First, the scale and intensity of the military confrontations between the parties involved; second, the geographic scope of the war and, consequently, its strategic and security repercussions; and, third, the breadth and magnitude of its resulting impacts, particularly economic ones, across the world, this should not lead us to underestimate the significance of other regional developments.
Some of these developments preceded the outbreak of the ongoing war but have undergone important transformations or changes since it began, while others emerged after the war broke out.
All of these regional developments carry important implications not only for the current regional and international environments, but also for the future in the short, medium, and long terms. This is particularly significant because these developments are unlikely to disappear or recede once the American-Israeli war with Iran comes to an end, regardless of the form, nature, or parameters of that end, its timing, the circumstances in which it occurs, or the regional and international environment surrounding it.
These developments include rapprochement among Arab states, as well as between Arab states and the non-Arab countries neighboring the Arab world. They also include shifts in the alliances of Arab states, in which positions have changed on numerous occasions and yesterday’s ally has become today’s “competitor,” without resorting to even stronger descriptions of the transformations witnessed in some of these relationships. Initiatives and projects have also been launched, some of which carry implications extending beyond the region to other parts of the world and even to the international system as a whole.
Amid these transformations, flashpoints have continued to persist in Arab countries across different parts of the Arab world. These are remnants of internal, regional, and international interactions that unfolded in the context of what the Western media called the “Arab Spring,” which began at the end of 2010 and passed through more than one wave over the years, ultimately encompassing more than half of the Arab countries. For roughly a decade and a half, this has enabled not only interventions by other Arab states, but also incursions by non-Arab regional powers and global actors from outside the region, affecting those countries, their national security, civil peace, stability, territorial integrity, and exercise of sovereignty over their territory and populations. Among its more specific consequences has been the growing role of non-Arab regional powers at the expense of Arab powers across the region as a whole.
Among these longstanding yet renewed developments, for example, are the Abraham Accords, concluded under US auspices during the first term of Republican US President Donald Trump. Their outcomes and the new realities they generated on the regional scene varied from one Arab state covered by the agreements to another. There is also the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, which continued for more than two years and ultimately resulted in the establishment of a “Board of Peace,” also proposed by President Trump. This “Board” has an international mandate, although its visible and active role thus far has focused on addressing the conditions resulting from that war. Some hope that this will serve merely as a prelude to resolving the Palestinian issue in its entirety, in accordance with international legitimacy.
There is also the accession of a number of Arab states to the influential global BRICS grouping, as well as Saudi Arabia’s membership in the G20, which exercises significant international influence. Nor should we overlook the Indian initiative of an international character known as the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC). The proposed route of this corridor passes through Israel and several Arab states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
These developments also include rapprochement between the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the one hand, and Türkiye and Iran, separately, on the other, following years of tension in Egypt’s relations with these two important Islamic states, both of which carry considerable regional weight in the Middle East. There was also the Saudi-Qatari rapprochement following years of estrangement between Doha and Riyadh, and indeed between Doha and several other Arab states. Then came what appeared to be a conflict of interests in Yemen, particularly in its southern regions, between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
At the same time, Gulf investments expanded in strategically important parts of the world, such as the Horn of Africa and East Africa, as well as Central Asia, while the political role of some Gulf states also expanded in other Arab countries. These developments were accompanied by Chinese mediation that succeeded in easing Saudi-Iranian tensions, as well as efforts by the new Iranian administration, led by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, to ease tensions with more than one Arab country, without abandoning Tehran’s principal regional allies among organizations and groups across the region.
Then came the rapid and unexpected regime change in Syria on 8 December 2024, and its repercussions for the regional balance of power and the political balance among the different components of the Syrian people. All of these are merely examples of some of the important regional developments carrying regional, and at times international, implications that preceded the outbreak of the ongoing war; they are not intended as an exhaustive list.
As for the regional developments that followed the outbreak of the American-Israeli war against Iran, among the most prominent was the targeting of Arab Gulf countries and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by Iranian attacks. Tehran defended these attacks as retaliation for American and Israeli strikes, stating that they targeted American objectives in those countries. The countries concerned, however, responded that the attacks had harmed national targets and interests unrelated to either Washington or Tel Aviv.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz on several occasions, both during the war and after the ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, once again caused economic damage to most Arab Gulf states, as well as to other countries in the region and beyond.
Repeated regional mediation efforts between Washington and Tehran aimed at ending the ongoing war then opened the door to intensive and sustained consultations and coordination among a number of Arab and non-Arab countries in the region, particularly Pakistan, Oman, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar.
Iran subsequently opened a new front through the Houthi group in Yemen, while the Houthis renewed their threats and warnings that they might close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and/or impose a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia. This prompted an increasing number of states to take action. Perhaps the most notable was the Saudi initiative to convene and host an international meeting aimed at reaching agreement on the establishment of a joint command for a multinational maritime military coalition involving 14 countries. This development was followed by the signing of the Mecca Agreement for Mutual Defence among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, at the initiative of the latter. Continuous summit-level consultations between Egypt and the Arab Gulf states have also continued.
All of the above, once again, is cited by way of example rather than as an attempt to enumerate all the regional developments that have taken place since the outbreak of the American-Israeli war against Iran on February 28, 2026.
We must recognize that even if some of these regional developments have been affected by the war, or perhaps even emerged partly because of it or as indirect and unintended consequences, they have, over time and as regional and international circumstances have evolved, acquired their own internal dynamics and their own capacity for continuity, adaptation, adjustment, and transformation.
Even assuming that the American-Israeli war against Iran comes to an end, along with the subsidiary wars that resulted from it, the regional developments that took place before or after the outbreak of the war will remain and will acquire life cycles of their own.
When considering the future of regional conditions, the regional order, and the regional arrangements anticipated, expected, or sought in our part of the world, we Arabs must recognize the importance and necessity of dealing with these regional realities as a new and lived reality that will remain with us for some time to come, whether that period proves long or short. Some objectives of certain regional initiatives may be reviewed or modified, as may the outcomes and consequences they have produced, but the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf will certainly not return to the way they were before.
Future scenarios may also allow for greater engagement with nearby regions with which there are extensive shared interests, such as South Asia, East Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. They may likewise provide opportunities for other international powers seeking, at times, to strengthen their role in the region or, at other times, to restore a former role they once played there.
Here, the Arab nation must remain vigilant, aware, and prepared to deal with all these scenarios in their multiplicity, diversity, and differences. It must also examine the opportunities and possibilities for maximizing the benefits that the Arab world can derive from all or some of them, while containing and limiting, or at the very least reducing, the losses that these developments, or some of them, may inflict on the Arab world in the foreseeable future.
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