announced that negotiations with Iran over the future management of the Strait of Hormuz were “positive”, calling on “all parties” to refrain from any actions that could undermine “the progress made in the negotiations”. It also condemned the “repeated attacks” on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi agreed with the Omani assessment that the negotiations were “positive”, describing the talks as having “neared their final stages”. However, this does not mean the strait will be opened, a move that requires the approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for its part, has taken a different position. Its spokesman, Hussein Mohebi, said that opening the strait had its own mechanisms and was unrelated to the Muscat talks. “Our current strategy is to control the strait until the enemy accepts all our conditions,” he said, adding that “the strait has now effectively become a battlefield for us, rather than merely a waterway.”
Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said that “the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened unless the United States corrects its behaviour,” according to a message reported by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). He demanded that the United States end “once and for all its war and aggression against Iran and Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq”, lift “the naval blockade and withdraw its military forces — naval, air, and ground — from the vicinity of Iran”, and “lift the unjust and unlawful sanctions imposed on the Iranian people” too.
Iran has closed the strait since the beginning of the war and has sought to compel vessels passing through it to pay a “service fee” for transit. It has repeatedly attacked vessels it accuses of attempting to circumvent the route it has designated. The United States rejects Iran’s right to collect any fees from vessels using the strait. The latest Iranian-Omani talks began several weeks ago, following the failure to implement a Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and Washington signed in June, which is due to expire in mid-August.
Under the proposed new agreement, which would remain in effect for 60 days, vessels would enter the Gulf through the northern channel of the Strait of Hormuz, which is under Iranian control, and exit through the southern Omani channel. The two sides — Oman and Iran — would also undertake to clear mines from the central channel of the strait within 30 days. Once cleared, the central channel would be used permanently for international shipping in both directions, with the terms of such an arrangement to be negotiated at a later, unspecified date. Neither country would charge vessels transiting the strait any fees, customs or dues.
The agreement also includes a proposal to establish a “voluntary fund” financed by some member states of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), to cover the costs of navigation, environmental protection and rescue operations. The countries bordering the Strait of Malacca — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore — collect “voluntary fees” to cover similar services and obligations.
Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Muscat has sought to prevent the Strait of Hormuz from becoming a theatre of confrontation and to restore it to what it was before the war: “a safe route that ensures the uninterrupted movement of shipping” regardless of military or political circumstances. Since the late 1970s, Muscat has pursued a foreign policy distinct from that of most Arab states. It did not sever relations with Egypt following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1978, placing it alongside Sudan and Somalia as one of three Arab countries to adopt a different position from the rest.
Two years later, Oman maintained a position of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight years and inflicted enormous loss of life and economic loss on both countries. Even during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Muscat adopted a position of neutrality, calling for peace and urging all sides to heed reason and put common interests first. Regarding the Yemen crisis, Oman undertook mediation efforts to help end the war that broke out in 2015 and ended in 2022. Ultimately, Muscat managed to persuade the Houthis to accept a truce with Riyadh.
Throughout the successive crises between Iran and the United States, Muscat has emerged as a trusted mediator for both sides. It hosted the initial talks that set in motion the negotiating marathon between Iran and the P5+1, which culminated in the 2015 agreement during the administration of former US president Barack Obama. However, all parties returned to square one when President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, during his first term in office (2016-2020). Oman persisted in its patient and discreet diplomacy, leading negotiations between two intransigent adversaries with no trust between them. Muscat became the key mediator between the two sides, despite the growing prominence of Qatar, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Omani diplomacy has been characterised by its low profile. Media reports from Muscat are rare compared with those emerging from Tehran and Washington, and even from other Gulf capitals. Oman is also known for its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. It recognises that the world has changed as a result of the vast flow of information, making it impossible to maintain the traditional discretion that has characterised its diplomacy for more than half a century.
This was evident on 18 March, when Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi published an article in The Economist under the headline “America’s friends must help extricate it from an unlawful war.” He argued that the US military option had brought an end to the negotiations then underway in Geneva, which could have produced positive results. Although such remarks were unusual in the light of Oman’s traditional approach to resolving disputes, they were nevertheless consistent with its principles, which hold that military solutions cannot resolve international crises, particularly in the Middle East.
Oman has not severed its relations with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, even though some of them have adopted a particularly hard line on Tehran, which has launched heavy attacks on several Gulf states. Nor has it undermined its partnership with Washington, particularly given the long history of mutual trust between the two countries, which played a major role in securing the 2015 agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme.
It is true, however, that the United States has threatened Oman, unwilling to see a relatively small country become involved in major international issues such as oil prices and the global oil market. But geography cannot be wished away. Oman is a partner in the Strait of Hormuz, with territory along the southern shore of the waterway through which around 20 per cent of global oil and gas supplies pass.
In fact, the visit to Muscat by Iranian Parliament Speaker Bagher Ghalibaf was aimed, among other things, at preserving Oman’s mediating role and signalling that Tehran is still keen on negotiations. It has come to one of the most important mediators, which helps explain the warm Omani reception afforded to the Iranian delegation. But the Iranians need to understand the reality of Oman’s position. Muscat sees itself as the guardian of the Strait of Hormuz, not a tax collector at its gate. Its objective is to ensure free, safe navigation.
Nor will Oman allow itself to provide Iran with legal cover that would enable the Islamic Republic to assert control over the strait. Muscat is compelled to engage in tough negotiations with Tehran, which is using the Strait of Hormuz to leverage power against Washington. But it will not lend legitimacy to any Iranian project that goes beyond the principles of international law governing the management of Hormuz.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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