The Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement in Yemen this week shifted the confrontation with Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, targeting “Saudi-linked” oil tankers and oil facilities in Jazan and Yanbu and leading many to wonder what the Houthis are trying to achieve through this re-escalation after several years of relative calm.
The brutal seven-year war in Yemen (2015-2022) effectively ended with a truce, which came into effect on 2 April 2022, the day after it was announced by UN Envoy Hans Grundberg.
The agreed-upon duration of the truce was two months, with the possibility of extending it. The war between Yemen’s internationally recognised government, backed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and the Iranian-backed Houthis, had led to the deaths of 150,000 civilians, many as a result of malnutrition and epidemic disease.
Millions of people were displaced and nearly 10 million became dependent on humanitarian assistance.
With the end of military operations on land, at sea, and in the air, the battle lines froze. The Houthis controlled most of what was formerly the Republic of North Yemen, with its capital in Sanaa, while the official government controlled the south, with Aden as its temporary capital.
When the two-month truce ended in June 2022, neither side announced its renewal, but military operations did not resume. Moreover, the two sides entered direct talks, which led to further de-escalation. It was clear that they were both war-weary and keen to begin a political settlement process.
The de-escalation in Yemen paved the way for the restoration of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The reconciliation agreement, mediated by China, was announced in March 2023.
In April that year, the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohamed Al-Jaber, travelled to Sanaa to meet with Mahdi Al-Mashat, chairman of the Houthi Supreme Political Council. In September 2023, a Houthi delegation travelled to Riyadh for five days of talks with the Saudi leadership. The talks, mediated by Oman, resulted in a roadmap for ending the Yemeni crisis.
While the truce gave the belligerents some respite, it proved an opportunity for long-simmering tensions within anti-Houthi groups to seethe to the surface. Before long, open fighting broke out between the Southern Transitional Council (STC), one of the members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, and other factions.
The STC, led by Aidarous Al-Zoubaidi, advocates the secession of the south and the revival of the Republic of South Yemen. Some have described it as the successor to the Southern Movement, an opposition movement that emerged towards the end of the former regime of president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The fighting that erupted between government forces and the STC weakened the anti-Houthi camp. At the same time, according to analysts, government forces became better armed and equipped at this stage.
They also argue that the fight against the “separatists” increased cohesion within its ranks, although this camp included Islamist groups such as the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen.
BIGGER PICTURE: On 28 February this year, the US and Israel attacked Iran, starting a war that continues to defy efforts to end it.
In response to the attack, Iran immediately moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, transforming this maritime chokepoint into a powerful source of leverage. As the November midterm elections approach in the US, the Trump administration is coming under mounting pressure due to rising fuel prices and energy bills.
Twenty per cent of the world’s oil supplies and roughly the same proportion of its natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Most of these supplies – around 20 million barrels of oil and billions of cubic metres of gas – is destined for Asian markets, which have been particularly hard hit by energy supply shortages and price increases resulting from the closure of the strait.
In an effort to alleviate this crisis, Riyadh sought to circumvent the strait by pumping a large portion of its oil through a pipeline running from the oil fields in eastern Saudi Arabia to ports on the Red Sea, especially the oil terminal in Yanbu. From there, the oil could be loaded onto tankers that would sail through the Bab Al-Mandeb, into the Indian Ocean, and onwards to its Asian destinations.
Riyadh had other reasons for pursuing this course. One was fear of growing competition from the Russian Federation, which has been the principal supplier of oil and gas to Asia since the beginning of the US-Israeli war against Iran.
But why are the Houthis striking Saudi targets now, jeopardising the truce that brought an end to a long and gruelling Civil War?
Their first objective is to strengthen Iran and its allies, including Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, and the Houthis themselves. Towards this end, the Ansar Allah is applying the same strategy that the Iranians are using against the Americans – namely, using another strategic chokepoint, the Bab Al-Mandeb – to pressure the Saudis.
However, according to Yemeni journalist Salah Al-Araji, this requires “a weapon the Houthis do not possess”. He believes that the Houthis are overestimating their strength and making poor political, strategic, and military calculations as a consequence.
“If the Houthis continue to provoke Saudi Arabia and the recognised government, Yemen could be plunged into a war in which the Saudis become involved. This is something nobody wants,” he said.
The Houthis’ second objective is to pressure Riyadh into paving the way for the de facto rulers of Sanaa to govern the whole of Yemen, instead of the internationally recognised government.
“Saudi Arabia cannot accept the partition of Yemen, even if it finds that temporarily convenient,” Al-Araji said. For decades, Saudi Arabia did not expressly favour or oppose Yemeni territorial unity, he said. “This was part of the Saudi policy of non-intervention, combined with the use of its economic resources to win allies in Yemen.”
Yet, Riyadh does not trust the Houthis to abide by their commitments, should they secure control of the whole country. “Once the Houthis control the whole country, they could easily turn their attention to attacking Saudi Arabia,” Al-Araji said,
According to the UK magazine the Economist, the Houthis give greater priority to economic demands. Above all, they want Saudi Arabia to lift restrictions on Yemen’s air and seaports, especially the ban on Iranian aircraft. They also need money in order to address the food shortages that affect nearly 60 per cent of the areas under their control.
“Economic demands are fundamental,” Al-Araji said. “If they are met, the Houthis can afford to somewhat reduce their commitment to strengthening the Iranian alliance.”
After the truce went into effect, the Houthis had to contend with the challenges of running a state and discovered that the burdens of governing were substantial. They realised that they would have to transform themselves into the ruling party of a poor country – the poorest in the Arab world. This could lead them to conclude that “the burden of governing a state is more costly than returning to war,” as Al-Araji put it.
History, however, has shown that most revolutionary parties and movements eventually make the transition to politics and government. In the process, they adopt a new discourse in which revolutionary legitimacy is replaced by a legitimacy based on delivering results that improve people’s lives.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 20 August, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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